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Abstract
Strategic alliances are currently very popular among organisations. Both the 
performance and success of strategic alliances have been extensively investigated 
over the last couple of decades. Many previous researchers have suggested that one of 
the main reasons for the high failure rates of strategic alliances is the cultural 
differences of the alliance partners. The goal of this thesis is to understand, analyse, 
and explain how differences in organisational culture affect International Joint 
Venture (IJV) performance in Russia.
A conceptual framework of IJV performance is developed that shows the role of 
organisational culture against a number of other factors, including: national culture, 
communication behaviour, and conflict resolution techniques. This research focuses 
on managerial values and practices as key elements of organisational culture.
This thesis is based on a sample of seventeen Russian IJVs. Data was collected both 
from personal interviews with the senior managers of each IJV, and from 
questionnaires measuring managerial values and practices which were completed by 
twenty-seven senior managers. A modified version of the Schwartz value survey was 
used to measure managerial values, while practices were measured using the focus 
questionnaire of Van Muijen et al. (1999).
The main findings of this thesis can be grouped into two parts: findings related to 
managerial values and practices, and findings related to organisational culture and its 
role in IJV performance. This research recognises that organisational culture is an 
important factor which can influence IJV performance. This study finds that 
managerial values and practices are good indicators of the current political, economic, 
and social conditions in Russia. Human values may be influenced by the current 
political, economic, and social environment in emerging economies (ECs) with a 
turbulent environment. The senior managers in the Russian IJVs who took part in this 
study exhibited different practices as well as values. This study identifies several sub­
cultures in Russia and suggests that human values should be studied on a regional 
level. Tradition and openness to change values of Schwartz’s framework are found to 
be congruous in this study.
The second group of key findings suggests that non-equity IJVs in Russia adopt an 
organisational culture similar to that of the partner with majority control whereas 
equity IJVs in Russia have a hybrid culture. IJVs with “foreign” and hybrid cultures 
are positively associated with IJV performance in Russia whilst IJVs with an 
organisational culture similar to that of the Russian partner are negatively associated 
with IJV performance. This research reveals that similarities of organisational cultures 
between partner companies are not essential for partnership success. Finally, the 
research finds that trust is a paramount aspect of IJV success in Russia.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this research project is to explore, and to understand, the influence and 
role of organisational culture on International Joint Venture (IJV) success in the 
context of Russia. There are many cultural theories that represent human beliefs and 
values within business organisation. These theories provide a number of different 
ways of understanding organisational culture, and the influence it has on the 
management and success of business organisations, in a wide variety of contexts. This 
research specifically focuses on the role of culture in IJVs in Russia.
This study considers the literature of strategic alliance, and reviews the different 
factors that are considered to influence alliance success. It will also outline the various 
models of values and practices that are cited as core elements and influencers of 
organisational culture. The available literature captures the relationship between 
organisational culture and IJV performance. This approach assists in conceptualising a 
model that shows the link between organisational culture and IJV performance. The 
overview of developing and emerging economies (such as that of Russia) provides a 
basis for the development of the research questions.
This introductory chapter describes the motivation for the research, its aims and 
objectives, and the overall structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motives for the Research
The research topic addressed in this study is important from several theoretical and 
practical perspectives.
Over the last two decades the topic of strategic alliances has received a lot of attention 
from researchers (e.g. Doz and Hamel, 1998; Spekman et al., 2000; Gulati and Zajac, 
2001; Dussauge and Garrette, 1997; Kanter, 1994; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Das and 
Teng, 2000; Lorange et al., 1992; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). The diversity and 
scale of the research on partnerships is really astonishing. Strategic alliances between
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organisations have been examined from a variety of perspectives, including: 
transaction cost economics, strategic management, and a resource-based view. 
Strategic alliances worldwide have increased significantly in recent years (Ireland et 
al., 2002). This has also been accompanied by a high rate of failure, which has led to a 
number of investigations of the factors associated with alliance success and
dissolution (see Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998; Dussauge and Garrette, 1997; Mohr 
and Spekman, 1994). These researchers concentrate on goal achievement and
relationship factors, such as: commitment, interdependence, trust, communication and 
conflict resolution techniques. Many researchers report that organisational culture is 
one of the most important factors in alliance performance because the different 
organisational cultures of partners may produce a damaging effect on the performance 
of alliances (e.g. Gancel et al., 2002; Hofstede, 1991; Schein, 1996a; Sirmone and 
Lane, 2004). Although many researchers allude to the importance of a cultural “fit” 
between alliance partners, there is little research to explain the importance of fit and 
how different organisational cultures influence the divergent paths of alliance success 
or dissolution.
Consequently, the topic of organisational culture in the context of IJV success offers 
various challenges to a researcher in adding to the existing literature on the topic.
Organisational culture is a fascinating topic for research. The domain of
organisational culture is wide open to interpretation and it still has an element of 
uncertainty. Because many researchers offer widely different definitions, the construct 
of organisational culture remains almost allusive and unclear. Most academics agree 
that the core of culture is values and beliefs, yet a universal model of measuring 
values has not been fully developed (e.g. Hofstede, 1991; Rashid et al., 2003; 
Lundberg, 1991). Today most research relies on more explanational models that 
depend on the perceptions of both researcher and respondent, and on a correlation 
with the apparent prevailing circumstances within an organisation.
This research adopts the Schwartz value model which has been extensively used to 
measure the cultural distance of managers (e.g. Kozan, 2002; Ralston et al., 2008). 
Schwartz et al. (2001) postulate the existence of ten motivationally distinct value 
dimensions that were empirically found to be recognised among many of the world’s
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cultures, these value types are: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self- 
direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, and security. In addition, 
Schwartz et al. (2001) show a dynamic structure of relations among value types that is 
organised in the form of a circular motivational continuum (see Figure 1.1). The 
relative distance between value types on the motivational continuum determines the 
degree of their compatibility, or incompatibility.
Figure 1.1: Structure of Relations Among 10 Values
Openness to 
Change
S elf
Transcendence
Self-
Direction Universalism,
Stimulation
Benevolence
Hedonism
Conformity
raditioi
Achievement
Security
Power
Self- x  
Enhancement
Conservation
Source: Schwartz et al., 2001: 522
Conflicts and compatibilities among the ten types of values can also be summarised in 
terms of structural relations among the basic dimensions: self-enhancement 
(hedonism, power, achievement) versus self-transcendence (universalism, 
benevolence); value and openness to change (self-direction, stimulation) versus 
conservation (conformity, tradition, and security).
This research uses a modified Schwartz value framework which consists of twelve 
cultural values and four domains, which are: altruistic values (a world at peace, social 
justice, equality), openness to change values (a varied life, an exciting life, curiosity), 
self-enhancement values (authority, influence, wealth), and traditional values
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(honouring parents and elders, family security, self-discipline). A modified version of 
Schwartz values was developed by Stem et al. (1998) who found that each Schwartz 
value structures may be reduced to three values still retaining reliability.
Differences in organisational culture are also viewed through practices. Managerial 
practices are the important elements of organisational culture because at an 
organisational level cultural differences reside mostly in practices and less in values 
(Hofstede, 1991). The organisational practices model of Van Muijen et al. (1999) is 
adopted in this research. This model identifies four organisational culture orientations, 
they are: support orientation, innovation orientation, rules orientation, and goal 
orientation.
This thesis unites two theoretical issues: strategic alliances and organisational culture. 
It will then develop a model to explain the linkage between these two in a Russian 
environment. Although strategic alliances are widespread in many industries and 
countries, there is little attention paid to alliances in emerging and transition 
economies. Therefore, the field of IJVs in emerging and transition economies leaves a 
potential theoretical gap, a gap which this thesis hopes to begin to fill.
Russia is one of the world’s largest transition economies, offering huge potential 
resources and apparent opportunities to Western companies; however, the business 
context of Russia has not yet been extensively explored. Research in Russia offers 
many challenges to researchers: it offers researchers an opportunity to contribute to 
the extant theory of alliances between businesses from different countries and it also 
offers the opportunity to examine the question of organisational culture in a large 
transition economy. Research can also provide a new and fresh insight into Russian 
culture as it changes under the weight of a market economy.
Organisations are under pressure in a transition economy to transform rapidly. 
Companies in transition economies work within ongoing economic, political and 
social reforms which overarches organisation change and transformation. Transition 
managers in a transition economies have to rethink their roles and repertoires. While 
shifting from ‘political’ to ‘economic’ orientation, managers within transition 
economies adopt different rationalities, identities and behaviours (Hollinshead and
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Maclean, 2007). Hence researchers have to regularly review understanding of 
organisational change in such environments in order to draw lessons to enhance better 
understanding of organisations and managements (Soulsby and Clark, 2007; 
Hollinshead and Maclean, 2007) and explain emerging patterns.
There are few research studies which have been conducted on Russian business 
culture. Some researchers have found that Russian managers are collectivistic, with 
high power distance, high levels of femininity, and uncertainty avoidance (e.g. 
Elenkov, 1997, 1998). Meanwhile, other researchers have shown that people’s values 
in Russia depend on the living area; for example, people who live in the large cities 
tend to have values which are more similar to those of the West (Salmi and 
Sharafutdinova, 2008). It has been suggested that managerial mentality in Russia is 
characterised by a high degree of political influence (Elenkov, 1998). One of the aims 
of the research is to look closer at managerial values and practices in Russia in order 
to explore organisational culture in IJVs. This is a significant reason to research 
Russian IJVs where at least two partners come from different countries to form a 
separate organisation. The new organisation may have an organisational culture 
similar to one of the partners, or it may have an entirely new culture.
Many authors rely on the idea of organisational culture “fit” (e.g. Gancel et al., 2000; 
Dawe, 2000; Moller and Svahn, 2004). They suggest that similarity of organisational 
cultures is important in order to create a successful alliance. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to find a partner with similar organisational culture, especially when this 
partner comes from a different country (i.e. Russia). The question which arises is 
whether the organisational cultures of partners and IJVs should be similar? And, if so, 
then to what extent are they similar?
This thesis further explores this topic, asking: What type of organisational culture 
exists in Russian IJVs? What are the main differences between IJV partners? And, 
how do these differences influence IJV performance?
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1.2 Aims and Objectives
This study aims to evaluate and increase the understanding of the role of 
organisational culture in the performance of IJVs within a Russian context. The 
paramount objectives of this research are:
1. To conceptualise strategic alliance, IJVs and organisational culture.
2. To identify the types of relationships between organisational culture and IJV 
performance.
3. To explore the context of emerging economies (specifically, Russia) and to 
ask what factors influence organisational culture in these countries.
4. To examine organisational culture in IJVs in Russia.
5. To explore how differences in organisational cultures may affect IJV 
performance.
1.3 Research Questions
This research asks the following questions:
1. What is the type of organisational culture in IJVs in Russia?
a. What are the managerial values in Russia?
b. What are the managerial practices?
2. Do successful and unsuccessful IJVs in Russia have different organisational 
cultures?
3. What are the main organisational culture differences between IJVs in Russia 
and their partners?
4. Do organisational culture differences influence IJV success?
5. What is the better cultural fit for IJVs in Russia?
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. It begins by reviewing the extant literature 
in the fields of alliances, organisational culture, emerging economies, and Russia.
Chapter 2 begins by introducing the importance of the research, and considers the 
definition of a strategic alliance and the main motives for alliance formation. This 
chapter looks at the different forms of alliances and, finally, it explores the different 
factors that influence IJV success. This chapter seeks to identify the essential nature 
of a cultural factor in IJV performance.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature of organisational culture. Different schools of thought 
on organisational culture are reviewed in order to gain a deeper insight into the topic. 
The link between organisational culture and partnership performance is highlighted, 
offering the possibility that values and practices are the core elements of 
organisational culture. Widely used models are examined, and values and practices 
are reviewed to provide a basis for the conceptual model of the current research.
Chapter 4 provides a consideration of emerging economies. It identifies the main 
characteristics of emerging economies through an explanation of institutional voids. It 
will also examine the influence of institutional voids on organisational culture. The 
Russian economy and culture is described with the context of historical background 
using a review of extant literature on Russian national culture in order to identify 
cultural values. This chapter describes the Russian economic and political 
environment to provide context and understanding of how these factors may influence 
managerial practices in Russian firms.
Chapter 5 presents a methodology of the research programme in order to answer the 
research questions. This chapter describes and compares different research methods of 
data collection. It introduces the joint use of qualitative and quantitative methods 
which are essential for capturing the complexity and depth of issues influencing IJVs 
in Russia, it also looks to the role of organisational culture in Russian IJVs. This
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chapter explains how data was collected and analysed. It also discusses triangulation, 
reliability, validity, and ethical issues.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 provide the data which was collected during the study, they also 
include an analysis of this data. While Chapter 6 concentrates on the data collected 
through questionnaires, Chapter 7 presents the cases and the data collected through 
interviews. Chapter 8 presents the findings and results collected from the 
questionnaires and interviews with seventeen IJVs in Russia. Chapter 8 identifies 
three groups of IJVs in Russia. It draws the link between the type of ownership and 
organisational culture in the IJVs, describing the major differences in organisational 
cultures between IJVs and their partners.
Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation by summarising the findings of this research, 
answering the research questions, highlighting the contribution of the study and 
implication for theory and practice. It will, finally, define the research limitations of 
this study and recommend areas of future research.
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Strategic Alliances
2.1 Introduction
In the 1990s cooperative strategy became a fashionable area of intellectual debate, 
rather like the way that competitive strategy became fashionable in the 1980s 
following the publication of works by Porter (Faulkner and De Rond, 2000). In 
addition, the historic movement towards globalisation has opened up many new 
opportunities to companies (such as new markets and new customers). Companies 
often require both local and global partners in order to reach their goal to expand 
internationally, or to achieve economies of scale (Doz and Hamel, 1998). IJVs may be 
the best option for many firms who wish to enter into a new foreign market because of 
the impact of international governmental regulation. Furthermore, many firms realise 
that a “go-it-alone strategy” is less viable because of the rapid development of new 
technologies. Development projects are often too large for any one single company to 
finance, and the development of the technology needed often requires the input of 
more than one company (Vyas et al., 1995).
The continued growth in the formation of alliances and IJVs has led to speculation 
that today’s notion of global firms will be superseded by the idea of globalisation as 
networks of strategic alliances among firms spanning many different industries and 
countries (Austin, 2000; Doz and Hamel, 1998). Strategic alliances can be very simple 
and can include only two organisations sharing their technological or marketing 
resources. Nevertheless, some have become more complex and involve many 
companies from different industries and countries. The result is a series of alliance 
networks in which some companies compete with each other in a number of product 
areas (Vyas et al., 1995). For example, the number of strategic alliances in the USA 
increased to more than 10,200 in the year 2000 alone. It is estimated (Ireland et al., 
2002) that US firms with US$ 2 billion or more in revenue each formed an average of 
138 alliances between 1996 and 1999. In 2002, each of the top 500 global businesses 
had on average 60 strategic alliances. Dyer et al. (2001), in their in-depth study of 200 
companies and their 1,572 alliances, find that a company’s stock price jumped
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approximately 1 % with each announcement of an alliance, which translated into an 
increase in market value of around $54 million per alliance.
Strategic alliances have become the most popular form of cooperation for entering 
international markets (Doz and Hamel, 1998). IJVs hold the most widespread mode of 
foreign direct investment across the globe, especially in emerging economies 
(Neimans, 1993; Lyles and Baird, 1994; Delios and Henisz, 2000). A number of 
academics have studied strategic alliances across the world, spurred by their 
enormous popularity in many countries and industries (e.g. Kotabe et al., 2000; 
Kauser and Shaw, 2004; Lowen and Pope, 2008; Neves, 2006; Zineldin and 
Dodourova, 2005). However, in spite of their popularity and growing number, many 
alliances fail. This high rate of failure has been documented in many works (e.g. Child 
and Faulkner, 1998; De Laat, 1997; Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998; Dussauge and 
Garrette, 1997; Kanter, 1994; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Ohmae, 1989). The 
possibility of failure is a considerable concern because alliances usually take a large 
investment of capital. Consequently, strategic alliances have become an important and 
timely mode of organisation to study. Scholars from a variety of backgrounds have 
chosen strategic alliances as an area for scholarly inquiry (Doz and Hamel, 1998). The 
significant scholarly attention paid to strategic alliances has resulted in valuable 
insights into the antecedents and consequences of strategic alliances that, in turn, have 
resulted in contributions to both theory and practice (Gulati and Zajac, 2001).
This chapter focuses on the literature of strategic alliances. Firstly, a clear definition 
of the alliances is offered. Secondly, the studies that identify the motives for the 
formation of alliances are reviewed. Thirdly, the different forms of strategic alliances 
are discussed. Finally, the various factors that influence alliance success are explored.
2.2 Definition of Alliances
A review of the literature on strategic alliances reveals that there are many different 
definitions of the term. Alliances are often defined according to their specific 
characteristics, such as: agreement between people, strategic intent of partners, and 
equity participation. For example, Gulati and Zajac (2001: 366) define strategic
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alliances as “voluntary arrangements between firms involving either a pooling or 
trading o f  resources. They can occur as a result o f  a wide range o f  motives and goals, 
take a variety o f  forms, and occur across vertical, horizontal, and other related 
boundaries. ”
Many definitions focus on the specific characteristics of alliances and the motives for 
their formation. For example, Gulati and Zajac (2001) show the resource-based 
motives for an alliance formation. Ireland et al. (2002) and Das and Teng (2000) focus 
only on competitive advantage as a source of an alliance formation. Spekman et al. 
(2000: 37), on the other hand, focus on the long-term objectives of alliances and claim 
that:
An alliance is a close, collaborative relationship between 
two, or more, firms with the intent o f accomplishing 
mutually compatible goals that would be difficult for each to 
accomplish alone.
Some key words emerge from this definition that warrant closer attention, as 
described by Spekman et al. (2000):
• Collaborative -  This implies that a set of operating norms exists among 
partners, such that each partner will not act in self-interest to the detriment 
of the others. Also implied here are the notions of voluntary involvement 
rather than coercion, and the expectation of reciprocal behaviour.
• Mutually Compatible -  This suggests that there is alignment among 
partners such that each can accomplish its objectives within the framework 
of the alliance.
• Difficult to Achieve -  This not only recognises that each partner is 
dependent on the other, but also acknowledges that their individual fates 
are linked. Each admits, for example, that costs are prohibitive, time too 
precious, expertise too limited, or management time and other resources 
too scarce to attempt to achieve the goals of the alliance without a partner.
A further implication of this definition is that an alliance represents an open-ended 
contract between separate firms that must share decision-making and control. The
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open-ended nature of an alliance contract reflects the view that alliances are formed 
partly as a response to an uncertain world and that the benefits can be achieved only 
through collaboration (Spekman et al., 2000). The definition of Spekman et al. (2000) 
considers collaborative and behavioural aspects which are important to the success of 
an alliance and are considered in this dissertation.
2.3 Motives for the Formation of Alliances
Scholars have identified a long list of motives for alliance formation. For example, 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) focuses on minimising the sum of transaction 
costs and production costs. Alliances may help an organisation to reduce the risk of a 
project by spreading this risk over their partners, as well as its costs (Das and Teng, 
2000; Lorange et al., 1992; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).
While TCE focuses on cost minimisation, the Resource-Based View (RBV) theory 
emphasises value maximisation of a company through using and combining valuable 
resources in order to maintain a competitive advantage (Das and Teng, 2000; Ireland 
et al., 2002). According to this theory, these firms need to seek a strategic fit between 
their internal characteristics (i.e. strengths and weaknesses) and their external 
environment (i.e. opportunities and threats) (Das and Teng, 2000). In RBV a company 
is defined as the set of tangible and intangible resources, and by optimising their 
combination a firm can develop its capabilities. Alliances are seen as a way of 
accessing and transferring others firms’ resources. This approach provides an 
important base for understanding the effective management of alliances and strategy 
formulation (Ireland et al., 2002).
A strategic choice perspective suggests that firms pursue inter-organisational alliances 
to: increase the competitiveness of market power; neutralise or block the moves of a 
competitor; and maximise their ability to offer attractive products or services 
(Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Burgers et al., 1993; Dyer et al., 2001). In an 
international context, firms usually form IJVs with local partners in order to enter 
foreign markets (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). The selection of such a mode of entry 
into a market is a strategic decision, based on how a partner can increase the firm’s
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competitiveness in a foreign market (Barringer and Harrison, 2000); for example, an 
organisation may lack knowledge of foreign markets. Also, in some emerging 
economies, an IJV with a local partner is required by governmental legislation.
In comparison with TCE and RBV which rely on an economic rationale, Institutional 
Theory (IT) adopts a behavioural rationale which suggests that institutional 
environments impose pressures on organisations to appear legitimate and conform to 
prevailing social norms. One way that firms can do this is through participation in 
inter-organisational relationships. For example, a small company may increase its 
visibility, reputation, and prestige through partnerships with larger and better 
established organisations. IT claims that in order to be legitimate, many organisations 
imitate industry norms. For instance, they may engage in inter-organisational 
relationships because other successful companies in their industries are doing so. On 
one hand, IT is helpful in the context of inter-organisational relationships because it 
describes some behavioural rationale of companies. However, on the other hand, if 
firms simply imitate each other then it will be difficult to create any source of 
competitive advantage through the partnerships (Barringer and Harrison, 2000).
The literature suggests that companies usually enter into alliances because of 
environmental characteristics, such as: market uncertainty, globalisation of the 
industry (Pucick, 1993), risk sharing, and host government policy. However, a firm's 
characteristics can also be a driving force of alliances, for example: alliances can 
often help to strengthen an organisations’ market position (Lowen and Pope, 2008) 
and power; overcome skill and resource weaknesses (Cravens et al., 1993); as well as 
provide customer information (Zaman and Mavondo, 2007).
2.4 Forms of Alliance
Strategic alliances can take many forms. These forms can vary depending on the 
alliance structure (Lewis, 1990), the input and output resources of the parents 
(Lorange et al., 1992), and the main goals of alliance formation (Kuglin and Hook, 
2002).
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For instance, Lorange et al. (1992) distinguish four types of strategic alliance, 
depending on the input and output resources of the parents, they are: ad hoc pool, 
consortium, project-based joint venture, and full-blown joint venture (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Types of Strategic Alliances
Parents9 Input of Resources 
Sufficient for
Parents’ 
Retrieval 
of Output
Short-term Long-term
Operation Adaptation
To Parents Ad Hoc Pool Consortium
Project-based Full-blown
Retain Joint Venture Joint Venture
Source: Lorange et al., 1992: 11
An over-riding consideration driving the formation of a strategic alliance is the type of 
relationship that the parent firms are going to have. Consideration needs here to be 
given to resources: physical, organisational and human. Resource input may be 
minimal, or it may be abundant. The parents’ desires regarding input and output 
resources are the basic determinants of the type of strategic alliance that a firm is 
going to enter into. For example, two firms may wish to put into the alliance a 
minimum set of complementary resources, perhaps on a temporary basis, and all of 
the output (learning, know-how, equipment, profit, etc.) is given to the parents; this 
form of alliance is known as an ad hoc strategic alliance (Lorange et al., 1992).
Joint ventures are a very popular form of strategic alliances, especially when the 
direction of the growth objective is international (Johnson et al., 1996; Dussauge and 
Garrette, 1995). They may be used to exploit a new product market opportunity,
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access an overseas market, share costs and financial risks, or acquire knowledge or 
technology for the core business (Cravens et al., 1993).
International Joint Ventures (IJVs) involve two or more organisations from different 
nations who cooperate to form a new organisation separate from, but owned by the 
parent companies (Johnson et al., 1996).
The key distinction between the strategic alliance and the joint venture is that the 
latter’s organisational form consists of the formation of a separate independent 
organisation by the venture partners. The joint venture creates a new organisation to 
perform one or more business functions, such as: marketing, production, and research 
and development (Cravens et al., 1993).
IJVs can be formed for one project only, or they can be a continuing business 
relationship. They fulfil the requirements of a host country’s government for a local 
equity position and furthermore, IJVs ease the risks incurred from operating in 
unfamiliar cultural and economic environments (Johnson et al., 1996). On the other 
hand, cross-national, managerial, and relationship problems may lead to a conflict, or 
even the dissolution of the venture, because IJVs involve at least two partners who 
may come from different industries and/or countries.
Many researchers (e.g. Dyer et al., 2001; Ozorhon et al., 2007; Spekman et al., 1996; 
Young et al., 1989) have found that, as with mergers and acquisitions, almost half of 
all alliances fail; and when they fail they destroy value, and the companies involved 
do not achieve their goals (Lowen and Pope, 2008; Reuer, 2004; Roussel, 2003; 
Spekman et al., 1996). Consequently, scholars from a variety of backgrounds have 
chosen strategic alliances as an arena for enquiry, reflecting the fact that strategic 
alliances themselves have grown dramatically in number and in importance for many 
organisations (Gulati and Zajac, 2001). Many researchers have begun to study the 
successful performance of alliances (e.g. Child and Faulkner, 1998; De Laat, 1997; 
Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998; Dussauge and Garrette, 1997; Kanter, 1994; Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994; Ohmae, 1989).
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2.5 Alliance Success: Main Factors
Researchers have identified a long list of factors contributing to alliance performance 
in order to explain why many alliances fail. A review of the literature shows that the 
most important aspects of alliance success are goal achievement and relationship 
factors, such as: commitment, interdependence, trust, communication and conflict 
resolution (see Figure 2.2). All of these factors are interdependent and a single weak 
link can contribute to the failure of a strategic alliance (Adams, 2001).
Figure 2.2: Factors Associated with Partnership Success
Conflict Resolution Techniques
Success of PartnershipCommunication Quality 
Information Sharing 
Participation
Communication Behaviour
Attributes of the Partnership
Commitment
Coordination
Interdependence
Trust
Source: Mohr and Spekman, 1994:137
Commitment refers to the willingness of trading partners to exert efforts on behalf of 
the relationship. This suggests a future orientation in which the partners attempt to 
build a relationship that can weather unanticipated problems (Mohr and Spekman, 
1994). They are expected to achieve the main objectives of a successful alliance 
because more committed partners are likely to be more cooperative, communicative, 
and flexible in accommodating conflict issues (Zaman and Mavondo, 2007).
Coordination reflects the set of tasks that each party expects the other to perform. 
Without a high level of coordination, work and production would stop and the 
partners could not reach their aims and objectives (Mohr and Spekman, 1994).
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The recognition of partners’ interest and interdependence is one of the key elements 
of a successful collaboration (Ohmae, 1989). Interdependence means that the partners 
need each other: they have complementary assets and skills, and neither can 
accomplish alone what both can do together (Kanter, 1994). Interdependence results 
from a relationship in which both firms perceive the mutual benefits to be gained from 
interacting, and in which any loss of autonomy will be equitably compensated through 
the expected gains (Mohr and Spekman, 1994).
Trust has received a great deal of attention from scholars in various fields, from social 
psychology and sociology to economics, organisational behaviour, strategic 
management, and international business (e.g. Child and Faulkner, 1998; De Laat, 
1997; Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998; Schumacher, 2006; Simpson and Mayo, 1997; 
Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Ohmae, 1989; Ring, 1997). Trust between organisations is 
an important independent variable (cause) of joint performance because of: enhanced 
cooperation (Luo, 2002; Schumacher, 2006), transaction cost savings, capability 
improvement, and increased strategic flexibility (Luo, 2002). Trust is seen as a key 
determinant of the relationship process. Child and Faulkner (1998: 45) identify trust 
as:
Having sufficient confidence in a partner to commit valuable 
know-how or other resources to transactions with it despite the 
fact that, in so doing, there is a risk the partner will take 
advantage o f  this commitment.
It was found that trust between partners should make them more willing to share 
information (Lane et al., 2001), and thus better inform their actions and decisions 
(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Johnson et al., 1996). Trust has a positive effect on 
planning and coordination (Simpson and Mayo, 1997), an organisation’s profit, and 
the quality of customer service (Kumar, 1996).
From the literature it may be seen that trust has a large impact on the success of an 
alliance. However, most researchers to date have only stated the importance of trust, 
whereas there are no findings on the level of trust which is necessary for successful 
partnerships. According to Aulakh et al. (1996), trust is significantly dependent on
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culture and geographic region. This is very important finding and may provide a 
valuable view on the success of an alliance in the future.
Communication behaviour is critical to partnership success because communication 
processes underlie most aspects of organisational functioning. In order to achieve the 
benefits of collaboration, effective communications between partners are very 
important (Mohr and Spekman, 1994).
Communication quality is a key aspect of information transmission. Quality includes 
such aspects as the accuracy, timeliness, adequacy, and credibility of information 
exchanged. Information sharing shows how often and accurately both partners 
exchange information about their tasks and businesses. The availability of information 
helps to complete tasks on time and more effectively (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). 
Consequently, effective information sharing can help a business to achieve an alliance 
goal and those objectives which are linked with partnership success. Participation 
refers to the extent to which partners are involved in planning and goal setting. All 
alliance participants must understand why the alliance makes sense and how it fits 
into the larger set of goals and objectives which are held by the firm. This implies that 
all alliances must be congruent with the values and beliefs of the firm, and that these 
core values are shared by the partner (Spekman et al., 1996).
In summary, good communication behaviour between alliance partners can increase 
the level of understanding, facilitate shared experience, foster a more cooperative 
atmosphere, and promote future interactions between the partners (Choi et al., 2010).
Conflict resolution techniques include a common vocabulary and joint problem 
solving (Spekman et al., 1996; Adams, 2001; Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Conflict 
often exists in alliances due to the inherent interdependencies between partners and, 
therefore, the manner in which partners resolve conflict may influence partnership 
success. A satisfactory solution may be reached if the partners engage in joint 
problem solving, thereby enhancing partnership success (Mohr and Spekman, 1994).
However, managerial communication behaviour and conflict resolution techniques are 
different in every country. The manner of each manager to communicate and resolve
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conflict is also dissimilar. Moreover, a conflict itself can arise as a result of cultural 
differences between partners because culture shapes the behaviour of alliance 
managers (Albaum et al., 2010; Das and Kumar, 2010a). Lorange et al. (1992: 16) 
reports that:
Cross-cultural differences play a vital role in the formation and 
management o f  strategic alliances, and they should not be 
allowed to get in the way o f  the purpose o f  the strategic alliance.
When an IJV involves partners from different countries, it carries challenges in 
communication behaviour at all levels of the organisation (Butler, 2010). Cultural 
differences create differences in authority, reporting, and decision-making styles, for 
example: which people get involved in decisions; how quickly decisions are made; 
how much reporting and documentation is expected; what authority comes with a 
position; and which functions work together (Kanter, 1994).
Cultures vary substantially in their decision-making style. For instance, managers 
from cultures characterised by collectivist tendencies and a strong group orientation 
will seek more interaction and involvement in the management of their IJVs 
(Hofstede, 1991). While, in contrast, managers from cultures characterised by 
individualistic orientations tend to prefer centralised decision-making in the IJVs 
management. For example, French and the American managers use different 
approaches to decision making: the former will emphasize logic, the latter facts. 
These differences can lead to the making of a suboptimal decision, no decision, or a 
delayed decision. Moreover, neither manager will be aware of the degree to which 
their decision-making styles are affecting the outcomes. Consequently, IJV 
functioning is likely to be damaged by the managers (Das and Kumar, 2010b). 
Furthermore, cultures vary in attitudes toward, and tolerance of, authority. Some 
cultures prefer stronger authority structures, while other cultures have less tolerance 
and preferences for defined authority (Johnson et al., 1996). In addition, cultural 
clashes can be found in a partner’s corporate values and expectations, organisational 
structures, leadership styles, work practices, and human-resources practices (Dyer et 
al., 2001).
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According to the model of Mohr and Spekman (2004), good information sharing helps 
partners to achieve their goals. However, Johnson et al. (1996) found that in some 
cultures withholding information from a business partner is considered simply good 
business practice, whereas in other cultures withholding information from business 
partners is considered to violate the basic norms of ethical business conduct.
It can be concluded from this that culture has a substantial influence on Mohr and 
Spekman’s (1994) attributes of the partnership, communication behaviour, and 
conflict resolution techniques. Because all of the factors in the model are 
interdependent, any mismatch can lead to an IJV failure. However, researchers do not 
estimate to what extent each factor contributes to partnership performance. It may be 
very difficult, or even impossible, to find two organisations with a perfect match in 
their goals and relationship factors and, therefore, some aspects have a greater 
contribution to the successful performance of an IJV than others.
2.6 Measuring Alliance Success
There is no consensus on the most appropriate criteria and methods for the evaluation 
of alliance and IJV’s success. In general, three types of measures can be ascertained 
from the literature: financial measures, subjective measures, and objective measures. 
The first type of measure focuses on financial indicators, such as: profitability, return 
on investment, sales, and growth. The second type is a subjective measure that 
focuses on managerial opinion of goal achievement and relational stability. The third 
type of measure considers the IJV duration. However, the first type of measure is 
criticised in the literature because it gives only short-term outcomes (Anderson, 1990) 
and is not appropriate for relatively new IJVs in emerging economies (Yan and Gray, 
2001), whereas the last type of measure does not consider if an IJV has achieved its 
goal (Rahman, 2006). For instance, some IJV partners may end their partnership 
because their IJV was formed to complete one project only. It has been found that 
measuring performance through profit, market share, and duration can be 
inappropriate for new IJVs in the emerging economies (Yan and Gray, 1994). In 
addition, obtaining accurate financial details on IJVs is very difficult since many firms 
are reluctant to provide this information, leaving the researcher questioning the
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quality and accuracy of the figures obtained (Anderson, 1990). Therefore, this 
research obtains a subjective measure, which is one of the most widely used measures 
(Choi and Beamish, 2004; Fey and Beamish, 2001; Ozorhon et al., 2007; Rahman et 
al., 2006; Yan and Gray, 2001).
Measuring performance as achievement of each partner’s objectives can help to give a 
better insight into the relationship issues of IJV (communication behaviour and 
conflict). This dissertation is going to use a satisfaction measure of performance 
where performance will be operationalised as the extent to which senior managers of 
the IJVs agree that their ventures are successful companies and both partners have 
achieved their strategic objectives. Communication behaviour and conflicts between 
partners reported by the senior managers will be taken into account as they increase 
the possibility of the IJV dissolution (Hennart et al., 1998).
2.7 Summary
The present chapter shows that a number of previous researchers have demonstrated 
the increasing role of partnerships in business. However, many IJVs fail because the 
partners have not achieved their goals. When investigating the main factors which 
influence alliance success most of the previous researchers have concentrated on: 
commitment, interdependence, trust, communication, and conflict resolution 
techniques. However, cultural differences clearly play a crucial role in IJVs.
Although the issue of alliances and their success has received increasing attention in 
the literature, there has been a lack of theory regarding the role of organisational 
culture in IJV success; despite the fact that a number of researchers have claimed that 
organisational culture can be an essential factor in the success of an IJV (e.g. Cravens 
et al., 1993; Sirmon and Lane, 2004). Therefore this research focuses on the role of 
organisational culture in IJVs. The next chapter will focus on the literature of 
organisational culture.
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A
Organisational Culture
This chapter reviews the role of organisational culture in IJV success. First to be 
considered are the definitions of organisational culture. Secondly, the different types 
of organisational culture are discussed. Thirdly, the relatively underdeveloped 
research area of the role of organisational culture in IJV performance will be 
explored. Fourthly, the different frameworks on cultural values and practices are 
reviewed. Finally, in accordance with past research, a model for understanding and 
analysing organisational culture impact on IJV success is developed.
3.1 Introduction
Cultures arise within organisations based on their own histories and experiences. 
Starting with the founders, those members of an organisation who have shared in its 
successful growth have developed assumptions about the world and how to succeed in 
it, and they have taught those assumptions to new members of the organisation 
(Schein, 1996b).
Organisational culture is important in trying to better understand the context of 
organisations and the people managing the organisation (Rashid et al., 2003). Culture 
forms the basis of direction in an organisation because it provides the meaning for 
employees of “where we are going and how we are related” (Lundberg, 1990:19). 
Also, cultures provide much of the rationale and supportive reasoning for an 
organisation’s mission, strategy, and policy. Organisational culture has a meaningful 
influence on what is perceived inside and outside the organisation; specifically, it has 
an impact on the corporation’s image or reputation and how people respond to a given 
company (Macintosh and Doherty, 2007).
Organisational culture can influence how people set personal and professional goals, 
perform tasks, and administer resources to achieve them (Lok and Crawford, 2004) 
from the human resource management point of view. Moreover, culture influences 
employees’ uncertainty and anxiety about expected behaviour (Smith, 2003).
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Some researchers have found that organisational culture has a significant influence on 
organisational performance. For example, Lok and Crawford (2004) found that 
organisational culture has a strong effect on job satisfaction and organisational 
commitment in Hong Kong and Australia. Russel (1989) and Kenny and Reedy 
(2006) found that cultural beliefs and norms can support innovation in an organisation 
because organisational culture affects the extent to which creative solutions are 
encouraged, supported, and implemented. Meanwhile, Kenny and Reedy (2007) 
report that a culture supportive of creativity encourages innovative ways of 
representing problems and finding solutions.
3.2 Definitions of Organisational Culture
Like alliances, organisational culture is a topic that has received much attention in 
both the practitioner and academic management literature over the past fifteen years 
(Bititci et al., 2004; Hofstede et al., 1990; Pettigrew, 1979; Schein, 1996a).
The concept of culture has been adopted from anthropology. Among culture scholars 
there are two main theories which should be outlined on culture in organisations. 
According to one approach, culture is treated as an independent variable that may be 
manipulated and changed. Those theorists who belong to this school see culture as 
something that an organisation “t o ” (e.g. Slocum, 1971; Harbison and Myers, 1959; 
Sekaran, 1981). The second approach sees culture as a root metaphor and it adopts the 
idea of culture as an epistemological device: “Culture as a root metaphor promotes a 
view o f  organisations as expressive forms, manifestations o f  human consciousness” 
(Smircich, 1983: 347). Those who support this perspective view culture as something 
an organisation “w” (Smircich, 1983).
Many researchers who have focused on organisational culture have defined it in terms 
of values and beliefs (e.g. Rashid et al., 2003; Lundberg, 1990). For example, 
Lundberg (1990) sees organisational culture as a set of values and beliefs reflected in 
the behaviour of the people who work in an organisation. Nevertheless, the construct 
of organisational culture is still unclear because many authors differ in their 
definitions. They define organisational culture as:
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Shared perceptions o f  organisational work practices within 
organisational units that may differ from other organisational 
units. (Van de Berg and Wilderom, 2004:571)
Organisational work practices are a central part of this definition. According to 
Hofstede (1991), values are important elements of organisational culture, but 
organisations show more differences in practices than in values. Van de Berg and 
Wilderom (2004:571) support this view:
We measured organisational practices and values by asking for  
the extent to which the practices are present or should be 
present, and we also found that organisations differed more 
strongly on practices than on values. Therefore, we did not 
include organisational values explicitly in our definition.
As mentioned above, culture may also be viewed as an internal variable where 
organisations are seen as culture producing phenomena. This view of culture has its 
roots in systems theory research, which views culture as existing in a determinant 
relationship with the external environment of the organisation. This theory suggests 
that the culture of an organisation is important to maintaining the balance of the larger 
system (Dawe, 2000).
Hofstede et al. (1991: 179) say that “there is no consensus about the definition of 
organisational culture but most authors would agree on its following characteristics:
• Holistic referring to a whole which is more than the sum of its parts
• Historically determined reflecting the history of the organisation
• Related to anthropological concepts like rituals and symbols
• Socially constructed created and preserved by the group of people who
together form the organisation
• Soft
• Difficult to change.”
Among the many definitions that have been proposed, Schein’s (1992:9) is widely 
used. He defines organisational culture as:
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A pattern o f basic assumptions -  invented', discovered, or 
developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its 
problems of external adaptations and internal integrations -  
that worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, 
to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think, and feel in relation to those problems.
In comparison with other definitions which mainly focus on practices, Schein 
emphasises behaviour and behavioural regularities. For Schein culture is the deeper 
level. Basic assumptions are the core beliefs of the group, they operate unconsciously 
and help to resolve employees’ problems of internal integration. Schein highlights the 
importance not only of values but also of shared experience among group members. 
Moreover, organisational culture is a result of group experience and may emerge from 
a group or an organisation with a significant history (Schein, 1992).
An organisation's culture is initially formed as a result of early experiences and the 
influence of early leaders. Over time, assumptions about how to operate become so 
implicitly imbedded in the underlying assumptions of action that they are difficult to 
articulate (Kaarst-Brown et al., 2004).
Schein (1992) built a three-level model of organisational culture to explain the 
cultural processes within organisations. At the deepest level, the basic assumptions of 
employees represent what they believe to be acceptable and true. These assumptions 
lie deeply, and employees do not consciously consider or identify them. Employees 
bring basic assumptions with them into an organisation, as well as developing others 
in the workplace.
The values of the organisation are at the next level. Values are also invisible and 
manifested in the behaviour of employees. They are mainly based on the values of 
founders or leaders.
The third level includes artefacts. They are the most visible aspect of the culture of an 
organisation. They can be easily observed but they are difficult to decipher. When 
changes occur in an organisation, the impact can be seen at the artefact level (Schein, 
1992).
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3.3 Types of Organisational Culture
The role of founders and leaders of organisations is very important as the values of the 
organisation are based on their values (Schein, 1992). Therefore, organisational 
culture is often classified according to the leadership style. This research adopts 
similar classification as leaders, and their decisions may influence the most important 
attributes of the IJV’s success.
Organisational culture can be divided into four main types: power culture, 
achievement culture, role culture, and support culture (Bititci et al., 2006).
The power culture indicates unequal access to resources. The dominant leadership 
style here can be defined as authoritative, autocratic and with an idealistic prime- 
mover (Bitici et al., 2006). In such a culture, there would be little empowerment of 
employees and all directions would emerge from the top. Employees’ initiative is 
usually not welcomed and they expect directions. Power cultures are common in Latin 
American and many Asian societies (Thomas and Lindsay, 2003).
In an achievement culture, employees are motivated but they still need some 
encouragement to achieve a high performance (Bititci et al., 2006). The essential 
components for the creation and maintenance of such a culture are well-selected and 
trained employees who operate in an environment of trust. However, some elements 
of the power culture are needed here as well. These include acceptance of the leader 
and his proposal. Strong leadership is necessary in this type of culture (Thomas and 
Lindsay, 2003), but the leader in this culture gives directions and encourages 
employees and his or her management style can be described as consultative (Bititci et 
al., 2006) but not dictating.
In a role culture, the power base of the leader is legitimacy and followers accord 
status out of respect of the office. The leader does what he or she is authorised to do. 
Leadership tends to be invisible, impersonal, and evasive. The leader practices 
“selling”, which is an intermediate position between telling and consulting (Bititci et 
al., 2006).
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Finally, the leader in the support culture is people oriented, caring and empathic. He 
or she involves people in the decision-making process and actively pursues 
participation, commitment, openness, and morale (Bititci et al., 2006). This culture 
can be important for the development of an achievement culture. Without a balance of 
caring (which is the main component in the support culture) the achievement culture 
can lead to competition between employees (Thomas and Lindsay, 2003).
According to Schein (1992), an employee who joins an organisation brings with them 
basic assumptions. If this person is a leader then these beliefs, values and assumptions 
may become a major influence on the culture of the organisation. As strategic 
direction often arises from the leader, it will be affected by their personal culture 
orientation which becomes absorbed into the broader organisation. Moreover, leaders 
sometimes can make decisions according to their assumptions rather than reality 
(Schein, 1992). This can be dangerous in high power cultures where managers can be 
isolated from the feedbacks of employees (Thomas and Lindsay, 2003).
It can be concluded that the type of organisational culture is very important as it 
shows the management style in an organisation, the decision-making process, the 
reporting, and the strategies which may have a crucial role in the IJVs success.
3.4 Organisational Culture and Alliances
The issue of cultural factors in alliances has increasingly attracted academic attention. 
Cultural background can be very influential when an organisation creates an IJV (Lu, 
2006) because this partnership brings together as least two companies from different 
countries.
Academic journals have published many articles reporting on different organisational 
culture type collisions, and their damaging effects on the performance of alliances 
(e.g. Hofstede, 1990; Meirovich, 2010; Moller and Svahn, 2004; Munns et al., 2000; 
Schein, 1996a; Sirmon and Lane, 2004).
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Some authors (e.g. Gancel et al., 2002) suggest that culture is the root cause of all a 
partnership’s problems because an alliance is like a marriage and needs the cultural 
match of both partners. Some authors (e.g. Butler, 2010; Das and Kumar, 2010b; 
Fuller and Vassie, 2002; Lu, 2006) argue that culture is important in the IJVs as both 
parents are from different countries and the behavioural differences, commitment, 
interdependence, information sharing, and conflict resolution techniques may lead to 
planning and interaction problems.
Researchers have found that cultural alignment generates mutual understanding and 
co-operation between the partners, whereas significant differences between the 
partners’ cultures could create conflicts and erect barriers to co-operative methods of 
working (Fuller and Vassie, 2002). Also, the similarity of the partners’ organisational 
culture increases partner learning (Rodriguez et al., 2003; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), 
satisfaction, and the effectiveness of interactions (Moller and Svahn, 2004; Sirmon 
and Lane, 2004; Pothukuchi et al., 2002), whereas differences in organisational 
culture decrease these positive outcomes (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). Improving the 
cultural alignment of partnering organisations creates common reference points, 
understanding, and practices and behaviours, and reduces the levels of uncertainty 
(Fuller and Vassie, 2002).
Overall, when the cultures of partner organisations present dramatically different 
philosophies, styles, and values they do not “fit” well and may result in what is 
commonly referred to as culture “clash” (Dawe, 2000).
Many authors suggest that it is important to find a partner with similar culture. They 
argue about the importance of culture but do not explain how important it is and to 
what extent both partners need to have similar cultures, whereas it may be very 
difficult, or even impossible, to find a partner with similar philosophy and values.
Schein (1996a) suggests that good culture fit is more likely to be determined by 
careful assessment of IJV partners’ basic underlying assumptions and values rather 
than more surface level artefacts. These values and basic assumptions are related to 
national culture as national culture relates primarily to deeply seated values that are 
common to the members of a nation (Sirmone and Lane, 2004). Differences in
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national culture systematically influence organisational cultures through the firm’s 
administrative heritage -  the historical management practices that have been used by 
organisations within a nation. Many managerial issues are defined and regulated by 
national culture and, therefore, when IJV partners collaborate the differences in their 
national cultures can manifest themselves as differences in the partners’ 
organisational cultures (Sirmon and Lane, 2004).
Hofstede (1991) supports this point of view: claiming that at the individual level, 
cultural differences reside mostly in values, whereas at organisational level, cultural 
differences reside mostly in practices and less in values. Following Hofstede’s 
suggestions, it may be argued that within a country organisations differ mostly in their 
practices. Organisational values are mainly determined by the dominant values within 
a given society. From a cross-cultural perspective, organisations differ partly in values 
due to the country values (Van Muijen et al., 1999). Differences in national culture 
explain 50% of the differences in managers’ attitudes, values, and beliefs (Hofstede, 
1991). Therefore, because this research focuses on IJVs, in this thesis organisational 
culture differences will be viewed through values and practices (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 summarises all of the previous arguments and shows the role of 
organisational culture in IJV performance. National culture is shown as the paramount 
factor. National culture influences and shapes managerial behaviour (Kanter, 1994; 
Johnson et al., 1996). Although organisational culture may readily modify the 
communication behaviour and conflict resolution techniques of organisational 
members, it is unlikely to be able to redefine the basic assumptions of national culture 
(Das and Kumar, 2010a). The previous chapter explained that differences in 
organisational cultures of IJV partners influence IJV performance through the 
differences in communication behaviour and conflict resolution techniques.
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Figure 3.1: The Connections between Organisational Culture and IJV Performance
National Culture 
(Values)
IJV PERFORMANCE
Organisational Culture 
(Values and practices)
3.5 Concept of Values
A previous model that was developed from the literature review shows that values are 
the core elements of culture (Hofstede, 1991). There is a substantial amount of 
literature which examines the concept of values (e.g. Christie et al., 2003; Fritzsche 
and Oz, 2007; Hofstede, 1991; Hood, 2003; Nonis and Swift, 2001; O’Reilly III, 
1991; Rallapalli et al., 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz et al., 2001; Trompenaars, 
1996). These studies focus on the values which are held by managers, a comparison of 
different value systems, and organisational ethical values.
The term ‘value’ has been defined in different ways. It may be seen as “a symbolic 
system” (O’Reilly III, 1991: 492), “the basic principles and tenets” (Hood, 2003: 263)
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or “an enduring belief that a specific mode o f  conduct or end-state o f  existence is 
personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode o f  conduct or end- 
state o f  existence” (Rokeach, 1973: 5). While their definitions are different, many 
researchers agree that values influence behaviour (Fritzsche and Oz, 2007). So, 
differences in values can explain differences in behaviour. Values affect a person’s 
attitudes; they also guide ongoing activities, values systems employed to resolve 
conflicts and to make decisions (Hood, 2003; Fritzsche and Oz, 2007; Rokeach, 
1973).
Further research shows that values may vary not only between individuals but also 
between institutions and organisations. Differences of values between two 
organisations can explain differences in their cultures. Values of the organisation may 
be transmitted to employees through a formal statement and organisational policies 
(Hood, 2003). Top managers communicate their organisational values to employees to 
shape behaviour and lead the firm (Schein, 1985). Therefore, the differences in 
managerial values and values systems may explain the differences in organisational 
cultures.
A ‘value system ’ may be defined as an enduring organisation of beliefs concerning 
preferable modes of conduct, or end states of existence, along a continuum, or relative 
importance (Rokeach, 1973).
There are several classifications of values which are in use (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; 
Hofstede, 1991; Schwartz et al., 2001).
Rokeach’s (1973) values measurement distinguishes 18 instrumental and 18 terminal 
values. The list of terminal values was obtained from the literature mentioning various 
values found in American and other societies, graduate students in psychology, and 
interviews of about 100 adults. The list of terminal values was obtained from 
Anderson’s (1968) list of trait-names. Rokeach’s approach focuses on personal values 
that influence one’s behaviour in day-to-day life; however, his method of 
measurement values has been criticised because of the following reasons: 
questionable relevance of the values to daily life, difficulty of the lengthy ranking 
tasks, and information loss because of rank ordering (Nonis and Swift, 2001).
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Hofstede’s (1991) work on cultural differences is one of the most influential. Many of 
the subsequent studies on the effect of cultural dimensions in managerial ethics, 
attitudes and decision-making have relied on the work of Hofstede (e.g. Albaum et al., 
2010; Christie et al., 2003; Armstrong, 1996; Thome and Saunders, 2002; Yan and 
Hunt, 2005). Baskerville (2003) examines the popularity of Hofstede’s work, using 
the Social Science Citation Index over the eighteen years from 1981 to 1998. Even 
though not all social science journals are included in this index, it shows an increasing 
use of Hofstede’s research in many disciplines. However, there are some limitations 
on the use of such data: citations can be negative or positive, or there can be major 
and minor citations. Despite these limitations, Baskerville’s (2003) analysis clearly 
shows an increasing use of the Hofstede’s research; for example, the total number of 
citations has increased from 46 citations in 1988 to 333 citations in 1998. 
Baskerville’s (2003) analysis also shows an overwhelming use of Hofstede’s work in 
two major research disciplines: management-related disciplines and psychology.
According to Hofstede (1991), cultural values may be represented by five dimensions: 
individualism vs. collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity vs. 
femininity, and short- vs. long-term orientation. His research is based on the IBM 
organisation and includes a large sample of employees from a number of different 
subsidiaries in forty countries. While Hofstede’s dimensions are widely used in 
business research, there are some limitations to his data.
Firstly, Hofstede’s sample does not include many emerging economies (e.g. countries 
from the former USSR and Soviet block countries). Hofstede recognises that 
including these nations could change the dimensions (Hofstede, 1991). Secondly, his 
sample includes only IBM employees. Their national culture could interact with 
organisational and professional cultures (Merritt, 2000) and, therefore, it is likely that 
studying different organisations would result in different dimensions. For example, 
Merritt (2000) makes sets of analyses to determine the extent to which Hofstede’s 
dimensions of national culture are relevant in the world of commercial aviation. 
Merritt’s (2000) study is based on data from 9400 airline pilots from 19 countries. The 
first analysis applies items from the original Hofstede’s Work Value Survey and is 
successful in replicating ‘power distance’ and ‘individualism’ indexes, but not the 
‘masculinity’ and ‘uncertainty avoidance’ indexes.
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Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have been also criticised. His dimensions are 
compared to other national measurements: GNP, economic growth, population size, 
latitude, population growth, and population density. For example, individualism 
relates to Gross National Product per capita and press freedom (Hofstede, 1991: 73) 
and Power Distance relates to income differentials (Hofstede, 1991: 43). 
Individualism may be predicted from the basis of national wealth and Power Distance 
from population size, latitude and national wealth. It may be seen that the dimensions 
identified by Hofstede describe the characteristics of nations, many of which could be 
identified as socio-economic factors. This socio-economic data may reflect the 
mechanisms of social organisation, or strengths and opportunism of different nations, 
which may be epiphenomenal to historical origins (Baskerville, 2003).
Schwartz’s values framework has been widely used in business and management 
research to measure a cultural distance of managers (e.g. Illes and Reiter-Palmon, 
2007; Kozan, 2002; Ralston et al., 2008), employees (e.g. Rice, 2006), and consumers 
(e.g. Fumham and Valgeirsson, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; Doran, 2009; Worsley and 
Lea, 2008). Schwartz values can be good predictors of managerial style, 
organisational hierarchy (Kozan, 2002) and destructive leader behaviour (e.g. striving 
for short-term over long-term goals) (Illes and Reiter-Palmon, 2007). Kozan (2002) 
also shows that cultural values of managers may significantly differ inside one 
country, creating a few subcultures of managers. Subcultures, as defined by Schwartz 
values, are very strong predictors of managerial behaviour and style.
Schwartz establishes that values can be grouped into ten value types, located in a 
single two-dimensional value space. His analysis is based upon data collected from 
60,000 individuals in 63 countries. Many countries provided two samples: secondary 
school teachers and students (Smith et al., 2002).
According to Schwartz et al. (2001: 521), the following value dimensions may be 
identified:
1. Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and 
resources. A person who likes to be in charge and tell others what to do.
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2. Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence 
according to social standards. Being successful is important. A person who 
likes to impress other people.
3. Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. A person who 
likes to enjoy life and having a good time is very important to him or her.
4. Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. A person who 
looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He or she wants to have an 
exciting life.
5. Self-direction: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, 
exploring. He or she thinks it is important to be interested in things. He or 
she is curious and tries to understand everything.
6. Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for 
the welfare of all people and for nature. He or she thinks it is important 
that every person in the world should be treated equally. A person wants 
justice for everybody, even for people they do not know.
7. Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact. They always want to help the 
people who are close to them. It is very important to them to care for the 
people they know and like.
8. Tradition: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas 
that traditional culture or religion provide of the self. A person who thinks 
that it is important to do things the way they learned in a family. They 
want to follow their customs and traditions.
9. Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset 
or harm others and violate social expectations or norms. A person who 
believes that people should do what they are told. They think that people 
should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.
10. Security: Safety, stability, and harmony of society, of relationships, and of 
self. Safety is very important for these people. They want their country to 
be safe from its enemies.
Schwartz found that 45 of the 57 values in his theory are universal in nature; that is, 
they have similar meanings across all cultures.
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The structural component of Schwartz’s et al. (2001) values theory explicates the 
dynamic relations among ten values. The pursuit of any value may conflict, or may be 
congruent, with the pursuit of other values. For instance, the pursuit of novelty and 
change (stimulation values) is likely to undermine preservation of tradition values. In 
contrast, the pursuit of tradition values is congruent with the pursuit of conformity 
values.
Figure 3.2 portrays a structure of relations among ten values.
Figure 3.2: Theoretical Model of Structure of Relations Among 10 Value Constructs
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Source: Schwartz et al., 2001: 522
Schwartz et al. (2001) explain that individual values can be organised in two basic 
dimensions. The higher value types (such as openness to change (with self-direction 
and stimulation value types) and conservation (with security, conformity, and 
tradition value types)) are bipolar in scale and form a dimension. The second 
dimension includes self-transcendence (benevolence and universalism) and self­
enhancement (power and achievement). Also, Schwartz et al. (2001) clarify that 
hedonism shares elements of both dimensions. As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the 
circular arrangement of the values represents a motivational continuum. The closer
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any two values are in either direction around the circle, then the more similar their 
underlying motivations will be. The more distant any two values are, then the more 
antagonistic their underlying motivations will be (Schwartz et al., 2001).
Schwartz’s values have several potential advantages when compared to Hofstede’s 
dimensions. Schwartz’s values are theoretically derived, whereas Hofstede derived his 
framework empirically. Both researchers empirically examined their frameworks 
using large scale, multi-country samples. However, Schwartz’s dimensions have been 
tested with more recent data (collected between 1988 and 1992) with two matched 
samples (student and teacher samples). Moreover, these samples are obtained from 
more diverse regions, including the former USSR. While Hofstede’s sample includes 
several countries, Schwartz’s sample focused not only on a single nation-state but also 
on cultural groups within a state (Imm Ng et al., 2007).
Schwartz (1994) claims that Hofstede’s four dimensions were included within his 
cultural dimensions. For instance, the tradition and conformity dimension corresponds 
to the collectivism dimension of Hofstede. However, he argues that his value types are 
different because
They are based on different theoretical reasoning, different 
methods, a different set o f  nations, different types o f  
respondents, data from a later historical period, a more 
comprehensive set o f  values, and value items screened to be 
reasonably equivalent in meaning across cultures. 
(Schwartz, 1994:117)
Some authors (e.g. Steenkamp, 2001) claim that Schwartz’s values overlap with 
Hofstede’s values. However, while the evidence of Steenkamp (2001) illustrates some 
overlap, other researchers (e.g. Breet and Okumara, 1998; Imm Ng, 2007) show that 
there are many differences between Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s value frameworks and 
these differences “add to the explanation o f  cultural differences between countries” 
(Imm Ng, 2007: 174). For example, Imm Ng’s (2007) statistical analysis is conducted 
to access the congruency between two frameworks and the results suggest that 
Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s frameworks are not congruent. Moreover, an analysis of 
trade statistics is also conducted to find out how well cultural distance scores based on 
both models predict the amount of trade between countries. This analysis shows that
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Schwartz’s values play a more significant role. Schwartz’s value framework is used in 
this research.
Schwartz et al. (2001) uses a 56-item instrument to measure value structures. This 
may be impractical for some researchers, because it takes an unacceptably large 
amount of time available for administering a research instrument. Stem et al. (1998) 
found that each of Schwartz’s value structures may be reduced to three values while 
still retaining acceptable levels of reliability. Stem et al. (1998) conducted two studies 
and factor analysed the value items from each study separately. They found a four- 
factor solution in each case which corresponded closely to the value clusters reported 
by Schwartz. The short scales were then developed, consisting of the items that match 
with Schwartz’s clustering (i.e. all of the items in a scale fall within the appropriate 
cluster as identified by Schwartz) while still maintaining good reliability and 
effectiveness (Stem et al., 1998). Composing the reduced values structures, Stem et 
al. (1998) rename the self-transcendence structure in altruistic values. Table 3.1 
represents a modified Schwartz’s value scale.
Table 3.1: Modified Values Scale
Construct Item
Altruistic values
A world at peace, free of war and conflict
Social justice, correcting injustice, care for the weak
Equality, equal opportunity for all
Openness to change values
A varied life, filled with challenge, novelty, and change
An exciting life, stimulating experiences
Curiosity, interested in everything, exploring
Self-enhancement values 
(or Egoistic)
Authority, the right to lead or command
Influence, having an impact on people and events
Wealth, material possession, money
Traditional values 
(or Conservation)
Honouring parents and elders, showing respect
Family security, safety for loved ones
Self-discipline, self-restraint, resistance to temptation
Source: Stem et al., 1998: 997
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Taking into account the operational benefits of the shorter scale of values along with 
the positive results of Stem et al. (1998), the reduced value scale is chosen for use in 
this research.
3.6 Practices
In his definition of culture Schein (1991) refers to various cultural elements. He treats 
basic assumptions as the essence of culture. However, basic assumptions are usually 
invisible and they can be observed through the next two cultural elements, which are 
values and artifacts. Artifacts, according to Schein (1991), are the most visible level 
of culture and may include technology, art and behaviour patterns.
In organisational culture literature practices and routines are often referred to as 
artifacts of organisational culture, in which values and norms are reflected (e.g. 
Hofstede, 1991; Meirovich, 2010; Van den Berg and Wilderom, 2004). It is important 
to observe organisational practices because at an organisational level, cultural 
differences reside mostly in practices and less in values (Hofstede, 1991; Van den 
Berg and Wilderom, 2004). Values may predict and explain behaviour and practices 
but they often may be different from practices. For example, people may behave 
differently because they believe that others would, or would not, like them to do it. 
This is often called a subjective norm (Trafimow et al., 2010). In individualistic 
societies, such as many Western countries, values are more important predictors of 
behaviour than subjective norms (Krauss, 1995). In contrast, people in collectivist 
cultures place more weight on group opinion (Trafimow et al., 2010). Therefore, their 
values and practices may be different.
Hofstede (1991) was one of the first researchers who found that a shared perception of 
daily practices should be considered as the core of an organisation’s culture. 
Symbols, heroes, and rituals can be subsumed under the term “practices” because they 
are visible to an observer although their cultural meaning lies in the way they are 
perceived by insiders (Hofstede et al., 1990).
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These values are programmed in our mind from childhood but the organisational 
practices are learned through a socialisation processes within the organisation, and 
organisational culture concerns the shared perceptions of daily practices (Hofstede, 
1991). This view is in line with the definitions of organisational climate, which 
underline the observable practices of the organisations (Fey and Beamish, 2001; Van 
Muijen et al., 1999).
In many studies on organisational work practices the actual measures of 
organisational culture may vary but the dimensions of organisational culture are very 
similar, they correspond to the type of organisational culture. Van den Berg and 
Wilderom (2004) and Fischer et al. (2005) analyse a number of different studies on 
organisational culture and practices. They show that many of them have similar 
dimensions (e.g. Hofstede, 1991; Van Muijen et al., 1999; O’Reilly et al., 1991; 
Schein, 1992; Detert et al., 2000; Ashkanasy et al., 2000). For instance, Van Muijen et 
al (1999), Hofstede (1991), O’Reilly et al. (1991), and Detert et al. (2000) identify 
goal or task oriented dimension. All of the mentioned researchers have the innovation 
oriented dimension and support or people oriented (Hofstede, 1991; Van Muijen et al., 
1999; O’Reilly et al., 1991; Schein, 1992; Detert et al., 2000; Ashkanasy et al., 2000). 
Van Muijen et al. (1999) constructed an internationally useful instrument for 
measuring organisational culture. They identify four organisational culture 
orientations (see Figure 3.3):
• Support orientation;
• Innovation orientation;
• Rules orientation; and,
• Goal orientation.
These four orientations are made by combining the four dimensions of organisational 
culture: internal and external focus of organisation, and flexibility and control.
The main concepts of support orientation are participation, cooperation, people-based, 
mutual trust, team spirit, and individual growth. Communication is often verbal and 
informal. Employees are encouraged to express ideas about their work and feeling
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about each other. Decision making often runs through informal contacts (Van Muijen 
et al., 1999).
Figure 3.3: Culture Orientations
Flexibility
Support Innovation
External
Internal
Goal
Rule
Control
Source: Van Muijen et al., 1999: 556
The innovation orientation is characterised by such concepts as creativity, openness to 
change, anticipation, and experimentation. Control from above is neither possible, nor 
required, and management expects commitment and involvement of employees (Van 
Muijen et al., 1999).
The rules orientation emphasises respect for authority, rationality of procedures, and 
division of work. The structure is hierarchical and communication is often written and 
top-down. Power is based on formal authority. The goal orientation includes such 
concepts as rationality, performance indicators, accomplishment, accountability, and 
contingent reward.
The model of Van Muijen et al. (1999) is circumplex: the circle can be read from left 
to right and vice versa. For example, the support orientation and the innovation
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orientation share an emphasis on flexibility and co-operation between colleagues, and 1
the innovation orientation and the goal orientation have in common an external focus. |
On the other hand, there is tension between the diametrical orientations. For example, 
stability and control (the rules orientation) are opposed to creativity and change (the 
innovation orientation), while team spirit and cooperation (the support orientation) 
contrast with contingent reward and accountability (the goal orientation).
In this thesis the organisational practices model of Van Muijen et al. (1999) is used.
This instrument has several advantages. Firstly, in comparison with the other scales 
(e.g. Hofstede, 1991), Van Muijen’s et al. (1991) framework is less time consuming.
In this research, senior managers are chosen as respondents; however, due to their 
tight schedule they might be unable to complete a large questionnaire. Also, Van 
Muijen et al. (1999) design their focus questionnaire using a large sample of 
organisations from different industries and different European countries, including 
those of the former Soviet Union. The final scale is based on items that are found to 
be universal in all these countries, this increases the reliability of the scale.
3.7 Summary
This chapter discusses the main theories and concepts regarding the organisational j
culture and its role in partnership success. The discussion is summed up in the j
conceptual framework (see Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4 represents the conceptual framework for the current research. As has been j
mentioned earlier, the process of an IJV requires that at least two partners from |
different countries come together to form a partnership. In Figure 3.4, Russian partner |
and Foreign partner represent two different organisations involved in the formation of i
the IJV. As this research focuses on the IJV, it was essential to identify the elements 
of national culture and values because they have a substantial influence on 
organisational culture. Based on the research of Schwartz, and the modified model of 
Stem et al. (1998), four dimensions with 12 values are chosen to measure national 
culture in this study, the instrument of Van Muijen et al. (1999) with four cultural
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orientations is taken for measuring organisational practices in order to gather a deeper 
insight into organisational culture in these IJVs.
During the process of IJV, both partners bring along their own organisational cultures 
and form a separate entity that has either: the culture derived from both partners, a 
culture similar to one of the partners, or an entirely new culture. When all partners 
collaborate, the differences in their organisational culture result in different 
communication behaviour (communication quality, information sharing and 
participation) which may lead to conflicts and IJV dissolution.
The previous chapter explains the concept of alliances, and outlines the factors which 
may influence IJV success. Experience with IJVs has shown that they face a number 
of problems which can often result in IJV failure. One of the principle reasons behind 
IJV failure is the cultural differences of IJV partners. In order to investigate the 
cultural concepts of IJVs in Russia, we first need to revise some issues related to the 
Russian economic, social and political environment. Russia, as one of the largest 
emerging economies, is undergoing a number of substantial changes, including the 
radical transformation of its socioeconomic processes and institutions. Knowledge of 
these institutional changes is of great interest and importance to this thesis because 
they have a significant impact on culture.
The next chapter reviews the main economic aspects of emerging economies, paying 
particular attention to Russia, and will identify their impact on organisational culture.
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Figure 3.4 Conceptual Framework
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Chapter 4
Emerging Economies and the Russian Context
The purpose of this chapter is to review extant literature relevant to emerging 
economies and in particular the Russian economy and culture. This chapter defines 
emerging and transitional economies and describes the main characteristics of these 
countries, the challenges they face, and how institutional voids may influence 
organisational culture. A gap in the previous research of the Russian culture and 
economy is identified and its influence on organisational culture and managerial 
practices is considered.
4.1 Introduction
In the 1980s, and the beginning of 1990s, the term “newly industrialising countries”, 
which had previously been applied only to a few fast-growing Asian and Latin 
American countries, was replaced by the broader term “emerging market economies” 
(ECs) because of liberalisation and the adoption of market-based policies by many 
developing countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Other categorisations, such as “Third 
World countries” and “developing countries”, have become inconsistent because they 
were mainly based on the absolute level of economic development, usually indicated 
by the average GDP per capita and the GDP growth rate.
The World Bank categorises countries on the basis of GDP per capita into low (for 
2006, less than $905; fifty-three countries), lower middle ($906 - $3,595; fifty-five 
countries), upper middle ($3,596 - $11,115; forty-one countries), and high groups 
(more than $11,116; sixty countries). However, only two of the ECs fall in the low 
category (India and Vietnam), although of course this is misleading because it 
disguises large disparities in incomes within this mean figure, whereas five countries 
are high-income economies (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Estonia and Czech 
Republic). Moreover, most emerging and transition economies have had an average 
annual GDP of more than 5 % since 2000 (see Figure 4.1). According to the 
International Monetary Fund they account for 30 % of world GDP at market exchange 
rates, and the half of global GDP growth (Chavalier, 2007). Consequently, ECs have
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evoked a considerable interest among researchers (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2000; Arnold 
and Quelch, 1998; London and Hart, 2004; Khanna and Palepu, 1997).
Figure 4.1: GDP Increase in ECs and Developed Economies
GDP, % increase on a year earlier
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4.2 Em erging Econom y: Definition
An Emerging Economy (EC) can be defined as a country that satisfies two criteria: the 
absolute level of economic development (usually indicated by the average GDP per 
capita, or the relative balance of agrarian and industrial activity) and government 
policies favouring economic liberalisation and the adoption of a free-market system. 
Emerging economies can be divided into two groups: developing countries in Asia, 
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East; and transition economies in the former 
Soviet Union and China (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Hoskisson et al. (2000) identify 64 
emerging economies, of which 51 are fast-growing developing countries and 13 are 
transition economies. If the country is in the process of economic liberalisation from a 
command economy, it is defined as a “transition economy” (Arnold and Quelch, 
1998). Transition economies are thought to be committed to strengthening their 
market mechanisms through liberalisation, stabilisation, and the encouragement of 
private enterprises (Hoskisson et al., 2000).
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Thanks to rapid growth, and a large market with a limited competition, emerging 
economies have become very attractive for many foreign investors and their potential 
has already affected a shift in multinational companies (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Arnold and Quelch, 1998). At the same time as domestic policies are becoming more 
market-oriented, emerging economy governments are opening their countries to 
foreign markets and joining regional trading associations (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In 
2007, emerging economies received significant amounts of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows, which grew from $568 billion in 2006 to $782 billion in 2007 (IIF, 
2008). However, entering low-income markets in emerging economies and operating 
in these markets may require a different strategic approach (London and Hart, 2004) 
because companies face a “high velocity” environment of rapid political, economic, 
and institutional changes that are accompanied by relatively underdeveloped factor 
and product markets (Wright et al., 2005).
Many emerging economies have experienced substantial change. Macroeconomic 
stabilisation, a precondition for external financial assistance, has been particularly 
difficult to achieve. The development of market institutions (such as legal 
infrastructures that provide the basis for effective corporate governance) has been 
even slower and more difficult. Economic and political shocks, and the current 
stresses resulting from the rapid implementation of economic reform programmes, 
have increased the uncertainty and risk for domestic companies and foreign investors 
(Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2000). In addition, it has also raised their 
costs because of the higher prices for resources in some countries, lowered prospects 
for profitability, and macroeconomic instability (Doh et al., 2003). As a result, 
factors such as the development of market institutions and the high variance in the 
institutional environment (Delios and Henisz, 2000), levels of government 
involvement, industry structures, ownership patterns, and enforcement of business 
laws may all contribute to explanations of strategic decisions of companies in 
emerging economies (Wright et al., 2005).
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4.3 Institutional Voids
One of the key factors in understanding the difference between developed and 
emerging economies involves the configuration of local institutions (Ricart et al.,
2004). The main challenges arise in emerging economies because of weak 
institutional infrastructures due to uncertainties arising from economic and political 
instabilities, and a lack of market-based management skills (Wright et al., 2005). 
Institutional voids occur when specialised intermediaries (such as communication 
infrastructure, financial services, or various databases on consumption) either do not 
exist or are failing. Without the functional activity provided by these intermediaries, 
key strategic decisions become more difficult to make, with direct consequences for 
industry analysis, positioning, and sustainability which are the key fundamentals of 
competitive strategy (Mair et al., 2007; Ricart et al., 2004).
Unlike developed countries, emerging economies do not have the necessary 
institutions which can help to facilitate the functioning of markets (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997). Advanced economies tend to have many seasoned market 
intermediaries and effective contract-enforcing mechanisms, whereas ECs have 
unskilled intermediaries and less effective legal systems (Khanna et el., 2005). In 
transition economies the process of transition requires fundamental change in 
institutional frameworks, and managerial and consumer attitudes (Ennew et al., 1993). 
That is, resources are employed within the business group in order to compensate for 
the lack of environmental resources available though the establishment of local 
offices, IJVs, or training programmes designed for local specialists (Ennew et al., 
2000).
Business groups have become intermediaries and have made organisational 
arrangements to fill institutional voids in some emerging economies, such as India and 
Chile. These groups have also played an important role in firm restructuring in some 
transition economies, such as China (Wright et al., 2005).
The problem of institutional voids can be seen through the product, capital, labour 
markets, and the government regulations of a country (Khanna and Palepu, 1997).
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4.3.1 Product Markets
Many emerging economies have underdeveloped communication infrastructures 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997) and distribution systems (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; 
Ennew etc., 2000). The postal service is typically inefficient, slow, or unreliable. 
Moreover, in comparison with developed countries, the number of Internet users, and 
telephone and mobile subscribers is much lower in ECs. For example, according to 
the latest data only 22 % of the population in China have the Internet, 38 % in Brazil, 
compared with 87 % in the Netherlands, 68 % in France and 76 % in the UK (see 
Table 4.1). However, many transition countries score relatively highly in the number 
of fixed lines, mobile phone subscribers, and the number of Internet users.
Table 4.1: Development Indicators
2008 Internet users 
(per 100 people)
Fixed line and mobile phone 
subscribers (per 100 people)
Netherlands 87 170
France 68 149
Switzerland 76 180
UK 76 180
USA 76 140
Brazil 38 100
China 22 74
Malaysia 56 118
India 4.5 34
Bulgaria 35 166
Latvia 60 127
Poland 49 141
Source: Work Bank, 2010
The development of the Internet services in a country has a great impact on 
organisations and their culture. The advent of the Internet, digital connectivity, and 
use of e-commerce and e-business models has helped many companies to improve 
their services and fit with customer demand. The Internet reinvented businesses and
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individuals, introducing “the age of network intelligence”. This has pressed 
organisations in developed countries to modernise their administrative practices and 
management systems. The bureaucratic paradigm (characterised by internal 
productive efficiency, departmentalisation, hierarchical control, and rule-based 
management) has been replaced by a competitive, knowledge based economy 
(characterised by flexibility, network organisation, innovative entrepreneurship, 
organisation learning, speed up in service delivery, and a customer driven strategy). 
For example, the Internet and mobile phones allow customers to access information 
about organisations and their services instantly, conveniently, and from anywhere. 
Also, organisations are conducting business-to-business e-commerce in order to lower 
their costs. The opportunity to conduct online transactions with the government 
reduces red tape and simplifies regulatory processes, therefore helping businesses to 
become more competitive (Ndou, 2004). In addition, the Internet helps to provide e- 
leaming between employees in a company, it brings employees together and promotes 
knowledge sharing among them. It gives employees the possibility of accessing 
relevant information regarding compensation and benefit policies, and training and 
learning opportunities. Overall, the Internet has helped companies in developed 
countries to reduce their costs, increase quality, and service delivery to businesses and 
customers. It has also helped to increase an organisations’ transparency and 
accountability. These factors have helped developed countries to shift to supportive 
and innovative organisational cultures (Ndou, 2004). Because many people in ECs do 
not have an access to the Internet, their organisations do not always deploy the 
appropriate IT infrastructure (web-sites, e-commerce and online services). This may 
explain why many ECs have an autocratic organisational culture, centralised and 
limited communications, and low information and knowledge sharing in 
organisations.
Many researchers claim that because of the high level of illiteracy it is difficult for 
companies to communicate with their potential customers (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 
1997; Arnold and Quelch, 1998). However, since 1997 the rate of illiteracy has 
changed substantially in many ECs. According to UNESCO (UNESCO, 2007), many 
of these countries have as high a literacy rate as that of developed countries. Many 
transition economies, especially the former USSR countries, are leading in the rate of
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literacy and tertiary enrolment (see Table 4.2), which can be explained by the 
historically great value that the USSR always put on education.
Table 4.2: Tertiary Enrolment
Rank Country Score
1 Finland 91.69
2 Korea 91.04
4 USA 82.72
8 Slovenia 81.19
11 Lithuania 76.04
12 Latvia 74.36
15 Russia 71.04
16 Ukraine 68.96
17 Spain 66.87
18 Estonia 65.74
21 Argentina 65.03
22 Poland 63.41
23 Belgium 63.01
26 UK 59.71
30 France 56.39
Source: UNESCO, 2007
Independent consumer-information organisations are rare in ECs, and there are only a 
few analysts who rate products and services (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Market 
research and advertising is much less developed, and the absence of databases on 
consumption patterns makes it difficult for companies to segment their customers 
(Khanna et al., 2005; Ennew et al., 2000) and get reliable information about 
consumers with low incomes who are the most significant segment in emerging 
economies (Khanna et al., 2005).
For instance, the World Economic Forum ranks countries on the availability of 
research and training services which is based on the Executive Opinion Survey 2006- 
2007. In most of the ECs specialised research and training services for companies are 
less available than in developed countries (see Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3: Local Availability of Research and Training Services:
In your country specialised research and training services are (1 = not available, 7 = 
available from world-class local institutions)
Rank Country Score
1 Switzerland 5.99
2 USA 5.99
3 Germany 5.98
5 UK 5.87
12 France 5.59
25 Czech Republic 4.82
31 India 4.71
32 Brazil 4.67
35 Slovenia 4.60
38 Croatia 4.39
41 Poland 4.37
45 Argentina 4.26
48 Lithuania 4.19
60 Hungary 3.97
74 Bulgaria 3.75
80 Kazakhstan 3.63
113 Georgia 2.85
Source: World Economic Forum. INSEAD, 2007c
These structural problems in the product markets influence the organisational culture 
of companies in ECs. For example, the absence of necessary databases and research 
services may have an impact on managerial decision making. Managers from 
developed countries will prefer consulting a research base before making a decision. 
They will place emphasis on the use of reports, databases and other electronic forms 
of information. In contrast, managers from ECs may gather information from friends, 
co-workers, relatives, and rumours. Consequently, organisational culture in these 
countries is usually relationship oriented and has less formal information and 
knowledge (Morden, 1999).
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4.3.2 Capital Markets
The problem in capital markets is similar to that in product markets. Access to 
information (such as sales levels or the number of distributors) is difficult and 
investors take a higher risk by putting money into unfamiliar ventures (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997). ECs do not have many reliable intermediaries like credit-rating 
agencies, investment analysts, merchant bankers, or venture capital firms (Khanna et 
al., 2005).
Because of the high environmental risks in many ECs (such as unstable currencies and 
corrupt governments) venture capitalists require large returns on their success and 
often invest only in firms promising high return rates. For example, in Brazil venture 
capital is offered only to IT businesses. To a lesser degree, opportunities have 
emerged in human healthcare and retail. In India the areas which attract venture 
capital are software and software services, and in Taiwan they are manufacturing and 
some integrated circuit design. In some ECs governmental policies toward venture 
capital are still undeveloped. For example, while in China the government intends to 
encourage venture capital, many of its laws discourage small firm formation (these 
include regulations on the minimum capital size of RMB 10 million to be considered 
a company (Kenney et al., 2002)).
In addition, the banking system in many emerging and transition economies is not 
well developed and the companies can not easily receive bank loans (Khanna et al., 
2005). Some ECs are leading in the availability of credit (see Table 4.4). 
Nevertheless, the banks’ interest rate remains very high in most of these countries. For 
example, in South Africa, Romania and Kenya it reaches 13.5 %, in Azerbaijan 
19.1%, and 23 % in Peru (World Bank, 2008a).
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Table 4.4: Getting Credit Rank in 2010
Country Getting Credit 
Rank
Malaysia 1
UK 2
South Africa 2
Singapore 6
USA 6
Bulgaria 6
Kenya 6
Latvia 6
Switzerland 15
Slovakia 15
Peru 15
Romania 15
Lithuania 46
Source: World Bank, 201 la
Additionally, systems of payment which are an integral part of the functioning of 
developed market economies (such as cheques and credit cards) are often largely 
underdeveloped in many ECs (Ennew et al., 2000).
For instance, the Bank for International Settlements shows statistics on payments in 
Turkey and Serbia, comparing them to those in developed countries. In 2005 the 
number of cards with a payment function per one inhabitant was 0.52 in Serbia and 
1.09 in Turkey which compared with 1.95 in the Netherlands, 2.35 in the UK and 5.20 
in the USA. The number of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) per 1 million 
inhabitants was 113 in Serbia and 206 in Turkey which compared with 1,631 in 
Canada, 1,289 in Belgium, and 968 in the UK (BIS, 2008).
Due to the problems with venture capitals and bank loans, many organisations in ECs 
do not have sufficient funds to support their existing businesses. This may reduce the 
level of innovativeness, technologies, and manufacturing processes in a company 
(MacMillan et al., 2008).
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4,3.3 Labour Markets
In spite of their large population, many emerging markets do not have enough skilled 
workers (Khanna et al., 2005). The rate of tertiary enrolment is very low in Malaysia, 
Mexico, Brazil, China, India and Indonesia (UNESCO, 2007), which can explain the 
low number of skilled employees. This is not such a problem exists in many transition 
economies (such as Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, Estonia, Poland and 
Kazakhstan) which are leading in the number of people who are enrolled in tertiary 
education (UNESCO, 2007).
In addition, ECs and many transition economies have fewer scientists and researchers. 
The total expenditures on research and development is much lower in these countries. 
For example, according to UNESCO data (UNESCO, 2007), in 2006 the number of 
researchers per one million inhabitants was 926 in China, 895 in Argentina, 952 in 
Romania, 1,344 in Bulgaria, 1,562 in Poland and 1,758 in Latvia. Nevertheless, these 
numbers remain low in comparison with developed countries (e.g. France* - 3,353; 
Germany -  3,386; UK -  3,033; and USA* - 4,651).
In ECs organisations have trouble recruiting managers and other skilled workers. 
There is little information about the ranks and teaching quality of universities and 
allied institutes. Another institutional void arises from the absence of executive search 
firms and recruiting agencies (e.g. Khanna et al., 2005; Ricart et al., 2004).
All these factors have a great impact on organisational culture. For example, in order 
to develop an achievement culture, organisations require well-trained and well- 
selected employees, but in most ECs this training and recruitment is not available. 
Moreover, the role of business education is considered to be a significant actor in 
shaping a base of organisational behaviour, but many ECs face a problem in business 
and management education. Firstly, many ECs do not have many specialised business 
schools. Next, the students would gain more benefit from their programme if their 
local lectures had experience of developed countries (Szamosi et al., 2008). 
Nowakowski et al. (2008) questioned 734 executives in 15 different Eastern European 
countries examining issues such as labour market, talent management and leadership.
In 2005
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60 % of their respondents suggest that their country’s universities and institutes are 
not preparing graduates with the necessary leadership skills. It was found that typical 
characteristics of a leader in ECs are criticising, autocratic (Suutari and Riusala, 2001; 
Szamosi et al., 2008), and “short-term minded” (Nowakowski et al., 2008).
4,3.4 Government Regulations
National and local governments are very influential in ECs. A high degree of political 
influence on business produces an institutional environment conspicuously different 
from that encountered by the typical Western firm (May et al., 2000). This reflects 
both the recent history of many ECs as command economies or closed markets, the 
desire of many host governments to build local business, and the importance of 
government-led infrastructure projects in the early stages of development (Arnold and 
Quelch, 1998). For example, in Malaysia foreign companies can enter into IJVs only 
after checking to see if their potential partners belong to the majority Malay 
community or the economically dominant Chinese community, so as not to conflict 
with the government’s long-standing policy of transferring assets from the Chinese 
community to the Malay (Khanna et al., 2005). In some former Soviet Union 
countries (such as Ukraine and Belarus) the governments own a large proportion of 
shares in manufacturing firms. From the middle of the 1990s the percentage of state 
ownership in these transition economies has fallen as a result of privatisation 
programmes; it now averages about 6 % in Ukraine, although in Belarus it still 
exceeds 20 % (Buck et al., 2000).
In addition, firms in ECs may be unable to use institutions that support their business 
activities (such as courts) for the enforcement of contracts. In some ECs there is a 
benchmark of more than 600 days needed in order to enforce a contract; for example, 
this process requires 616 days in Brazil, 820 days in the Czech Republic, 830 days in 
Poland, 1,350 days in Slovenia, and 1,420 days in India. Moreover, the number of 
procedures to enforce a contract from the moment the plaintiff files a lawsuit in court 
until the moment of payment is higher in many ECs (see Table 4.5) (World Bank, 
2007b). As a result, some companies bear additional costs when they engage with
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organised crime by paying for protection and other security services that would 
otherwise be unnecessary (Doh et al., 2003).
Table 4.5: Number of Procedures to Enforce a Contract in 2010
Rank Country Score
1 Ireland 20
2 Singapore 21
5 Austria 25
6 Netherlands 25
6 Belgium 27
53 Argentina 36
53 Chile 36
53 Estonia 36
53 Georgia 36
65 Kazakhstan 38
75 Indonesia 40
110 Brazil 45
112 India 46
170 Armenia 49
Source: World Bank, 201 lb
In order to overcome these difficulties with regulations, laws or norms, people in ECs 
sometimes use their personal connections with people who control necessary 
resources. Network contacts and personal relations may help to reduce uncertainty 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). Batjargal (2003) and Peng (2001) found that network 
connections in emerging markets can be a crucial value-adding factor in a firm’s 
performance. Networks in ECs are based on the objectives of: achieving a reciprocal 
exchange of information and favours (not governed by rules), to share advice freely, 
to expand the network at will, to inspire each other, to achieve personal goals, and to 
help each other obtain business and career advantages. Networks may help facilitate 
trust and professionalism in society because the people linked together in the network 
know that they can rely on each other (Dobovsek, 2008).
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For example, in China network contacts (guanxi) are a major dynamic in society. The 
Chinese word ‘guanxi’ refers to the concept of drawing on established connections. 
Guanxi bonds people through the exchange of favours. This relationship does not 
have to involve friends, though, where possible, this is preferred. Guanxi can be 
described as a long-term oriented intangible asset (Dunning and Kim, 2007). It can be 
a key factor in achieving business goals and objectives (Zhu and Zhang, 2007) as it 
helps to smooth transport arrangements and collection of payments, build the firm’s 
image and reputation, as well as access the bureaucrats who facilitate business 
transactions. Guanxi in China can be identified with a traditional form of relationship 
marketing; however, it differs from relational exchange in Western society. The 
guiding principles of relational behaviours in guanxi are morality and social norms. 
Guanxi is an informal relationship based on personal affiliations. Exchange partners 
in Western society will have more explicit role expectations and the guiding 
principles of a relational exchange will be legality and rules (Flambard-Ruaud, 2005). 
Guanxi in China results in certain management practices, such as a long-term horizon, 
a consensus approach to decision-making, and a risk reduction approach (Flambard- 
Ruaud, 2005).
In developed economies, it is difficult to operate using networks because of the legal 
and institutional infrastructure which prevents fluid operations of such networks due 
to intellectual property right laws, stringent requirements for transparency, ownership 
and board functioning (Wright et al., 2005). The development of civil law in the West 
has reduced the authority of the business leader of the firm compared to that of leaders 
in the ECs. In the same way, the importance of the contract has reduced flexibility, 
giving less weight to confidence in the word of one’s partner, and made easier the 
development of imposing hierarchical structures and impersonal networks (Flambard- 
Ruaud, 2005).
The lack of strong legal frameworks and ineffective institutional systems has allowed 
a significant increase in opportunism, bribery and corruption in ECs which create the 
greatest potential for distorting investment plans. For example, in September 2002, a 
Lesotho court found Acres International, a Toronto-based firm, guilty of passing 
$260,000 as a bribe to the chief executive of the project. In July 2002, Xerox admitted 
that it had made improper payments of more than $500,000 to government officials in
61
India to increase sales. Red tape and bureaucratic delay also result from dealing with 
corrupt officials or complying with the requirements of corrupt regimes. Firms may 
use bribes to avoid red tape and delays in facilitating project approvals. However, 
Procter & Gamble, as a part of its broader exit strategy from Nigeria closed a Pampers 
plant rather than pay a bribe to a customs official (Doh et al., 2003).
In ECs corruption reduces FDI (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). It can also decrease tax 
revenue, raise transaction costs, and pressure many companies to go underground 
(Wilson, 2006). On an organisational level, corruption results in managerial 
incompetence because managers often promote incompetent leaders and employees. 
According to data from the World Bank, only a few emerging economies have a low 
level of corruption -  Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. However, a number of 
countries (such as Estonia, Chile and Malaysia) have improved their indexes in 
corporate and judicial corruption, and are moving closer to developed countries in 
their ranking (World Bank, 2005).
Many companies attempt to offset the costs of corruption and bureaucracy through the 
selection of different entry modes and structures (Doh et al., 2003). Many prefer to 
overcome these difficulties and barriers in emerging economies by forming an IJV. 
Institutional pressures arising from incumbent state-owned firms and domestic market 
orientation of investor lead to a preference for IJV entry in countries such as 
Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Wright et al.,
2005). Doh et al. (2003) found that in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
economies, the probability of investing through an IJV rather than a wholly owned 
subsidiary increases with the level of corruption.
Entry via an IJV with a local partner may provide access to local networks and reduce 
uncertainty (Doh et al., 2003). Furthermore, it helps organisations to learn about new 
markets (Prahalad and Lieberthal, 1998), develop their brands, and establish a 
distribution system (Arnold and Quelch, 1998).
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4.4 Reasons for Foreign Organisations to Enter the Russian Market
Since 1991 Russia has experienced significant economic changes, turning from a 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy. When they were first opened the 
large Russian markets offered great opportunities for foreign investors. As a result, a 
number of foreign businesses have entered into the Russian market. Before 1991 there 
were 116 US companies already based in Moscow and these were joined by further 
businesses in the following years (Dulworth, 1995). Nevertheless, many organisations 
that have been attracted by the business opportunities in Russia have encountered a 
number of serious obstacles. As has been suggested by a number of studies, the 
Russian environment is very complex and the Russian culture is very different from 
that of the West (Elenkov, 1998).
There are several key reasons why foreign firms are attracted to Russia. Chief among 
them is the vast size of the Russian market with over 150 million people (Fey, 1996; 
Bartley and Minor, 1994). Russia's relatively inexpensive and highly-skilled labour 
force is also viewed as a key attractor (e.g. Fey, 1996; McCarthy et al., 2005). Many 
foreign firms are also eager to enter Russia quickly since it was viewed as relatively 
inexpensive country to develop a base for a business so that when the Russian 
economy stabilized, they would be in a good position to take advantage of the Russian 
market (McCarthy et al., 2005).
Moreover, many foreign investors are attracted by Russia’s sustained economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability, which are viewed as positive components by 
many current foreign investors in Russia (Ernst & Young Report, 2007). Russian real 
GDP growth has accelerated from 7.4 % in 2006 to 8.1 % in 2007, and the data from 
early 2008 indicates further growth of well above 8 % (The World Bank, 2007b). 
However, the current financial crisis has resulted in the significant decrease of 
Russia’s GDP rate in 2008 and 2009. Although Russia's economy emerged from 
recession in the third quarter of 2009, its GDP contracted by 7.9% for the whole of 
2009 (slightly less than the prediction of above 8%). Russia's economy began to grow 
in 2010, with an average growth of 4.5 % (The World Bank, 2011).
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Foreign firms often view Russia as attractive because of the lack of competition in 
many sectors of the Russian market. As a result, companies that were quick to react 
had appealing opportunities (Fey, 1996). In addition, many foreign organisations see 
access to Russia’s natural resources as a major reason to enter the country. Many 
partnerships between Russian and foreign firms were formed in the oil, gas, chemical 
and manufacturing sectors (McCarthy et al., 2005); examples include the TNK oil 
company and British Petroleum, AvtoVAZ and Fiat, the Russian leading Chemical 
company Metafrax and Swedish Perstorp Formox.
4.5 Foreign Direct Investment in Russia
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Russia has been growing steadily since 1999. The 
main factors for this have been: macroeconomic stability, the high growth of 
disposable income, the achievement of investment-grade credit ranking, the flexible 
exchange rate policy, and the easing of currency laws (Savov, 2007). According to the 
World Bank, Russia ranked among the five top countries in terms of cumulative FDI 
over 2001-2007 (World Bank Group Project, 2008). Russia’s FDI was USD 52 billion 
in 2007, comparing to the USD 14.2 billion in 2005. However, during the recent crisis 
it dropped to USD 12 billion (World Bank, 201 lc).
According to Ernst & Young (2007), most foreign investors in Russia have 
significantly increased their profits and sales since 2005. For example, 29 % of 83 
current investors reported their profit increased in the 10-20 % range, while 15 % of 
current investors saw their profits rise more than 50 % in 2005 (see Figure 4.2). 
Moreover, more than 90 % of respondents said that they plan on increasing both their 
business operations and investment in the next three years (Ernst & Young, 2007).
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Figure 4.2: Profits (base: 83 current investors)
Over 50% 
30-50% 
20-30% 
10-20% 
Less than 10%
□  15%
»■ . -I*-1 1 13%
>
i 29%
| 26%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Source: Ernst & Young, 2007: 43
The main reasons of the growth in foreign investment in Russia are its 
macroeconomic situation (i.e. a high GDP rate, better nominal exchange rate, lower 
unemployment, and higher disposable income) (World Bank, 2008c). However, 
Russia remains far behind other countries vying for FDI. China, the world’s leader, 
had a total FDI of USD 63 billion last year -  twice that of Russia (Ernst & Young 
Report, 2007). One of the suggested reasons for this is the intricate Russian 
environment and culture. Therefore, the next sections are going to examine the main 
aspects of Russian culture.
4.6 The H istorical Background o f R ussian Culture
Historical insight is necessary to understand some specificities of the Russian national 
culture.
Many research studies on the Russian business environment (e.g. Schrader, 2004; 
Shleifer and Treisman, 2005; Kets de Vries, 2000; McCarthy et al., 2005; Shama and 
Merrell, 1997) connect people’s values and behaviour with the Soviet experience, 
they do not take into account the Imperial and early periods of Russian history. 
Seventy years of the Soviet era had developed new practices, but this is a very short 
period of time to change people’s values which have been shaping for thousands of 
years.
65
The historical background of Russian culture in this section was written after an 
extensive literature review (e.g. Nikolai Berdiaev, Vasily Klyuchevsky, Dmitry 
Likhachov, Nikolai Karamzin, notes and letters of Dostoevsky, count Leo Tolstoy, 
prince Peter Viazemsky, notes and memoirs of foreign travellers to Russia -  marquis 
de Custine, duke de Liria, and Alexandre Dumas- pere).
Russian history can be divided into four main periods: early (pagan) periods, 
Byzantine period, the Russian Empire, and the USSR. A brief overview of the first 
three periods is very important because after the fall of the Soviet Union many people 
were alarmed with what they perceived as the loss of traditional Russian culture and a 
distinctive Russian identity during the Soviet era, which included the formation of a 
new identity for all Soviet citizens - “the new Soviet person”. So, as the USSR 
collapsed, Russians turned to their roots and many perceived ancestral values have 
since resurfaced. Churches are being restored all across the country, Russian writers 
and artists whose works were banned are once again being honoured, and the 
individual character of ancient cities and communities is once again becoming 
established.
Nowadays, resurgence in the early pagan period can be seen in Russian culture, 
people’s life and daily behaviour. For example, old Russian folklore takes its roots in 
the pagan beliefs of ancient Slavs, much of which is represented in the Russian fairy 
tales. The beliefs and rituals of ancient Slavs are similar to those in many Western 
European countries but, unlike many Western Europeans, the Russians still widely use 
these beliefs in their daily life. The other common practice includes mysticism 
(fortune-telling, tarot cards, and astrology). These beliefs and rituals are more 
widespread in small towns and villages.
The most important aspect of the Byzantine period in Russia was the adoption of 
Orthodox Christianity, which led to a fundamental cultural transformation. Russia 
adopted a whole set of cultural values, beliefs, artefacts and language from the 
Byzantine Empire. The main beliefs of this tradition are considered to be personal 
sacrifice, obedience, and forgiveness. By the middle of the fifteenth century the 
remnants of the Byzantine Empire and other previously powerful Orthodox countries 
(such as Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania) were all conquered by the Turks. Russia
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remained the only fully independent Orthodox country, and Moscow succeeded 
Constantinople as the centre of Orthodox Christendom. At that time the church 
developed a new theory about the role and power of the tsar, which later helped 
Russian tsars to build the tsarist autocracy. The Russian Church and state continued to 
play this central role in the Orthodox world for the next 450 years, carrying out all its 
original rituals and everyday practices.
The period of the Russian Empire was begun with Peter I (Peter the Great, who ruled 
Russia from 1682 to 1725), whose reforms of and modernisation made Russian 
culturally much closer to Western Europe. Next, the reign of Catherine the Great 
(which began in 1762 and ended in 1796) is often regarded as the high point of 
absolutism. Many emperors (Paul I, Alexander I, Alexander II, and Nicholas II) had 
liberal political views and followed a modernisation programme. An autocratic regime 
in Russia caused the Decembrist revolt (December, 1825) when a small circle of 
liberal nobles wanted to install a constitutional monarchy, and it would later help 
create the Narodnaya Volya organisation which assassinated Alexander II in 1881. 
After the failure of the Decembrist revolt Nicholas I turned to the new doctrine of 
Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality. Following Alexander’s II assassination in 
1881, the throne passed to his son Alexander III who reviewed the previous doctrine. 
Alexander III believed that Russia could be saved from chaos only by shutting itself 
off from the subversive influences of Western Europe. Russian society was divided 
into two camps -  Slavophiles and the "decadent" West. The Slavophiles were 
opponents of bureaucracy, preferred the collectivism of the mediaeval Russian world, 
or village community, to the individualism and capitalism of the West. After the 
revolution in 1905 Russia got a constitution and a national-level representative 
assembly (Duma). This system was abolished after the revolution of 1917. The USSR 
was formally established in 1922.
The process of modernisation in the Russian Empire included the development of 
education. In the nineteenth century university education, travelling, and knowledge 
of foreign languages was essential and even necessary (e.g. French was the second 
official language of the Russian Empire).
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On the other hand, until 1861 the majority of Russia’s population were still living as 
serfs and had not been integrated into new ‘western’ Russian culture. Culturally, 
Russia’s serfs were told that intellectual work was only a “gentleman’s amusement” 
and a favourite pastime. As a result, the serfs continued to live by old beliefs and 
traditions which included old pagan habits and the Orthodox Christian faith. By 1917 
the cultural gap between the working and middle classes was great, and would not 
have been common in other countries.
Russian culture of that time was described as a hybrid of Byzantine and the West (e.g. 
Berdiaev, 2000; Likhachov, 1999). Some authors (e.g. Guseynov, 1998) paint Russian 
culture of the nineteenth century, and the first decades of the twentieth century, as a 
hybrid animal with a European head and a Byzantine body.
In 1915-1918, exploring the beliefs and values of Russian people, Berdiaev (2000) 
distinguished two main cultural groups (subcultures) in Russia with the following 
traits (Table 4.6).
Table 4.6: Values in Russia (based on the descriptions of Berdiaev)
1 Group 2 Group
Rational (opinions and actions based on 
reason and knowledge)
Intuitive (opinions and actions based on 
feelings rather than facts or proof)
Individualistic Collectivistic
Elitist Folk origins
Materialistic (believe that only physical 
matter exists and the spiritual world does 
not)
Spiritual values (believe in spiritual 
world)
Source: Berdiaev, 2000
Also, many scholars (e.g. Nikolai Berdiaev, notes and letters of Dostoevsky, notes and 
memoirs of foreign travellers to Russia -  Marquis de Custine) notice that the most 
distinctive trait of Russian culture was the absence of “the happy medium”. For 
example, the level of individualism of the first group was as high as the collectivism 
of the second group.
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The USSR’s politics of community groups strengthened collectivism in Russia. 
Religion as “the opium of the people” was banned. Many educated people (including 
writers, composers, scientists, and merchants) were murdered or sent abroad.
From the start the Soviet government placed a high value on education and scientific 
research. The ordinary people were encouraged to receive an education, which was 
free in the USSR. Many theatres, cinemas, museums, and concert halls were built and 
they were made available for use by all of the people who lived in the cities. 
However, a large part of the Soviet population still lived in villages and small towns. 
The village population did not have a right to travel to the cities. Staying in isolation 
they continued living by their old traditions and beliefs. This may explain: the rapid 
revival of the Orthodox religion and its values after 1991, why superstition and 
mysticism are still common in Russia, and why there was a split in Russian society 
into traditional Slavophiles and the Western leaning group in the 1990s.
4.7 Russian Culture Today
As has been described in Chapter 3, culture can be described as deeply rooted beliefs 
and values. As values differ significantly between countries, then respective 
managerial values and approaches are also likely to differ. Cross-national differences 
in managerial values can be crucial in IJV’s where cooperation and understanding are 
essential to make effective decisions (Elenkov, 1998).
Russian culture was not measured during the Soviet period, and the early description 
of Russian values (Table 4.6) of Berdiaev (2000) at the beginning of the twentieth 
century is based on historical analysis and observations.
One of the first studies on Russian culture and values was conducted in 1999 by the 
Romir Independent Research Centre. According to this survey, a high standard of 
living was found to be of concern to only 17 % of people. Freedom and job were 
chosen as the least important values, whereas security and social values were rated as 
the most important (Salmi and Sharafutdinova, 2008).
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Another investigation was made in 2002. Exploring the dynamics of Russian values 
during the 1990s, the Institute of Socio-Political Research (which is based in the 
Russian Academy of Sciences) found that Russians primarily favoured spiritual 
values, such as the comfort of one’s internal world, family, and an interesting job. 
Material values and success were not found to be significant. Moreover, the study 
shows whether people share individualist or collectivist values. The study compares 
Russians living in Moscow region and those living in the South-West of Russia. It 
found that inhabitants of the Moscow region are very individualistic and their 
mentality is close to that of the West, while it found that the inhabitants of the South- 
West region relate more to collectivistic values. Finally, the most recent analysis of 
Russian values by Russian public opinion research in 2005 confirms all of the 
previous findings: spiritual values were chosen by the majority of respondents and 
esteem, power, and wealth were ranked low (Salmi and Sharafutdinova, 2008).
Elenkov (1997, 1998) measures Russian culture among 178 Russian managers using 
Hofstede’s dimensions. His findings show that Russian executives are collectivistic, 
with high power distance, high levels of femininity, and high uncertainty avoidance.
Overall, Russian values depend significantly on where people live. People living in 
large cities are characterised by individualism, wealth and power values, whereas 
people living in towns and villages share collectivistic, spiritual, and social values 
(Table 4.7). It is interesting that this data coincides with the early findings of 
Berdiaev.
Table 4.7: Values in Russia (derived from the literature review)
Large cities Towns and villages
Individualism Collectivism
Materialistic Spiritual values
High power distance
Femininity
High uncertainty avoidance
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The Russian modem economy and institutional voids will be described next in order 
to explain current managerial practices.
4.8 Russian Economy Today
During the 1990s, Russia underwent extraordinary transformations. The country 
experienced several significant economic, legal, and political developments during the 
1990s that deeply affected business (McCarthy et al., 2000).
The first significant change occurred in the late 1980s when the government in the 
USSR allowed limited market forces to operate within a centrally planned economy 
and established policies encouraging the creation of cooperatives, small businesses, 
and IJVs (McCarthy et al., 2000). Conceived by Gorbachev, the quick-fix strategy 
sought to restructure the Soviet economy within a socialist, centrally planned, one- 
party system (Shama and Merrell, 1997). The objective was to help alleviate the 
inefficiencies of state organisations in such areas as consumer goods and services 
(McCarthy et al., 2000).
Early cooperatives and JVs represented the main types of private and quasi-private 
enterprises allowed by the government. Although some of these organisations were 
private, governments at various levels (such as the Moscow city government) often 
participated in ownership and management. The Law of Soviet State Enterprises of 
1987, for instance, introduced such features of a market-oriented economy as self- 
financing by enterprises (McCarthy et al., 2000). However, the party used officers 
from the Komitet Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti - KGB (Committee for State 
Security) in early IJVs with Western companies to control all the profits from 
business with foreigners (Vinogradova, 2006). In practice, such measures failed 
because they threatened management and workers alike and resulted in lower 
production and higher prices (Shama and Merrell, 1997).
In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia turned to a market-oriented 
economy. Hundreds of thousands of small and medium-sized private firms have since
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sprung up in various areas of the economy (Puffer and McCarthy, 2007). The rapid 
and strong growth of the Russian economy is spread across many relatively new 
industries. For example, retail, communications services, automotive sales, 
maintenance services, insurance, production of construction materials, branded 
consumer durables, value-added foods and beverages, hospitality services, and 
personal care and fitness services are all segments where significant growth has been 
visible and is projected for several years to come (Ernst & Young Report, 2007).
Russia is fast becoming a very attractive market for increasing numbers of foreign 
multinationals like General Motors Corp., Gilette, Renault, Danone and others 
(McCarthy et al., 2000). Furthermore, in 1991 approximately 2,000 IJVs from more 
than 60 countries were registered in Russia, whereas by 1997 this number had 
increased to 16,000. The main partners were the USA and European Union countries 
(mainly Germany, the UK, Finland, France, Italy, and Poland) (Kleyner, 1998).
New reforms that were adopted by the Russian government in 1992 freed almost all 
prices, allowed private ownership of land, permitted privatisation of collective farms, 
motivated privatisation of small enterprises, and enabled the transfer of many state 
enterprises into joint stock companies. An annual inflation rate in 1992 was 1,353 % 
and a 20 % decline in the GDP. By 1993, the monthly inflation rate was 25 %, and the 
rate of decline of the GDP had eased. Russian managers were facing competition and 
inflation for the first time in their professional lives (Shama and Merrell, 1997).
Among the problems which occurred during the transition to a market economy were 
the Soviet educational and science systems. Many teachers and scientists, together 
with doctors and computer programmers emigrated from Russia. A Harvard study 
indicates that Russia has lost between 10,000 and 30,000 scientists since 1991 
(Mereu, 2002). Other sources estimate the number between 500,000 and 800,000 
scientists (BBC, 2002). The main reasons of this emigration were low wages and a 
decline in the prestige of intellectual labour. For example, the amount of funds for 
scientists has declined and the government invests less money in R&D (Genov, 2007).
Moreover, according to a conservative World Bank estimate, $88.7 billion in funds 
were transferred from Russia between 1993 and 1996 (McCarthy et al., 2000). Later
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data shows that in 2004 $33 billion were transferred from Russia and between January 
and December 2008 - $85 billion (Fitch Ratings, 2005).
In addition, organised crime reached pandemic levels among politicians, corrupt 
government bureaucrats, and quasi-business entities (May et al., 2000). Part of this 
culture has been tax evasion, manifested in under-reporting such economic activities 
as production, sales and profits, especially by private-sector companies (Shama and 
Merrell, 1997).
In the middle of the 1990s substantial control over the Russian economy was taken by 
the leaders of the largest financial-industrial enterprise groups -  the oligarchs. 
Oligarchic capitalism refers to the economic activities of a small number of very large 
and powerful financial-industrial groups operating in highly concentrated industries in 
the private sector, predominantly in natural resources (Puffer and McCarthy, 2007).
While most industrial branches of the Russian economy experienced a sharp decline 
for most of the 1990s, gas and oil production remained relatively stable, and the 
electricity sector maintained more than enough capacity to meet demand. Russia 
possesses roughly one-third of the world’s natural gas reserves -  mostly concentrated 
in 20 large fields -  and currently supplies a quarter of all gas on the world market. 
The natural gas sector is dominated by Gazprom, in which the government has a stake 
of more than 50 %. Gazprom has a virtual monopoly on the production, transport, 
processing, and storage of gas (Ernst & Young Report, 2007).
Russia’s electrical power infrastructure (consisting of approximately 215 million 
kilowatts of generating power and 2.7 million kilometres of high- and low-voltage 
grid) represents the largest such infrastructure in the world. The volume of Russian 
electricity production is second only to that of the United States. The Russian 
electrical company RAO Unifited Energy Systems (RAO UES) and its subsidiary 
firms are responsible for 70 % of the production and supply of electricity (Ernst & 
Young Report, 2007).
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Russian oil reserves are the seventh largest in the world and amount to over 69 billion 
barrels (Ernst & Young Report, 2007). The majority of oil resources in Russia are 
controlled by LUKoil and Rosneft companies.
All these empires are owned by a small number of extremely wealthy and powerful 
people, many of whom are included on Fortune’s billionaires list (Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2007).
This form dominated the Russian economy in the second half of the 1990s and early 
2000s. It still remains as an important, but less dominant component of the economy. 
Putin’s election signalled a vastly increased role for the government in the economy 
and business. The ownership of some companies acquired by the oligarchs became the 
subject of challenges from the state (Puffer and McCarthy, 2007). For instance, in 
2003 the Yukos-Khodorkovsky case called into question the role of the Russian 
government in business and the economy, the type of economic system that was 
emerging, and the implications for Russia’s global competitiveness (Puffer and 
McCarthy, 2007). The arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, CEO of the largest oil 
company in Russia, was widely believed to be designed to punish Yukos for funding 
liberal political parties (Shleifer and Treisman, 2005).
After 2003, the Russian government gained more influence over the economy by 
controlling a number of major corporations in which it has majority or significant 
ownership (Puffer and McCarthy, 2007). For example, after the prison sentence of 
Khodorkovsky, Yukos’s assets were broken up and sold at auction. The assets created 
the basis for the newly created petroleum company, Rosneft. Moreover, the 
government obtained more than 50 % of Gazprom’s shares, which is the Russian gas 
monopoly. Next, two Russian oligarchs of Interros, one of the largest financial 
groups, and Roman Abramovich of Sibneft sold a large share of their business to the 
government. Moreover, the government announced in 2006 that it intended to gain 
majority control of Alrosa, the Russian diamond monopoly (Puffer and McCarthy, 
2007).
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So, the Russian government still plays a very large role in economy and the Russian 
managerial mentality is characterised by a high degree of political-influence 
orientation and uncertainty avoidance (Elenkov, 1998).
4.9 Institutional Voids in Russia
There is a high degree of uncertainty and risk for businesses in Russia due to the 
absence of a formal market infrastructure, and a lack of sufficient experience and 
knowledge about working under such conditions (Aleshin, 2001).
Russia is a very large country (stretching across 9 time zones) and a major proportion 
of the population lives in the western part of the country. Communication 
infrastructures (e.g. railways and postal services) are mainly developed in the western 
part of Russia. Consequently, the main economic activity, industries and infrastructure 
are concentrated around the large cities (with Moscow leading by a significant 
margin) and in the western part of Russia. Consequently, foreign business has a 
relatively limited choice of areas in which to invest (Savov, 2007).
Large distances between cities make contacts with suppliers and clients slower and 
increase costs. Moreover, communication processes become complicated as the 
number of Internet users in Russia is very low. In 2008, only 32 % of people had the 
Internet access (World Bank, 2010) due to the high prices on the Internet services 
(World Economic Forum, 2007b). Russia scores high in the number of fixed lines and 
mobile phone subscribers (172 subscribers per 100 people) (World Bank, 2010). 
However, for organisations the Internet is a more effective and faster way to contact 
their customers, and promote products and services. For customers, the Internet is 
also a great source of information and knowledge, as well as an access to many 
products and services. There is no demographic information about Internet users in 
Russia. Nevertheless, it can be suggested that the majority of them live in large cities 
because in many Russian towns and villages Internet services are still unavailable.
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The capital market in Russia is still very weak. There are few credit-rating agencies or 
investment analysts. Venture capital is available only for organisations in the most 
profitable businesses, such as real estate development and natural resources. In 
addition, the banking system is not well developed. Although the Russian banking 
system is stronger in comparison with Brazil or China, it is mainly dominated by 
state-owned banks (Khanna et al., 2005).
According to recent World Bank data, Russia has made a significant progress during 
the last year in the availability of credit for business. In 2007 Russia was ranked 156 
among 178 countries, whereas in 2010 it had moved to 87th (World Bank, 201 Id). 
Although the consumer credit market is booming in Russia, the central bank’s interest 
rate still remains very high (reaching 14-15 %) (Central Bank of Russia, 2011). This 
has a number of impacts on Russia’s economy. Firstly, these factors prevent an 
increase in purchasing power, Russia’s credit and financial services are in high 
demand among people with lower incomes. Secondly, it prevents organisational and 
industrial growth (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002).
Russia’s relatively inexpensive and highly-skilled labour force is viewed as one of the 
main attractors for foreign investors (e.g. Fey, 1996; McCarthy et al., 2005). Russia is 
one of the leaders in tertiary enrolment and the rate of literacy is still high (UNESCO, 
2007). Moreover, in comparison with other emerging and transition economies, 
Russia has many scientists and researchers. In 2005 the number of researchers per 
1,000,000 inhabitants was 3,227, and in 2006 this number has increased to 3,255 
(Table 4.8).
Higher education is very popular in Russia. There are also many institutes and 
universities. The quality of university education is high, predominantly in 
engineering, natural sciences and mathematics because of the USSR’s focus on these 
subjects (Fey and Bjorkman, 2001). Although there is no recent tradition of business 
education in Russia, the first Russian business school, the Moscow Institute of 
Commerce, was founded in 1907 on the private donations of merchants. This was the 
only institute which prepared qualified businessman. In the USSR the only type of 
business education which was available was administrative training, teaching how to 
run a centrally planned economy. This education was mainly available for the top
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leaders of the Communist party and their children. Consequently, many Russian 
executives in the Communist era typically had an engineering background (Fey and 
Bjorkman, 2001; Kets de Vries, 2000). Nowadays, there are still many lecturers and 
professors with experience of a command economy teaching in Russian business 
schools.
Table 4.8: Number of Researchers per 1,000,000 Inhabitants
Country 2005 2006
Bulgaria 1,298 1,344
Croatia 1,126 1,148
Latvia 1,426 1,758
Poland 1,627 1,562
Russia 3,227 3,255
China 852 926
Argentina 822 895
France 3,353 n/a
Germany 3,359 3,386
Netherlands 2,477 2,524
UK 2,995 3,033
USA 4,651 n/a
Source: UNESCO, 2007
Russian managers can be divided into two main groups: the older generation who 
received their education and experience in the USSR and the younger generation. The 
process of adjustment to the new Russian society and economy can be easier for the 
new generation because for the younger group of business people the emphasis will be 
on learning, whereas for the older generation the main challenge is unlearning (Kets 
de Vries, 2000). Understanding the main characteristics of both groups is important 
because managers play the most important role in IJV formation. However, as the new 
generation of managers has just started replacing the older generation, there is no 
research and data about their managerial attitudes and practices. Thus, the 
characteristics of the older group of managers are discussed in this section.
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Managerial attitudes and orientation is one of the main problems foreign firms face in 
Russia (Ennew et al., 2000; McCarthy et al., 2005; Kets de Vries, 2000). In Russia 
this problem is much stronger than in other ECs because of the lack of experience of a 
market economy, a highly integrated industrial structure, and heavily entrenched 
employee rights (Ennew et al., 2000).
The older generation of managers who obtained their basic experience in state-owned 
enterprises carry their values from their past. Authoritarianism and the preference for 
concentrating power at the top created vastly hierarchical organisations. Focused on 
running centrally planned economy, Soviet education did not devote attention to 
management styles, marketing, consumer behaviour, production management, 
business strategy, HR, nor organisational development. It also did not take into 
account basic psychological concepts. So, Russian managers frequently treat their 
employees like robots and have little respect for the person. Employees in such 
organisations are usually idle and do not show much initiative. Also, learning and 
information sharing is very slow (McCarthy et al., 2005). Moreover, being new to the 
concepts of market economy and management, many Russian executives lack the 
vocabulary to communicate effectively about business issues (Kets de Vries, 2000). 
Overall, many Russian organisations have a punishment-oriented culture with highly 
directive leaders who centralise decision-making within themselves and operate 
within rigid hierarchies (McCarthy et al., 2005).
4.10 Government Regulations
The State and government regulations play a very important role in Russia. The 
state’s involvement in business is a constant feature of Russian culture and 
institutions. As has been mentioned above, after a short period of market reforms, in 
2003 the Russian government once again regained a strong influence over business.
Nowadays, the levels of bureaucracy and corruption in Russia are much higher than in 
many ECs. For example, Khanna et al. (2007) compared different economic indices, 
such as governance indicators and corruption perceptions between Brazil, Russia,
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China and India. They show that while three of these countries share similar markets, 
Russia is an outlier on many parameters (Khanna et al., 2005). Also, foreign investors 
in Russia see bureaucracy and corruption as the main problems when they enter and 
operate in the Russian market (Savov, 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Ernst & 
Young, 2007). For example, in Russia in order to get a licence for a business, firms 
are often required to obtain a variety of documents and the process takes on average 
704 days. In fact, the World Bank ranks Russia 177th out of 178 countries when it 
comes to dealing with licences (World Bank Group Project, 2007). While Russia 
scored poorly on all counts, the data (see Table 4.9 and Figure 4.3) shows that while 
the number of procedures and the length of time it takes to obtain a licence has been 
relatively stable, the cost expressed as a percentage of per capita income has increased 
significantly.
Table 4.9: Historical Data: Dealing with Licences in Russia
2006 2007 2008
Rank - 172 177
Procedures (number) 56 56 54
Duration (days) 739 739 704
Cost (% of income per capita) 404.6 317.7 3788.4
Source: World Bank Group Project, 2008: 14
Part of these increased costs can come from an increase in corruption, as officials 
from many sides (health, fire safety, environmental) have significant discretion in 
delaying the issuance of a licence (Savov, 2007).
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Figure 4.3: Costs versus Duration: Comparison with Other Countries
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For instance, licence registration for business in Russia takes more time than the 
benchmark of five days (Figures 4.4 and 4.5) and Russian firms are sometimes 
required to obtain a large number of permissive documents.
Figure 4.4: Methods of Registration
u>
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Source: CEFIR, 2007
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Figure 4.5: Methods of Registration
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Registration costs have risen due to the increased use of intermediaries (Savov, 2007). 
Consequently, in 2006 there was an increase in the number of firms that used personal 
connections (17 % of all firms) and gave gifts or bribes (12 %) during the registration 
process. In fact, only 0.1 % of firms appealed formally.
Moreover, the Centre of Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), with financial 
support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has 
been monitoring the level of regulatory burden imposed by the government agencies 
on small businesses. CEFIR’s findings suggest that there was a gradual improvement 
in the business environment for SMEs during the period 2001-2006. One of the more 
recent negative tendencies to emerge was that the respondents felt that unequal 
competition and corruption had become more serious problems. CEFIR’s report 
highlights such areas of concern for business as inspections (CEFIR, 2007).
Various polls have shown that inspections by government and municipal authorities 
have become a perennial problem for companies in Russia. CEFIR also concludes that 
tax inspections have become a more serious problem when compared with 2004. The 
findings of 2006 by CEFIR monitoring highlight the following areas of concern 
(Savov, 2007):
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• Repeat inspections: The majority of the inspecting agencies comply with the 
norms provided by the law and do not visit any particular firm more than once 
every two years. However, there are numerous inspections: the tax, fire and 
sanitary authorities and the police all violated this benchmark during 2003- 
2006 in 35%, 34%, 21% and 13% of firms polled, respectively.
• Unscheduled inspections: Around half of all inspections conducted by the 
police and trade inspectors were unplanned, while more than 30% of the 
inspections conducted by the tax and fire inspections were administered 
without a warrant, which should not happen according to the law (CEFIR, 
2007).
Also, CEFIR (2007) surveyed corruption relative to SMEs in various regions. It found 
that some regions of Russia are less influenced by corruption than others. Moreover, 
the situation appears to have improved on average. Out of the 20 regions surveyed, 15 
regions felt less pressure to give bribes in 2006 which compared with 11 in 2005 and 
nine in 2004 (Figure 4.6). Most notably, pressure to give bribes has decreased 
dramatically in Moscow and St Petersburg; however, some areas did report higher 
corruption pressure, such as the Primorskiy and Smolensk regions. Many regions in 
Russia that have a high level of corruption are also the most developed and have the 
highest concentration of business.
Figure 4.6: Pressure to Give Bribes (by region)
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In 2010 Russia was ranked very highly by the World Bank on the contract 
enforcement scale, being 18th among 178 countries (World Bank, 2011b). Enforcing 
contractual obligations (i.e. when a counterparty defaults on its part of a contract) 
provides an important foundation to business stability. Nevertheless, in Russia 
businesses still often use non-court mechanisms to enforce contractual relations, for 
example: self-enforcing agreements using prepayment and barter transactions; third- 
party enforcement through business associations; financial industrial groups; and 
administrative mechanisms such as local or regional government, bankruptcy 
commissions, securities commission, and anti-monopoly committees (Savov, 2007).
Private enforcement through tribunals and courts is less likely to be used by Russian 
companies. Russian judges have found it difficult to keep up with the many laws and 
procedural rules, which can change daily. The numbers of court-houses were 
insufficient to satisfy the needs of the rapidly growing private sector and the judges 
were left after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Another problem is a reportedly high 
level of corruption among judges and judicial enforcers, which is compounded by low 
salaries and a lack of oversight (Vinogradova, 2006). Consequently, Russia is ranked 
very low injudicial independence (see Table 4.10).
Because of the high level of corruption and bureaucracy in Russia, people’s 
interactions, transactions, and spheres of trust are in many cases still limited to their 
rather closed social networks and people strongly refer to, and rely on, their personal 
networks (Schrader, 2004).
Personal networks in Russia are usually mobilised among family and friends. Russian 
entrepreneurs adopt systematic networking strategies to build and maintain effective 
networks for entrepreneurial success. The material reciprocity and rational 
calculations about contacts’ resources are the main selection factor for network 
recruitment (Batjargal, 2006).
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Table 4.10: Judicial Independence
Is the judiciary independent from political influences of members of government 
citizens or firms? (1 = no heavily influenced 7 = yes entirely independent)
Rank Country Score
1 Germany 6.53
12 United Kingdom 6.04
28 France 5.26
37 United States 5.06
56 Czech Republic 4.10
73 Lithuania 3.60
81 China 3.43
101 Bulgaria 2.75
102 Russia 2.70
107 Ukraine 2.52
108 Georgia 2.52
127 Venezuela 1.19
Source: World Economic Forum. INSEAD, 2007a
As connections refer to a strong reliance upon personal networks in conducting 
business, trust is typically generated only within such networks. In the Communist 
period, networks were imperative for most people to accomplish virtually anything in 
their everyday lives. A study of Russian entrepreneurs by Puffer and McCarthy (2007) 
found that network connections reduced uncertainties and risk in financial 
transactions, provided access to resources and loans, and helped increase sales and 
profits. Also, networks are used extensively by the state to influence companies’ 
activities through its personal contacts with industry and links with the media and 
banks (Buck, 2003).
The other consequence of the Soviet politics and current corruption is very low trust. 
Many Russians do not trust others because of the moral heritage of the Soviet regime 
with its secrets and lies, the current institutional chaos, and the widespread deception 
and violence. In this environment, networking activities become very costly. As a
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result, the luck of trust makes network expansion and enrichment difficult and 
expensive (Batjargal, 2006).
In common with other transition economies, economic actors in Russia use personal 
relationships as hedging safeguards against legal, institutional and environmental 
uncertainties. One leading Russian sociologist, who was interviewed by Batjargal 
said:
Russian entrepreneurship is embedded in neither markets nor 
hierarchy but in a hybrid form o f  the two. There exist therefore 
parallel structures where the same amount o f  money and 
connections has different values in each. You make the same 
volume o f  profit by spending different amount o f  money. 
Succeeding in Russian capitalism depends not only on your 
financial capability but also on many other factors such as 
informal networks, trust, etc. (Batjargal, 2003: 541)
Hence, poorly developed and weak institutions, economic and political instability, and 
a lack of established business culture has created corruption in all levels of state 
authority, bribery, and a lack of trust (Vinogradova, 2006; Taylor et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, it forced many companies to evade taxes, and under-report sales and 
profits.
4.11 Under-reported Economy
Official statistics are widely used by international business to access consumer 
demand, portray a standard of living, and examine currency stability. By this account, 
Russia’s official GDP declined in real terms by 13 % in 1991, 20 % in 1992, 12 % in 
1993, and 15 % in 1994, making for a combined decline of 50-60 % over four years. 
Officially, Russian GDP continued to decline in 1995 and 1996 (Shama and Merrell, 
1997).
Russia’s private sector, now constitutes approximately 70 % of the economy (Peng, 
2001), and has been growing by 15 to 150 % annually since 1992 (Shanna and 
Merrell, 1997). Moreover, the population in Russia has been experiencing an
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improving standard of living since 1994. For example, average living space increased 
from 16 square meters per person in 1990 to 19 in 2000 and 21 square meters in 2005 
(Goskomstat, 2008). Private ownership of cars doubled between 1991 and 2000. The 
number of Russians going abroad as tourists rose from 1.6 million in 1993 to 4.3 
million in 2000 (Shleifer and Treisman, 2005).
Furthermore, about 90 % of private-sector income and about 40 % of all wages are 
never reported to Goskomstat and are not reflected in the official reports of Russia’s 
GDP and per capita income (PCI). These unreported earnings are part of the informal 
economy, which may be larger than the official economy (Shana and Merrell, 1997). 
The tax burden has driven many companies to tax evasion, and the under-reporting of 
sales and profits (Vinogradova, 2006; Shana and Merrell, 1997). Under-reporting 
economic activity is mainly a private-sector phenomenon (Shana and Merrell, 1997).
There is little research on the unreported economy in Russia. Shana and Merrell 
(1997) interviewed 20 managers in Russia from different private companies. All their 
interviewees said that they do not report all their profit and sales. On average, only 10 
% of incomes were reported by these organisations and 90 % was unreported. 
Incomes were usually not reported in order to minimise possible taxes (Shana and 
Merrell, 1997).
Tactics used by private companies to avoid reporting income include cash deals, 
double sets of books, bogus capital expenses, fictitious subcontracts, foreign trade, 
and “creative” lists of employees (Shana and Merrell, 1997).
For example, in cash deals (i.e. purchasing from suppliers and selling to customers in 
cash) usually one in ten transactions is recorded and reported (Shana and Merrell, 
1997). In the two sets of books case, there is one ‘official’ contract with fictitious 
prices and volumes of supplied or purchased goods or services, and then there is 
another document, kept for internal records, that reflects the real money and 
goods/services exchanged (Vinogradova, 2006). This tactic is usually used with cash 
deals. When a bogus capital expenditure is used, the company generates fake 
documents from cooperative suppliers, and the cost of the capital good is charged 
against company revenues to reduce profits and taxes. A real capital good does not
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change hands, only the documents do. The use of fictitious subcontracts involves the 
cooperation of understanding people in other businesses who give receipts for 
specified sums of money, presumably for services performed for a company. These 
accommodating subcontractors are paid 5-7 % of the sum specified in the fictitious 
subcontract (Shana and Merrell, 1997). Companies with large export activity often 
hide some of their revenues in foreign banks and report lower incomes and profits. 
Finally, there is the listing or non-listing of employees. Some organisations do not 
declare all employees. Those employees who are not declared are paid in cash. The 
other technique is to declare all employees but report only 10 % of their actual wages 
(Shana and Merrell, 1997). However, those organisations that require transfers of 
large sums of money, or that involve large, especially state-owned enterprises as 
transacting parties rarely use these techniques (Vinogradova, 2006).
So, foreign managers working with Russia face very different managerial practices 
and behaviour, and these differences may create serious troubles in an IJVs 
negotiations and operation. Overall, many Russian managers may lack a business 
education, they often have an autocratic management style, and, because of 
environmental and political uncertainty, they are short-term oriented. The level of 
trust among Russian executives is very low and they prefer to rely on their personal 
networks.
4.12 Summary
The first two chapters discussed theories and concepts relative to alliances and IJVs. 
Cultural implications associated with IJV success were considered. In order to analyse 
organisational culture in IJVs in Russia. This thesis pays particular attention to the 
main aspects of ECs in order to analyse organisational culture in IJVs in Russia. 
Organisational culture in ECs is shown to be different from that of developed 
countries, not only because of differences in national culture but also because culture 
may be influenced by institutional voids. This chapter highlights the main 
characteristics of Russian culture and business that inform the main research 
objectives.
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Research Methodology
This chapter describes the objectives and approach which are used in this research. 
The main aim of this research project is to understand and analyse the effects of 
organisational culture, and the effects of their differences, on IJV performance in 
Russia. This chapter will first identify the research questions and objectives. It will 
then discuss the benefits of different methodologies and the design of questionnaires. 
This chapter then focuses on: sampling for the study, interview procedures and 
analysis, questionnaire distribution and collection, and the methods which are used to 
analyse the questionnaire and interview data.
5.1 Research Paradigm
There are two main research traditions utilised in cultural studies: a positivist 
approach (Hofstede, 1990) and an interpretivist approach (Smircich, 1983). These two 
methodological paradigms are based on different underlying assumptions about 
culture and IJVs.
A positivist approach suggests that the forces shaping social behaviour may be studied 
using scientific methods. A positivist approach may suggest greater objectivity 
through the use of quantitative methods because they allow for the collection of 
numerical data presuming “truth” over opinion and bias (Carey, 1989; Schwandt, 
1997). A form of elitism (Eurich, 1985; Greenwood and Levin, 2000) and “cultural 
pedagogy” (Kincheloe, 1995; Giroux, 1997; McLaren, 1997; Berry, 1998) has been 
described to underline a limited access to “understanding” provided by this 
“scientific” approach in pursuit of “truth”. Positivists believe that researchers should 
not directly interact with the people they are studying because they may influence 
their behaviour (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). This presents some problems in a search 
for links between culture and IJV performance.
Quantitative methods are unlikely to develop a framework for our understanding of 
complex links between culture and IJV performance. While quantitative research may
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provide some objective measures for mathematical data treatment, the provision of 
data reflecting managerial values, feelings and behaviour are difficult to measure by a 
more numerical approach. Thus, an approach that seeks to explore the more complex 
side of human nature is required and this research adopts an interpretivism approach 
to gain a deeper insight into the cultural context of IJVs.
Interpretivism arose from the recognition that the human sciences were fundamentally 
different from the natural sciences (Ellson, 2004). For interpretivists the social world 
consists of, and is constructed through, meanings. Interpretivism is a means of 
analysis of verbal data in phenomenology (Agar, 1980; Daft and Weick, 1984; 
Smircich and Stubbart, 1985; Guba, 1990; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The 
interpretivist uses a subjective approach to describe behaviour and explain that 
behaviour from the point of view of those involved. An interpretive perspective 
encourages personal involvement and emphasises knowledge as “standpoint 
dependent ” (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985: 728). An interpretivist methodology leans 
toward the collection of qualitative data (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).
This study seeks to explore the questions related to cultural influences on IJV 
performance suggesting the need for an ontological approach based on qualitative 
methods. The case method offers the practical potential for observing a business 
within a changing environment, patterns of behaviour (Stake, 1988), access 
(Silverman, 2001), and the possibility of authenticity, plausibility and criticality 
(Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993). Interpretivism allows the researcher to gain insight 
into managerial culture and understand and interpret human actions within their 
cultural context. The epistemology of interpretivism leads to the need to interact 
closely with the subject of the study. These ontological and epistemological needs 
influence the research design and these needs are discussed next.
5.2 Research Questions
Although many researchers agree that organisational culture plays an important role in 
IJVs, the literature review failed to find a previous study which has investigated this 
issue. Many of the research studies which concentrate on the Russian business
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environment, or on IJVs in Russia, were written seven to twelve years ago; however, 
taking into account the highly turbulent Russian economy during this period, most of 
the information presented in these studies is now outdated. Consequently, the 
importance of organisational culture in IJVs in Russia is selected as a primary focus 
of this research project.
After analysing the existing theories on organisational culture and its influence on 
IJV’s performance, it was found that cultural incompatibility is one of the leading 
reasons of IJV dissimilation and conflict in IJVs. Therefore, this study was designed 
to explore and identify how differences in organisational culture can influence the 
success, or dissolution, of IJVs in Russia.
Another of the aims of this study is to evaluate and increase the understanding of the 
role of organisational culture in the IJV performance within a Russian context. The 
paramount objectives of this research are:
• To conceptualise the strategic alliance, IJVs and organisational culture.
• To identify the types of relationships between organisational culture and IJV 
performance.
• To explore the context of emerging economies, and in particular Russia, and 
also to explore what factors influence the organisational culture in these 
countries.
• To examine the organisational culture in IJVs in Russia.
• To explore how differences in organisational cultures may affect the 
performance of IJVs.
This research aims to answer five main questions:
1. What is the type of organisational culture of IJVs in Russia?
a. What are the managerial values in Russia?
b. What are the managerial practices?
2. Do successful and unsuccessful IJVs in Russia have different organisational 
cultures?
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3. What are the main organisational culture differences between IJVs in Russia 
and their partners?
4. Do organisational culture differences influence IJV success?
5. What is the better cultural fit for IJVs in Russia?
In order to investigate all of these issues, particular attention will be paid to the 
properties of IJVs in Russia.
5.3 Research Methods
One of the goals of this study is to combine both qualitative and quantitative 
methodology to provide a more thorough understanding of the questions being 
investigated. As many authors have indicated, the study of culture and its influences 
benefits from the combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology in order to 
yield more comprehensive and meaningful data (e.g. Hofstede, 1984; Hines, 1993; 
Kiessling and Harvey, 2005; Reiter et al., 2010; Yauch and Steudel, 2002). Although 
most of the previous research studies on organisational culture and IJVs have used a 
questionnaire methodology (e.g. Ralston et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2005; Fey and 
Denison, 2003; Van Muijen and Koopman, 1994), questionnaires alone are not able to 
investigate this topic in-depth. Interviews can help to yield rich, or in-depth, data 
(Hall and Hall, 1996) and they offer the possibility, through empathetic listening, to 
achieve a thorough insight (De Witte and Van Muijen, 1999). They are also ideally 
suited to examining topics in which several different levels of meaning need to be 
explored (King, 1994). A qualitative methodology was found to be especially 
necessary in this study for capturing the complexity and depth of the issues which 
influence IJVs in Russia, as well as to examine the role that organisational culture 
plays in this.
While interviews help to collect in-depth data about IJV and its organisational culture, 
questionnaires may provide further valuable information about the cultural values and 
practices of managers. In previous studies questionnaires have been the most popular 
method used to collect data about values (e.g. Schwartz, 2001; Elenkov, 1997; Kozan, 
2002; Smith et al., 2002; Doran, 2009). Questionnaires are also less time consuming
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and they may help to collect data from a number of managers in the IJV. Therefore, in 
this research project it was decided to use both qualitative and quantitative methods: 
information about managerial values and practices was gathered through the use of 
questionnaires, while interviews with senior managers provided information about an 
IJV, its partners, and the differences in organisational culture.
One of the best ways to study the “cultural fit” in IJVs is to access the IJV and its 
partners; however, this requires a lot of time and travel. For example, in order to get 
access to the senior managers of an IJV and its partners, the researcher first has to 
establish a rapport with the respondents and develop a relationship and trust. This is 
particularly important for data collection in Russia because the Russian people are not 
used to being interviewed and they are very suspicious at any attempts to learn their 
views (Fey, 1996). Consequently, in this research it was decided to access only the 
senior managers of Russian IJVs.
The interviews were conducted between November 2009 and February 2010. The 
interviews were one to three hours in length and they were conducted with the CEOs 
(in some cases other senior managers from the IJVs) of seventeen IJVs which are 
based in Russia. The interviews attempted to identify how the differences in the 
organisational cultures of an IJV and its partners can influence the success of an IJV. 
Further data was then collected through questionnaires.
5.4 Questionnaire Design
Questionnaires are one of the most commonly applied and efficient methods for 
collecting standardised data. They allow respondents to reply at a time which is 
convenient for themselves, while also ensuring minimum disruption to the 
organisation.
The questionnaires used in this study are comprised of five-point Likert-type scales 
(see Appendix 2 and 3). The choice of Likert-type scales was caused by several 
factors. The main advantage of this scale is that it is easier to read and quicker to 
complete than other types of scales. This point was especially important for this study
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because the senior managers were the questionnaire respondents. The senior managers 
are very busy and in order to increase the response rate, it was beneficial to have 
questionnaires which were quick to complete. Also, five-point Likert-type scales have 
been shown to possess reliability equivalent to the other scales (Neuman, 2000). For 
these reasons, the extensive use of five-point Likert-type scales in this study seemed 
to be justified and optimal.
As mentioned above, a modified version of Schwartz’s instrument developed by Stem 
et al. (1998) was used to collect data on values. This questionnaire aims to measure 
the value structure of the top managers in IJVs. The four value structures which were 
used are: altruistic values, traditional (or conservation) values, self-enhancement (or 
egoistic) values, and openness to change values.
The second, quantitative phase of the research includes a survey to measure 
manager’s perceptions of the practices in their work situation and estimate the type of 
organisational culture (Appendix 3). The four types of organisational culture 
measured by this questionnaire are: support, innovation, rules, and goal orientation. 
This survey is developed by Van Muijen et al. (1999) to measure observable 
behaviours, procedures, and policies within organisations.
All of the questionnaires which were used in this study have been previously used in 
other research, and as such their reliability and validity have been tested (e.g. 
Fritzsche and Oz, 2007; Stem et al., 1998; Van Muijen et al., 1999); therefore, this 
study was able to minimise any problems with the questionnaire’s usefulness as 
predictors of relevant attitudes and behaviours.
5.5 Translation
There are many cross-cultural studies which are based on the use of an adapted, or 
translated, questionnaire which has originally been developed for use in another 
country. However, using an adapted, or translated, questionnaire does not necessarily 
ensure that it measures the same constructs as the original, this issue arises because of 
the inevitable cultural and lingual differences (Lin et al., 2005). For example,
94
translation may cause a number of problems, such as: poor wording, inaccurate 
translation, or inappropriateness of item content. One of the most widely used 
techniques to detect translation bias is an independent back translation, as 
recommended by Brislin (1970). An independent back-translation means that:
An original translation would render items from the original 
version o f  the instrument to a second language, and a second 
translator—one not familiar with the instrument—would 
translate the instrument back into the original language. 
(Geisinger, 1994: 306)
Several steps were taken in this research project to ensure the competence of the 
questionnaires. Firstly, the questionnaires were reviewed by the researcher’s 
supervisor and the Ethical Committee of Cardiff Business School. Changes were 
made to correct minor problems that were identified. Then, the questionnaires were 
translated into Russian by a native Russian speaker. Once this was complete the 
questionnaires were back-translated into English by another person who is fluent in 
both Russian and English (this translator moved to the UK at the age of 12 and holds a 
Master’s degree in business). Finally, the completed Russian and English versions 
were reviewed by a native speaker of Russian and English (this translator is currently 
studying a PhD in Psychology). The same technique (back translation) was applied to 
ensure the efficiency of interview data.
5.6 Sample
In order to increase the researcher’s understanding of the IJVs in Russia, personal 
interviews (each averaging two and a half hours in length) were conducted with either 
the CEOs or the senior managers responsible for the IJV development. The senior 
managers at each IJV in Russia were then asked to fill in the questionnaires.
The senior managers were selected for interviews on the basis of their expertise and 
relevance to the research and their influence, prominence, and knowledge of the 
company suggested as elite interview” (Marshall and Rossman, 1995) or “high-
status interview” (King, 1994). Elite interviewing has many advanti Senior
managers holding a senior position within an organisation can provide the researcher 
with valuable information about an IJV and its partners. They are likely to be familiar 
with the legal structure of the organisation and the actual relationship between an IJV 
and its partners.
However, elite interviews also have some difficulties related to access. Senior 
managers are usually busy people working under a demanding time schedule and 
difficult to contact to arrange a meeting. Another disadvantage in interviewing senior 
managers is that the interviewer may have to adapt the planned-for structure of the 
interview based on the wishes and preferences of the senior manager (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1995). Consequently, elite interviews place onerous demands on the 
researcher including a working application and knowledge of the subject as well as a 
high degree of confidence (King, 1994). However, the insights and meanings and the 
quality of information that they may provide (Marshall and Rossman, 1995) can be 
original and hugely valuable to the research process.
5.6.1 Sampling Requirements
To be included in the sample, an IJV had to be located in the Moscow, Perm, or 
Ekaterinburg regions. The Moscow region is the largest in Russia and it has the 
largest concentration of IJVs. Meanwhile, Perm and Ekaterinburg are both large cities 
with a population of 1 and 1.2 million respectively. Perm is situated in the European 
part of Russia, near the Ural Mountains, while Ekaterinburg is situated on the eastern 
side of the Ural mountain range. Both cities have been major trade and industrial 
centres since the time of Imperial Russia.
To be included in this study, the IJVs were required to employ at least fifteen people 
and to be set up by both a Russian organisation and a foreign company. The IJVs must 
also have been started before September 2007, in order to allow adequate time for 
performance and organisational culture to stabilise. This date was chosen because in 
the first two years IJV performance is often irregular and the organisational culture is 
uncertain (Woodcock et al., 1994).
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This study included IJVs with two and more parent firms from different sectors. In 
addition, to gather more information and learn the experience of IJVs in Russia it was 
decided to include at least one IJV which is no longer operating. This IJV had to be 
operating in Russia for at least five years and to have employed no less than fifteen 
employees.
5.6,2 Sample Selection
The initial list of 827 IJVs in Russia was obtained from Russian governmental 
organisations and commercial databases. The IJV had to be at least two years old and 
to be located in Moscow, Perm, or Ekaterinburg regions. Then, 350 IJVs were 
randomly chosen for this study. However, it was soon found that many of the IJVs in 
the list could not be contacted because they had gone out of business. In addition, 
many of the contacted IJVs had changed their form of ownership and are now fully 
Russian owned or have been taken over by the foreign organisations. Consequently, 
only 57 out of the 350 IJVs were able to be reached. Attempts were made to contact 
each IJV at several times on different days, and at different times of day. For instance, 
sometimes no one answered the telephone, sometimes the telephone number no longer 
belonged to the IJV, but in the majority of cases the IJV has changed its form of 
ownership and is now either a fully owned Russian or foreign company. 39 out of the 
57 reached IJVs met the sampling requirements (i.e. they had more than 15 employees 
and have been operating longer than two years). O f the 39 IJVs, 15 agreed to take part 
in this study: this represents a participation rate of 38 %. Also, two senior managers of 
recently operating two IJVs were reached and they both met the sampling criteria. 
One of these IJVs is no longer operating, but the other has changed its form of 
ownership and it has become a fully owned foreign company. Both IJVs had been 
operating as IJVs for not less than five years. The list of IJVs included in the sample, 
and the industries they operate in are shown below (see Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1: IJVs Included in the Sample
IJV Industry
Ventures A, D, G, J, and N Energy and Utilities
Ventures B, O and P Construction
Venture C Financial Services
Venture E Manufacturing/Automobiles and 
Trucks
Venture F Engineering and Research
Venture H InfoTech and
T elecommunications/Cellular
Venture K Manufacturing/Machine tool
Ventures L and R Manufacturing/IT and Electronics
Ventures M and Q Chemical
5.7 Interviews
Interview questions and cover letters were sent to all of the senior managers who 
agreed to take part in this study. They were then contacted again to arrange an 
interview date. The interviews averaged 150 minutes in length, and they were 
conducted between 29th of October 2009 and the 10th of February 2010. The 
interviews were semi-structured, and they were based on the interview guide which is 
shown in Appendix 4.
There are certain advantages to the use of this semi-structured schedule. For example, 
it allows flexibility so that a specific topic can be explored in more depth, depending 
on which issues have emerged during the interviews. While a structured interview 
has formalised questions, a semi-structured interview is flexible and allows new 
questions to be brought up during the interview. This is very important in the current 
research project because the researcher aims to explore the many issues which are 
related to the IJVs and organisational culture. As Lindlof and Taylor (2002) suggest, 
an interview guide was prepared beforehand with a range of questions which the 
interviewer can ask (see Appendix 4). Interview guides help researchers to focus an 
interview on the topics at hand without constraining them to a particular format. They
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can also help interviewers to tailor their questions to the interview situation, and to the 
people that they are interviewing (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002).
The interview questions were open-ended; for example, “Could you describe the 
organisational culture in your organisation?” Some specific questions about particular 
dates and demographics were also asked, these included: name, position, organisation, 
partners, and date of formation. These questions mainly provided the interviewer with 
a guide to the minimum information needed about an IJV. The guide consisted of 
fourteen open-ended questions. The interview guide was constructed to find what the 
feelings of the interviewees’ experience in the IJV were. Some of the questions were 
derived from the guides for examining organisational culture in alliances which are 
developed by: Doz and Hamel (1998), Spekman et al. (2000), and Austin (2000). In 
this study the interviewer asked the managers for additional explanations of their 
comments when their answers were too brief. There were 19 senior managers 
interviewed (12 male and 7 female) from 17 IJVs (see Table 5.2).
The interviewer assured the respondents that their responses and the names of IJVs 
will be aggregated and will not be identifiable with the individual responses in the text 
of the thesis. During the interviews the researcher took detailed notes. At the start of 
the interviews the researcher asked the senior managers or CEOs permission to use a 
tape-recorder. Some of them directly rejected its use, and some clearly felt very 
uneasy and uncomfortable. As has been mentioned above, Russian people tend to be 
suspicious and are not used to being interviewed. Perhaps, this is a remainder of the 
communist era and KGB (Vinogradova, 2006). It was consequently decided to use 
written notes during the interviews.
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Table 5.2: List of Interviewed People
IJV Position of Interviewed Person Sex
Venture A CMO (Chief Marketing Officer) F
Venture B CEO F
Venture C Chief of Strategic Development and Communication 
Officer
F
Venture D CFO F
Chief of Economic Analysis and Planning Officer F
Venture E CEO M
Venture F CEO M
Venture G CEO M
Venture H CEO M
Venture J CEO M
CMO M
Venture K CFO M
Venture L CMO M
Venture M CEO M
Venture N CFO M
Venture 0 CEO M
Venture P CTO (Technical Director) M
Venture Q CFO F
Venture R CEO M
Written notes have a few potential advantages in comparison with taped 
conversations. Firstly, written notes are less time consuming. Taping may require 
going through the data three times: interviewing, typing the transcript, and reading 
notes for coding and analysing. On average, each hour of taped interview may take 
five hours to transcribe (Glaser, 1998). Secondly, taping only collects words and not 
observations. Interviews without observations are not informed by behaviour and in 
this regard they are not grounded in meaning. Finally, offering confidentiality is 
undermined by taping, especially in sensitive areas where being on record may be
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seen as dangerous by the respondents (ibid). This was particularly important and 
relevant to this research.
In this research, the interview notes were written and checked again within two hours 
of completing the interviews. Any additional impressions that the researcher had were 
also added, but they were always kept separate from the senior managers’ responses. 
Following the advice of Yin (1984), all of the data and information obtained were 
included in the notes, even if it was not specifically asked by the interviewer. Also 
included in the notes was some information about the IJVs which was gathered on 
organisation’s web-site, and the patterns that the researcher noticed across the IJVs as 
a whole.
The next stage of the research was a systematic analysis of the qualitative interview 
data. The theoretical framework provided a starting point for data classification. The 
results of the qualitative analysis are presented in the next chapters.
5.8 Questionnaire Distribution and Collection
After the interviews, the senior managers of the IJVs in Russia were asked to fill in 
two questionnaires. In large organisations the questionnaires were distributed between 
three senior managers, and in smaller companies they were distributed to between one 
to two top managers. Both questionnaires were filled in by the interview respondents 
and those senior managers who were recommended by the CEOs to be knowledgeable 
respondents.
Twelve managers completed questionnaires on the day of the interview and then 
returned the completed forms to the researcher. The rest of the questionnaires were 
sent to the twenty-seven managers by e-mail or fax. Twelve of the managers returned 
their completed questionnaires to the researcher after a few days. After two to three 
weeks the fifteen managers who had not returned their questionnaires were contacted 
again. Two more managers responded and sent the researcher completed 
questionnaires following this reminder. The thirteen managers who had still not 
returned their questionnaires after two to three weeks were contacted by telephone
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and sent a second copy of the questionnaires by e-mail. If after this the managers still 
had not responded then they were contacted one final time by an e-mail that explained 
the importance of their participation in the project. Those managers who had still had 
not responded by week ten were considered to be non-respondents.
Questionnaires were sent to managers of 17 IJVs. Overall, 39 questionnaires were 
sent and 27 responses received (Table 5.3) from 17 IJVs. This represents a 
participation rate of 69 %. Thus, the qualitative and quantitative part of this 
dissertation is based on 17 IJVs.
Table 5.3: List of Sample Demographics
N Venture Position Sex Age Education
Level/Subject
Nationality 
(R- Russian, 
F- Foreign)
1 A CMO F 36-45 BSc/Business R
2 A CFO M 36-45 BSc/Business R
3 B CEO F 46-55 BSc/Business R
4 B CFO F 26-35 BSc/Business R
5 C Chief of Strategic 
Development and 
Communication Officer
F 36-45 BSc/Business R
6 C Chief Economic 
Analysis and Forecast
F 46-55 BSc/Business R
7 D CFO F 46-55 BSc/Business R
8 D Chief of Economic 
Analysis and Planning 
Officer
F 36-45 BSc/Business R
9 E CEO M 36-45 BSc/Business R
10 E CFO M 46-55 PhD/Business R
11 F CFO F 26-35 BSc/Business R
12 G CEO M 36-45 BA/Politics R
13 H CEO M 36-45 Masters/Business R
14 J CEO M 36-45 BA/Law R
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15 K CFO M 56 and 
over
BSc/Business F
16 L CMO M 46-55 BSc/Engineering R
17 M CEO M 56 and 
over
PhD/Chemistry R
18 N CFO M 46-55 BSc/Business F
19 N Chief Accounting F 45-55 BSc/Business R
20 0 CEO M 56 and 
over
BSc/Engineering F
21 0 CMO F 36-45 BA/Philology R
22 P CTO M 46-55 BSc/Engineering F
23 P CMO F 46-55 BA/Philology R
24 Q CFO F 46-55 BSc/Business R
25 Q CEO F 46-55 BSc/Business R
26 R CEO M 46-55 BSc/Engineering R
27 R CFO M 36-45 PhD/Business R
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology in a case method was 
found to be the most appropriate methodology for this research because it explored 
and described a cultural context.
5.9 Data Analysis
This research was conducted using a case method approach. The main aim of the use 
of the cases in research is to develop a richer, contextually based theoretical 
understanding of the problem. This method was chosen for use in this research study 
because the aim was to develop an understanding of how differences in organisational 
cultures may influence IJV success in Russia. The literature review shows that there is 
a theoretical gap in the role of organisational culture in IJV performance. Moreover, 
the Russian context has not yet been widely explored. This gap first requires a
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theoretical understanding of the “cultural fit” of IJV’s partners and its role in IJV 
success or dissolution.
Cases are used by scholars to develop theory about topics. One principal convention 
of the case approach presents through quotations, explanations, syntax, cultural 
cliches (Van Maanen, 1988). If only limited theoretical knowledge exists concerning a 
particular phenomenon, an inductive research strategy that lets theory emerge from 
the cases can be a valuable starting point (Siggelkow, 2007). Cases can be historical 
accounts but they are more likely to be contemporary descriptions of recent events. 
The central idea is to use cases as a basis to develop theory inductively. So, cases are 
often seen as the bridges from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive 
research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
There are three important uses for case research: motivation, inspiration, and 
illustration. First, cases are a great way to motivate a research question. A case is a 
influential way to demonstrate why a certain phenomenon is important. Second, the 
interest in rich case data enables an inspiration for new ideas. Third, cases help to 
provide a great illustration. Case research may sharpen existing theory by pointing to 
gaps and beginning to fill them (Siggelkow, 2007).
Although cases are seen as subjective research, well prepared theory building from 
cases can be “objective” because its close adherence to the data keeps the researcher 
“honest” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
This research uses a case method in order to capture some properties of life in 
organisations, organisational culture in IJVs, and to explore and understand the 
relationships of IJVs and their partners.
5.9.1 Quantitative Data Analysis
Cluster analysis was applied to the data gathered in this research in order to analyse 
managerial values and practices. According to Yin (2003), cluster analysis is a
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desirable technique for use in case studies. Cluster analysis has been broadly used in 
market and cultural research when working with multivariate data from surveys (e.g. 
Hofstede, 1998; Hofstede et al., 2002; Brida et al., 2010; Garibaldi de Hilal et al., 
2009; Kozan, 2002; Kwantes et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2011; Lukasova et al., 2006; 
Walsh et al., 2008). Previous researchers have used cluster analysis to group objects 
according to their similarities or dissimilarities. This technique also helps to better 
understanding of the relationships between different groups and their socio­
demographic and behavioural factors (Brida et al., 2010; Bernini, 2009).
In this study cluster analysis was performed for both questionnaires, and it was carried 
out using an R programme. In addition, the simple average was calculated for each 
value in Questionnaire 1 (Appendix 2), and each question in Questionnaire 2 
(Appendix 3), in order to define their weight.
The first step in cluster analysis is variable selection, which is necessary in order to 
define the variables upon which the respondents will be clustered. In this research, 
twelve cultural values were used to cluster respondents in Questionnaire 1. It is then 
desirable to use alternative segmentation criteria for external validation, such as: 
demographics, geographic, incomes, and others. Consequently, it was decided in this 
research to use gender as an additional variable for Questionnaire 1; Questionnaire 2 
was similarly performed. All respondents were clustered according to their daily work 
practices (a total of twenty-one practices). Educational subject was included as an 
additional variable. The choice of these two variables is based on the literature review 
(e.g. Rosener, 1990; Van Vianen and Fischer, 2002). Gender is a very important 
factor which shapes and influences values and beliefs because historically the roles of 
males and females have been different. The choice of educational subject as an 
additional variable is based on the results of some previous studies which have found 
that many managers in Russia have a different educational background to those in the 
West (e.g. engineering instead of business) (e.g. Kets de Vries, 2000; McCartney et 
al., 2005). Consequently, their leadership style and practices may also differ.
The next stage to be made in cluster analysis is the estimation of the number of 
clusters. There are no clear recommendations to be found in the literature about 
defining the optimal number of clusters and, therefore, it is suggested to use a
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subjective approach instead (Hajmi et al., 2010). The cluster analysis in this research 
project was performed using several different methods. They all gave the same result 
and clusters, which confirms their validity. Finally, based on the clusters’ relative size 
and substantiality, the most rational number of clusters in both questionnaires was 
considered to be four. All of the characteristics of these segments are summarised and 
described in the next chapter.
5.9.2 Qualitative Data Analysis
The next step to be made was an analysis of qualitative data, which is based on the 
interviews which were made with seventeen IJVs in Russia. Two of these IJVs are no 
longer operating (as described above). Overall, nineteen senior managers were 
interviewed (Table 5.2).
The main aim of this research is to examine how organisational culture may influence 
IJV success, and to ask how important these differences are for IJV performance. 
Therefore, the interviews which were made with the senior managers should be able 
to provide this study with information about IJV performance. They should also be 
able to identify how managers view the role of organisational culture in IJV success. 
The current research used a subjective measure of senior managers to determine if an 
IJV is successful (as has been described previously in Chapter 2). The duration of an 
IJV can also provide information about success where an IJV has been operating for a 
long time. Thus, the interview guide included such question as “When was your IJV 
was formed?” Many interview questions were aimed to understand the relationship 
between IJV and its partners. Consequently, the majority of the senior managers 
clearly expressed their opinion about the success of their IJV. However, it was 
decided to add a direct question at the end of the interview which could provide more 
information about what managers think about the success of their IJV, the question 
was: “Would you call your IJV successful?” In addition, in order to decide if an IJV is 
successful, the researcher has used her own impression which is based on all the 
information obtained from the interviews.
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All of the interview data was analysed using textual content analysis, which is 
associated with the interviews’ open-ended questions responses and additional 
spontaneous information that was received during the interview process. The main 
aim of textual content analysis is to obtain richer contextual information based on 
statement, stories, and other verbal responses. Content analysis includes the process of 
analysing the verbal responses through the development of content dictionaries and 
data coding (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The content analysis process included: open 
coding, axial coding, and selective coding. The process of interpretation begins with 
open coding, while towards the end of the whole analytical process selective coding 
comes more to the fore. Coding here is understood as 4representing the operations by 
which data are broken down, conceptualised, and put back together in new ways' 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 57). Each coding provides a specific function. Open 
coding aims at expressing data and phenomena in the form of concepts. Firstly, the 
data are disentangled and labelled. Then the concepts start to be developed and 
categories begin to emerge. In the current study the open coding was done by 
analysing and comparing each interviewee’s data to the other interview data. Next, the 
data was categorised and the links were identified.
5.10 Reliability and Validity of the Research
Reliability is an important measure of research quality. Yin (2003) defines reliability 
as demonstrating that the operation of a study, such as data collection procedures, can 
be repeated and the same results will be obtained.
The main criticism of the case method is that the role of the researcher is principal to 
data generation and interpretation, which can lead to a problem of bias. The main 
point of this criticism is that if the same research is conducted by another researcher 
then the results may be different. In addition, the use of interviews raises questions of 
reliability because the individual report may be inaccurate.
In the current research, several steps were taken in order to increase the reliability of 
the interview data. Firstly, the researcher had additional training on qualitative 
research, including interviewing. In addition, the researcher had an experience of
107
interviewing senior managers in the past while gathering data for an MBA 
dissertation. The promise of confidentiality improved the reliability of the interview 
data as the character of the discussion appeared to be more open and not tense. Then, 
as Silverman (1993) suggests, some conventions and abbreviations were used in notes 
during the interview process so that the researcher could write down all the answers. 
In addition, after each interview the researcher checked all the notes and added 
information which had not been written during the interview, this information was 
written using different coloured ink. Finally, the researcher added additional 
impressions, which were kept separate from the interview data.
The question of validity can be summarised as ‘ a question o f  whether the researcher 
sees what he or she thinks he or she sees' (Flick, 2002: 224). Validation is constructed 
through application of internal validity and external validity. Internal validation is 
established if the research conclusions are supported by the research design, data 
gathered, and analysis. If this process develops an accurate conclusion, supported by 
the research, then it will meet the internal validation requirement. According to 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000), internal validation can be achieved by:
• Formulation of the research question which guides the study (presented in the 
beginning of this chapter).
• Identification of a site and participants (i.e. IJVs in Russia, and CEOs or senior 
managers in the organisation).
• Identification of the data collection strategies which are to be used (i.e. semi­
structured interviews and two questionnaires).
• Identification and statement of the researcher’s own bias (which is presented 
in the following text).
• Documentation of the research plan and analysis methods (see Chapter 5).
Internal validation of this research can also be supported by reliance on previously 
used, and verified, methodologies and methods. As has been mentioned above, both 
questionnaires were previously used in similar research works. Interview techniques 
are very popular in management and cultural studies, and they are one of the most 
important tools which is used in the research of national and organisational culture
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(Smimich, 1983, Hofstede 1991; Schein, 1991). They also provide an excellent 
source for case studies (Yin, 2003). In this work, the guide for semi-structured 
interviews with open-ended questions was developed according to the 
recommendations of: Doz and Hamel (1998), Spekman et al. (2000), and Austin 
(2000). Thus, internal validation in this study is achieved by a well structured process 
and the use of proven methods.
In order to understand external validation or generalisability one has to pay attention 
to the research design’s purpose (Yin, 2003). The aim of this research was to develop 
a better understanding of the organisational culture influences on IJVs in Russia, this 
includes: an understanding of organisational culture in Russia, how senior managers 
of IJVs perceive this organisational culture, and how it may be involved in IJV 
development. However, the results and findings of such research are contextually 
based and present challenges to the generalisability of the findings.
According to Yin (2003), one of the main challenges of this approach is that the case 
method research is a theoretical building research method and so will not be tested 
through the deductive process of hypothesis development and testing. This research 
project is a contextually based research which involves people from several different 
countries and, hence, several different cultures. If this research method is applied to 
IJVs in other countries then the researchers may get different results and findings. 
Finally, the researcher’s own personal cultural bias also presents a challenge (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2000). The researcher’s own values and attitudes influence the 
understanding of topic. For the social researcher this is an acknowledged fact and, 
while he or she may acknowledge it, it cannot be eliminated.
The challenges mentioned above acknowledge that the research results in this study 
are not statistically, but are analytically, generalisable (Yin, 2003).
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5.11 Triangulation
Triangulation is a powerful technique which helps a researcher to receive a more 
detailed and balanced picture of the situation and increase the validity of the research 
(Flick, 2002). Denzin (1989: 237-241) distinguishes four types of triangulation:
• Data Triangulation - The use of different data sources.
• Investigator Triangulation - The use of different observers and interviewers to 
detect or minimise biases which result from the researcher as a person.
• Theory Triangulation - The use of multiple perspectives to interpret data.
• Methodological Triangulation - The use of different methods to study a 
research problem.
The current research uses two methods of triangulation. The first method is data 
triangulation. Data triangulation is used through quantitative and qualitative studies. 
In quantitative studies a few managers from each IJV were asked to fill in 
questionnaires. In terms of qualitative studies, I interviewed senior managers from the 
different IJVs in Russia. The second method is methodological triangulation. This 
study uses between-method triangulation by combining the questionnaires with semi­
structured interviews. The different methodological perspectives complement each 
other in the study, thereby reducing the weaknesses of each single method and 
increasing validity of the research (Flick, 2002). Combining quantitative and 
qualitative data can help the researcher to see if they both support each other because 
each method adds a different shade to the interpretation. A between-method 
triangulation helps to clarify meanings and develop an in-depth understanding of the 
research questions. Methodological triangulation is more likely to contribute to the 
development of theories (Ellson, 2004).
The main purpose of this research is to understand the effects of organisational culture 
differences on IJV performance in Russia. This topic is still not widely explored, 
especially in the Russian context. Methodological triangulation helps to broaden the 
knowledge on the topic and develops further understanding of the research questions.
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5.12 Reflexivity
Reflexivity is an important topic for qualitative researchers to consider. During the 
last few decades a number of social studies have put forward a lot of evidence 
supporting the argument that personal, social, and local factors influence both the 
research process and its results, which creates a problem for objectivity. One of the 
methods which is used to keep the research objective is to use standardised methods, 
in this view data collection and interpretation should be conducted with procedures 
that help eliminate subjective and local influences (Breuer, 2002).
Qualitative research normally does not use standardised procedures. Doing qualitative 
research makes the impact of the researcher far more obvious than in its quantitative 
counterpart (Breuer, 2002). “There is always a temptation to tell the whole story and 
there is the opportunity to highlight the author as a hero rather than a participant or 
observer. ” (Ellson, 2004: 110)
Perhaps it is almost impossible to avoid subjectivity but the main concern is how 
much of our own subjectivity we put into research reports (Gilgun, 2010). In the 
current research the researcher included only those bits of reflexivity that add to the 
understanding of IJVs in Russia and their organisational culture. The cases of IJVs 
and their analysis are separated and, therefore, the readers’ understanding and 
implications of these events can be different.
5.13 Research Ethics
There is no international agreement or regulations of ethical standards in research 
(Ryen, 2004). However, ethical issues arise from the kinds of problems researchers 
investigate, and the various methods which are used to obtain valid and reliable data. 
Ethics may be evoked by: the research problem itself, the setting in which the research 
takes place, the procedures required by the research design, the method of data 
collection, the kinds of people serving as research participants, and the type of data 
collected (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmia, 1996).
I l l
In order to protect the participants in this research project it first sought approval from 
the Cardiff Business School Ethical Committee. Both questionnaires and the interview 
guide (see Appendices 2, 3, and 4) were approved by the Ethical Committee.
The researcher promised confidentiality to all of the senior managers and the IJVs. 
Ryen (2004) suggests that in order to maintain confidentiality, the researcher should 
be obliged to protect the participants’ identities and locations. In this research all of 
the organisations were named symbolically (Venture A, Venture B, etc.) Their exact 
locations and the locations of their foreign parents were protected to avoid revealing 
the identity of the company concerned.
All of the senior managers voluntarily participated in the study. During the interviews 
the researcher recognised the right to refuse answers, or to object to the interview 
being tape-recorded.
5.14 Summary
This chapter has developed a valid research methodology. It also presented the 
research objectives and questions. The use of qualitative and quantitative methods 
was considered to be an effective way of gathering data about IJVs and organisational 
culture. Two questionnaires are used to receive information on managerial values and 
practices, whereas open-ended interviews help to gather in-depth data about 
organisational culture in the IJV and its partners. The research design also recognised 
the potential threats and any necessary action was taken to make the quality of the 
study valid. The next chapter will discuss and analyse the questionnaire findings.
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Data Presentation and Analysis
This chapter presents the data from, and offers an analysis of, the questionnaires. The 
aim of the two questionnaires was both to determine managerial values and practices 
in order to provide a better understanding of organisational culture in IJVs in Russia, 
and to answer one of the main research questions: “What is the type of organisational 
culture in IJVs in Russia?” Cluster analysis of the data collected from questionnaires 
will be presented in this chapter, and the results will be depicted graphically. The 
main clusters will be determined and comparisons will then be made.
6.1 Demographic Characteristic of Sample
Questionnaires were sent to 39 managers, and responses were received from 27. All of 
the respondents are senior managers of the IJVs. From the descriptive statistics shown 
below (Table 6.1) it can be seen that there are 14 males (52 %) and 13 females (48 %) 
in the sample. 18 respondents (67 %) have a degree in business, and the highest 
education level for the majority respondents (23 people -  85 %) is undergraduate*. 
Most respondents are Russians (85 %), the other 4 respondents (15 %) were from the 
country with which IJV was formed. The majority of the respondents fall into two age 
categories: 36-45 and 46-55.
There is no division into undergraduate (BSc/BA) and graduate (MSc/MA) levels in Russia. Tertiary 
education always fitted into a single stage resulting in a specialist diploma which takes 5-6 years to 
complete. Specialist diplomas o f selected high-ranking universities are perceived to be equal to 
Western MSc/MA qualification.
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Table 6.1: Demographic Characteristic of Sample (N = 27)
Demographics Number
(people)
Percentage
(%)
Sex:
Male 14 52
Female 13 48
Age (years):
25 years old or less 0 0
26-35 years old 2 7.4
36-45 years old 10 37.2
46-55 years old 12 44.4
56 years old or over 3 11
Education Subject:
Business and Management 18 67
Other 9 33
Highest Level of Education:
BSc/BA 23 85
Masters 1 4
PhD 3 11
Nationality:
Russia 23 85
Other 4 15
6.2 Cluster Analysis for the Questionnaire 1
A hierarchical cluster analysis, followed by a simple average calculation, was 
performed for Questionnaire 1 in order to find out what values are the most important 
for senior managers in IJVs in Russia (see Appendix 5). All 12 cultural values were 
used as input variables for clustering. Gender was used as an alternative variable. 
Based on the clusters’ relative size and substantiality, the most rational number of 
clusters for the most appropriate representation of the data was considered to be four. 
The primary characteristics of all the segments are summarised below.
Cluster 1
This cluster includes three cultural values which were ranked the highest by the 
respondents, these values are: family security, honouring parents and curiosity. 
According to the Schwartz model (see Chapter 3) family security and honouring 
parents belong to the group of traditional values while curiosity is one of the openness
115
to change values. Some demographic information on this segment is summarised 
below in Table 6.2.
In terms of demographic characteristics, no significant differences in scores were 
found between genders and managers with different educational backgrounds (i.e. 
business studies and others). The age category shows substantial differences for all 
three values. For example, people who are in the age group 56 and up gave lower 
values to ‘family security’ and ‘honouring parents’. However, two out of the three 
managers from this age category are foreigners and these differences in values can be 
explained by national and cultural differences. Also, younger age groups (26-35 years 
old, and 36-45 years old) have substantially lower scores for the ‘curiosity’ value. 
‘Honouring parents’ is found to be less important for younger managers (26-35 years 
old).
Table 6.2: Average Values for Cluster 1 (Questionnaire 1)
Value Family
Security
Honouring
Parents
Curiosity
Average (N = 27) 4.9 4.2 4.5
Sex:
Females 5.0 4.3 4.4
Males 4.7 4.1 4.6
Age:
26-35 5.0 3.5 3.5
36-45 5.0 4.6 3.7
46-55 5.0 4.5 4.7
56 and up 3.7 3.0 4.0
Educational Subject:
Business 4.9 4.2 4.4
Other 4.7 4.2 4.7
Educational Level:
BSc/BA 4.9 4.2 4.4
Masters Degree 5.0 4.0 4.0
PhD 4.7 4.0 5.0
Origin:
Russian 5.0 4.3 4.6
Other 4.3 3.3 4.0
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Managers with the highest educational level (i.e. PhD) ranked the ‘curiosity’ value 
higher than the others. In addition, all three values in this cluster have lower 
importance for foreign managers than for Russian managers.
Cluster 2
There are three values in this cluster: wealth (self-enhancement/egoistic value), 
exciting life (openness to change value), and varied life (openness to change value). 
All three values received similar scores from the respondents (3.9; 3.8; and 4.0). 
‘Wealth’ belongs to the group of self-enhancement or egoistic values, while ‘varied 
life’ and ‘exciting life’ values are related to the ‘openness to change’ group. The main 
characteristics of this cluster are shown below in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Average Values for Cluster 2 (Questionnaire 1)
Value Wealth An Exciting Life A Varied Life
Average (N = 27) 3.9 3.8 4.0
Sex:
Females 3.8 4.0 4.0
Males 4.0 3.6 4.0
Age:
26-35 3.5 3.5 3.5
36-45 3.9 4.3 4.3
46-55 4.0 3.6 3.8
56 and up 4.0 3.0 4.0
Educational Subject:
Business 3.9 3.9 3.9
Other 4.0 3.6 4.1
Educational Level:
BSc/BA 3.9 3.7 3.9
Masters Degree 4.0 5.0 5.0
PhD 4.0 3.7 4.7
Origin:
Russian 3.9 3.9 4.1
Other 4.0 3.0 3.3
As in Cluster 1, there were no large differences found between genders and managers 
with different educational background. Scores for all three values differ in age groups.
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‘Wealth’ received lower scores from young managers (26-35 years old), while both 
‘change’ values were rated higher by the 36-45 year old managers. Furthermore, as in 
the previous cluster, senior managers with a PhD showed different scores in the value: 
‘a varied life’. There was only one person with a Master's degree who showed higher 
scores in both ‘change’ values. Also, as in the previous cluster, obvious differences 
can be seen between nationalities. Foreign senior managers value ‘exciting life’ and 
‘varied life’ lower than the Russian managers, while ‘Wealth’ receives similar scores 
from both Russian and foreign managers. This fact is inconsistent with the findings of 
some previous researchers (Salmi and Sharafutdinova, 2008) who claim that money 
and wealth are less important values in Russia than they are in Western countries. 
Nevertheless, it confirms the findings of those previous researchers (e.g. Salmi and 
Sharafutdinova, 2008) who claim that Russian people living in large cities are more 
similar in their values to those in Western societies.
Cluster 3
This cluster contains three values: authority (self-enhancement/egoistic value), 
influence (self-enhancement/egoistic value), and equality (altruistic value). In contrast 
to the previous two clusters, the value ranks are more divergent in Cluster 3. Table 6.4 
represents the average values. It can be observed that all three values in this cluster 
received different scores in all categories: gender, age, educational subject, 
educational level, and origin.
The main differences in this segment appear between females and males. ‘Authority’ 
and ‘influence’ were ranked higher by males. Some differences in values may also be 
found in the age groups. For example, managers in the age category 26-35 ranked 
‘authority’ much lower than did the other age groups. A higher value for ‘influence’ 
can be seen in the age group 56 and up. All of the 26-35 years old respondents were 
females, which can help to explain why this age group scored lower in ‘authority’. As 
has been mentioned above, the majority of senior managers in the age 56 and up are 
foreigners and, therefore, the value differences of this age group can be seen as 
national and cultural differences.
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Interestingly, in Cluster 3 the different values of ‘influence’ can be seen between 
respondents in the educational subject category. Managers who have a degree in 
business value ‘influence’ higher. As in the previous clusters, managers with a PhD 
show different scores.
Finally, it can be underlined that the values of ‘influence’ and ‘equality’ are very 
different between Russian and foreign executives.
Table 6.4: Average Values for Cluster 3 (Questionnaire 1)
Value Authority Influence Equality
Average (N = 27) 3.5 3.5 3.6
Sex:
Females 3.2 3.2 3.7
Males 3.7 3.7 3.4
Age:
26-35 2.5 3.5 3.5
36-45 3.7 3.4 3.5
46-55 3.5 3.4 3.7
56 and up 3.3 4.0 3.3
Educational Subject:
Business 3.5 3.7 3.6
Other 3.4 3.1 3.6
Educational Level:
BSc/BA 3.3 3.3 3.6
Masters Degree 5.0 5.0 3.0
PhD 4.0 4.0 3.7
Origin:
Russian 3.5 3.4 3.7
Other 3.5 4.0 3.0
Cluster 4
The three cultural values that belong to this cluster are: self-discipline 
(traditional/conservative values), social justice (altruistic value), and a world at peace 
(altruistic value). This cluster received the most divergent scores from the 
respondents. As in Cluster 3, there are different scores between males and females. 
Males rank altruistic values lower than females, this can help to explain the low score
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for this value in the educational subject category because the majority of people 
(78%) who have a degree in other than a business subject are males.
Table 6.5: Average Values for Cluster 4 (Questionnaire 1)
Value Self-discipline Social Justice A World at 
Peace
Average (N = 27) 3.6 3.3 3.7
Sex:
Females 3.5 3.5 4.1
Males 3.8 3.1 3.3
Age:
26-35 3.0 3.5 4.0
36-45 3.3 3.3 3.5
46-55 3.9 3.4 4.0
56 and up 4.0 2.3 2.7
Educational Subject:
Business 3.5 3.3 3.8
Other 3.9 3.1 3.3
Educational Level:
BSc/BA 3.7 3.3 3.7
Masters Degree 5.0 5.0 5.0
PhD 3.0 2.7 3.0
Origin:
Russian 3.5 3.4 3.7
Other 4.5 2.5 3.3
A value of self-discipline is increasing in the age group: young managers found it less 
important than old. It can be seen that there are large differences in scores between 
respondent with different educational level. Finally, it should be underlined that 
national cultural differences in values also remain significant in this cluster.
6.3 Cluster Analysis for the Questionnaire 2
The second questionnaire aimed to find out more about the organisational culture in 
IJVs in Russia. It included 21 questions related to different types of organisational 
culture: support, innovation, rules, and goal oriented culture. Because many managers
120
felt uneasy to describe an organisational culture in their companies, this questionnaire 
helped to get additional information about organisational practices.
As was the case with Questionnaire 1, a hierarchical cluster analysis followed by 
simple average calculation was performed for Questionnaire 2 (see Appendix 6). All 
21 questions (practices) (see Appendix 3) were used as input variables for clustering. 
Educational subject was used as an alternative variable. Based on the clusters’ relative 
size and substantiality, the most rational number of clusters for the most appropriate 
representation of the data was considered to be four. The primary characteristics of all 
segments are summarised below.
Cluster 1: Rules Orientation
All three questions from the rules orientation culture (i.e. questions 13, 14, and 15) 
received the highest scores from the respondents. This fact is fully consistent with the 
literature review (e.g. McCarthy et al., 2005; Kets de Vries, 2000) which claims that 
Russian managers have an autocratic style of leadership. Young managers (26-35 
years old) showed much lower rates in all three questions (Table 6.6). Because the 
younger generation received their education and work experience in the post-Soviet 
period, their managerial style can be very different from that of the older managers. 
Surprisingly, foreign senior managers scored even higher in this section. In addition, a 
large difference in responses is to be found between managers with different 
education.
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Table 6.6: Average Values for Cluster 1 (Questionnaire 2)
Practices Question 13 Question 14 Question 15
Average (N = 27) 4.1 4.3 4.3
Sex:
Females 3.9 4.2 4.2
Males 4.4 4.4 4.3
Age:
26-35 3.0 3.5 3.5
36-45 3.9 4.2 4.2
46-55 4.5 4.5 4.3
56 and up 4.3 4.7 4.7
Educational Subject:
Business 4.2 4.3 4.2
Other 4.0 4.4 4.3
Educational Level:
BSc/BA 4.0 4.3 4.3
Masters Degree 4.0 3.0 3.0
PhD 5.0 5.0 4.7
Origin:
Russian 4.1 4.3 4.2
Other 4.3 4.8 4.5
Cluster 2: Goal Orientation
This cluster includes all of the variables (i.e. questions 16-21) from goal oriented 
culture, and two variables (i.e. questions 5 and 6) from support oriented culture (see 
Table 6.7).
In contrast to the previous cluster, a large diversification in average scores may be 
found between almost all of the groups (gender, age, educational subject, and 
educational level). Thus, in this case, it is necessarily to study each IJV separately in 
order to find the reasons behind these differences.
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Table 6.7: Average Values for the Cluster 2 (Questionnaire 2)
Practices Quest 5 Quest 6 Quest 16 Quest 17 Quest 18 Quest 19 Quest 20 Quest 21
Average (N = 27) 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1
Sex:
Females 3.2 3.3 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.8
Males 3.8 4.0 3.6 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.4
Age:
26-35 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 2.5
36-45 4.1 3.7 4.2 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.4
46-55 3.5 4.2 3.7 3.4 4.0 3.7 3.7 4.2
56 and up 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.3 4.0 3.7 4.0
Educational
Subject: 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9
Business 4.0 4.2 4.1 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.9 4.4
Other
Educational
Level: 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.0
BSc/BA 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
Masters Degree 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.3 5.0 4.7
PhD
Origin:
Russian 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.1
Other 3.8 3.8 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.5 4.0
Cluster 3: Innovation Orientation
In spite of the fact that ‘openness to change’ values were ranked quite highly by most 
of the managers, innovation culture in IJVs received relatively low scores (Table 6.8). 
By analysing the average it can be seen that all questions received very low scores 
from females. Senior managers with a PhD ranked all practices related to innovation 
higher than others. Meanwhile, the low scores from young managers (26-35 years old) 
may be explained by gender differences because both of the senior managers in this 
age category are women.
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Table 6.8: Average Values for the Cluster 3 (Questionnaire 2)
Practices Question 7 Question 8 Question 10 Question 11 Question 12
Average (N = 27) 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.3
Sex:
Females 3.3 2.7 3.1 3.2 2.8
Males 4.1 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.9
Age:
26-35 2.5 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0
36-45 4.4 3.9 4.0 3.5 3.7
46-55 3.2 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.2
56 and up 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.7
Educational
Subject: 3.5 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2
Business 4.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.6
Other
Educational Level:
BSc/BA 3.6 3.0 2.4 3.4 3.3
Masters Degree 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 4.0
PhD 4.0 3.7 3.3 4.3 4.7
Origin:
Russian 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.3
Other 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.5
Cluster 4: Support Orientation
This cluster received the lowest scores from the respondents. It includes four 
questions related to the support orientation and one question from the innovation 
culture. The question, “How often do unpredictable elements in the market 
environment present good opportunities?” received low scores from almost all of the 
managers.
From the analysis of average values it can be highlighted that one question from the 
support orientation (“How often is constructive criticism accepted?”) has very 
divergent scores.
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Table 6.9: Average Values for the Cluster 4 (Questionnaire 2)
Practices Question 13 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4
Average (N = 27) 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.3
Sex:
Females 3.3 2.7 3.1 3.2 2.8
Males 4.1 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.9
Age:
26-35 2.5 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0
36-45 4.4 3.9 4.0 3.5 3.7
46-55 3.2 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.2
56 and up 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.7
Educational Subject:
Business 3.5 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2
Other 4.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.6
Educational Level:
BSc/BA 3.6 3.0 2.4 3.4 3.3
Masters Degree 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 4.0
PhD 4.0 3.7 3.3 4.3 4.7
Origin:
Russian 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.3
Other 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.5
6.4 Summary
This chapter analysed the clusters obtained in relation to some demographical factors, 
such as: gender, age, level of education, educational subject, and nationality. This 
analysis demonstrates the managerial values and practices of managers in Russia. 
Overall, from the cluster analysis, it can be observed that traditional values got the 
highest rates from the Russian managers. Also, the main differences in average values 
were found between both Russian and foreign managers, and different age groups. In 
the Questionnaire 2 rule oriented culture received the highest scores from senior 
managers. The main differences in average values can be seen between managers 
from different age groups and educational levels.
The qualitative analysis provided very valuable information about the type of 
organisational culture in IJVs in Russia. However, in order to get complete
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information and answer research questions, it is necessary to refer to the interview 
data. In the next chapter, a number of case studies which are based on the results of 
the interview data will be presented.
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A
Cases
This chapter presents the cases of 17 IJVs in Russia. These cases rely on data which is 
derived from interviews with senior managers.
The cases in this chapter will present a brief introduction to the parent firms, followed 
by background on the venture. All companies will remain anonymous, simple 
fictitious names will be used that are not meant to represent any existing firm. The 
sample includes IJVs with companies from different countries. In many cases, 
mentioning the country of a partner, or partners, could disclose the names of the 
companies involved in the IJV. Thus, in order to maintain confidentiality, it was 
decided to give instead the name of a continent: America (including Canada, the USA, 
and Latin America), Europe (including Western, Eastern, or Central), and Asia.
The main objective of these cases is to understand and characterise the main features 
of organisational culture in the IJVs in Russia. This chapter gives an insight into 
organisational practices and provides a base for future analysis.
7.1 Venture A
The IJV which is described in this case was undertaken by Russian and American 
organisations in 1994. This venture was formed between partners who had long stable 
relationships which are based on mutual trust and interests.
American Partner
The American partner is a large company with headquarters located in a number of 
different countries. It is engaged in energy and utilities production. The company is 
proud of its geographical diversification and production in different countries. A 
mission statement of the American parent declares that it looks for growth 
opportunities through strategic partnerships and acquisitions. The main objectives of 
the company are: profitable, low-cost growth; financial flexibility and openness to
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serve the long-term interests of shareholders; and, a qualified and experienced team. 
The company pays a lot of attention to its people and: their expertise and 
qualifications, training, and health and safety issues. The company’s employees are 
seen as a source of competitive advantage and this is highlighted by the social 
responsibility of the organisation.
Russian Partner
The Russian partner is one of the oldest, and largest, Russian organisation. It is proud 
of its long history and achievements in manufacturing and construction. The company 
emphasises that it has its own long traditions. Throughout its history, the Russian 
partner has achieved a considerable expertise in manufacturing and quality control. 
The company sees key strategic advantages in both employing a highly-qualified staff 
and in running a modem quality control system. This organisation employs the latest 
approaches to HR management. One of the main goals of the company is staff 
development and training, including running its own professional training 
programmes and in sponsoring education in a number of different colleges and 
universities. This organisation recognises the need for good managerial training in 
order to develop the managerial and leadership skills of its managers. The Russian 
partner has its own university, which was established for staff training. Also, it draws 
attention to its collaboration with different universities and institutes in order to 
support young professionals. Along with high wages, the organisation offers a lot of 
social benefits to employees and various promotion programmes.
Although in this case study both partners are from different countries, the words they 
use to describe themselves, their vision, and purposes are very similar. They are 
similar in size and both pay particular attention to quality. Both of them are strongly 
committed to their employee’s staff training and education.
Joint Venture
In 1994 both partners set up a 50/50 IJV in order to produce high quality products for 
the energy industry. One of the main aims of the American partner was geographical 
expansion and an entrance into a new emerging market (i.e. Russia). The Russian
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partner saw an opportunity for learning new technologies in manufacturing through 
staff training and education. The IJV is a small company (less than 50 employees). 
The IJV under this study will be referred as a Venture A.
Interviewee: CMO (Marketing Director)
Place: Head Office
Date: 26th January 2010
The interview with the Marketing Director took place in the meeting room of the head 
office. The head office is a new, modem style building with production units located 
on the left wing. The Russian parent’s head office is only a few minutes away.
In the beginning of the interview the manager briefly described both partners and the 
Venture A. Then, she showed me a catalogue of the Venture A and asked if I wanted 
to look around the production units. She emphasised their new equipment in the 
production units, their cleanliness, and even the uniform of the engineers and the 
technical workers. She seemed very proud of this production unit.
Role of Culture in Venture A
The interview question about organisational culture seemed to confuse the CMO for a 
while. She found it quite difficult to describe the organisational culture of Venture A. 
She highlighted that the organisational culture in their venture was mainly shaped by 
the American partner. Then, comparing and contrasting the cultures of both partners 
and the Venture A, she quickly described the meaning of their organisational culture. 
She saw and described it through the structure of the Venture and its partners, their 
decision-making styles, and their managerial work practices.
Explaining the main differences between the Venture A and its partners, the manager 
mainly talked about the differences and similarities with the American parent 
company. The Russian partner was rarely mentioned. She explained:
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“The American partner has shaped our organisation. They are 
constantly with us. They are interested in all the details o f  our 
work. The Russian partner cares only about financial outcomes. ”
The CEO of Venture A is an American of Russian origin. He has worked in the 
American parent for a few years. He has close relationships with the American 
managers. Thus, the American organisation has a great influence over the daily work 
and corporate culture in Venture A. The Marketing Director highlighted:
“ We have been working together (the American partner and the 
Venture A) fo r  15 years. Our employees and managers know 
each other very well and now we are like one family. We trust 
each other, and this is most important. ”
Almost all of the daily communications of Venture A with the Russian parent depend 
entirely on the CEO of Venture A. The rest of the managers of the Venture do not 
participate in negotiations with the Russian parent. The Marketing Director 
commented:
“He [i.e. the CEO] regulates and manages all o f  the 
communications with them. Then, he informs us [i.e. the 
employees] about outcomes. ”
The manager paid particular attention to the different accounting systems, legislation, 
and “mentality” when portraying the differences in the organisational cultures of 
Venture A and the American partner,
“They [i.e. the American managers] want us to do all the 
documentation and finance according to their standards, but we 
cannot. Russian law regulates these standards, and we have to 
follow it. ”
Explaining the differences in mentality, she stated:
“Bribes and network are common in Russia. But it can ruin 
relationships with the foreign partner. That is why constant 
negotiations and trust are so important in this case. ”
The resolution of cultural differences was seen as essential for success in the venture:
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“Constant negotiation and cultural training help to resolve 
cultural differences. Also, trust is very important. ”
Overall, the role of culture in the IJV success was seen as “quite important”.
The successful fit of cultures depends on people, and their training and education. 
Venture A has very close relationships with their American partner. The employees 
have regular training and meetings. Most of them have been trained abroad.
The managers of the American parent and Venture A meet every three months. All of 
the managers are encouraged to make decisions, but some decisions are only made by 
Venture A’s CEO and the top managers of the parent companies.
In general, Venture A is seen as a successful organisation by its senior manager:
“We have been operating in the market fo r 15 years. We have 
very close and stable relationships with our partners. We have 
good financial performance. ”
Analysis
According to the interview data, Venture A’s culture is very similar to its Western 
partner. The firm has a flat structure. Many employees participate in the decision­
making process. Employee training and meetings with the American partner are 
regular. The company recognises the need for cultural training. The interviewed 
manager mentioned that employees of Venture A are trained in the national cultures 
of both partners. Venture A has only minimum control from the Russian parent.
Venture A’s CEO was bom into a Russian family in an American country. He is 
fluent in both languages, and knowledgeable about both countries and cultures. The 
CEO brought his experience and knowledge from the American partner and 
replicated the same values in Venture A. The CEO showed high scores in the 
openness to change values. Close relationships between managers could have better 
helped the foreign parent to implement its culture in Venture A.
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7.2 Venture B
The IJV illustrated in this case was formed in 2000 by two privately owned 
companies. Both partners came from countries with similar economic and business 
environments.
European Partner (Tormer USSR)
The European partner is a MSE (medium size enterprise) which is owned by one 
family and operating in the construction industry since 1992. The organisation has 
access to the natural resources which are used in the construction works. Until 2000, 
the European partner was the only construction company which had access to 
resources and so the company could offer cheaper services than its competitors. Until 
2000, the European partner was a leader in the local market.
In 2000 the new governmental policies allowed access to similar resources to all 
businesses, thereby encouraging the creation of new companies. A lot of new 
organisations, including large foreign corporations, spread into the market. The 
European partner faced high competition.
The European partner still has neither a web-site nor a mission statement. The 
objectives and purposes are stated in the registration documents and organisational 
brochure; they include: profit maximisation, high quality work, staff training, 
qualifications, and safety.
Russian Partner
The Russian partner is a small family-owned enterprise which is operating in the 
construction industry. The company was set up in 1996. The director of the Russian 
partner has close relationships with a large number of suppliers. This allows the 
organisation to offer a wider range of services and products to its customers. Similar 
to many small Russian organisations, the Russian partner does not have a web site or
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a mission statement. Its main objectives include profit growth and a high quality of 
products and services.
Joint Venture
In 2000, the directors of the two firms signed an IJV agreement. Establishing a 
partnership was seen as a new source of competitive advantage for both companies. 
The main purpose of both partners was to get access to new resources and suppliers. 
The share of the European partner is 60 %, the Russian partner owns 40 % of the IJV. 
The IJV is a small company (less than 50 employees). The IJV under this study will 
be referred as a Venture B.
Interviewee: CEO (General Director)
Place: Head Office
Date: 27th November 2009
The interview took place in the head office with the General Director. When the 
researcher telephoned to the Venture B, the director agreed to give an interview in the 
same day, but she expressed concern that she will not be able to help because Venture 
B is a very small organisation and its partners are quite small companies whereas an 
organisational culture is “something only large corporations have”
The head office was in the process of alteration. The General Director invited me into 
her office explaining that the head office will be fully renewed in three weeks.
In the beginning of the interview the researcher explained the purposes of the 
research and reminded the General Director about the ethics of this research project. 
When the researcher asked permission to use an audio recorder, the manager replied 
with a smile:
“I  would prefer not to be recorded. Hopefully, it is okay with 
you, too? ”
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The manager briefly described both partners and Venture B. She explained that 
Venture B offers a wide range of construction works. Some of the materials and 
techniques they use are new in the region. The main aims of the company are profit 
maximisation, high quality services, and the development of new products and 
services.
Role of Culture in Venture B
The question about organisational culture made the CEO feel uneasy.
Researcher: How would you describe organisational culture in your IJV?
CEO (after a short pause): To be honest, I  do not know.
When she was asked to describe the differences in organisational cultures of both 
partners and Venture B, she tried to explain it through the differences in national 
cultures. She explained that both countries (Russia and the European partner’s 
country) have quite similar cultures as “their historical development is similar and 
both people have similar beliefs and attitudes.”
Researcher: How dissimilar are your IJV and your partner organisations 
in the ways you make decisions and perform work?
CEO: It is difficult to explain. But... I  have never seen our European
partner. We are used to contact by phone or e-mails. Now I  
am in touch only with the Russian partner. Their directors 
[the managers o f  the European partner] lack negotiation 
skills. They constantly order. They speak to us [i.e. the 
General Manager and other employees] as i f  we were 
servants. Then, they never accept any criticism. I  never can 
express my own opinion! Finally, we have serious conflicts.
Then, we stopped contacting each other. Now, they speak 
only to our Russian partner.
Our Russian partner is very similar to us in terms o f  its aims, 
structure, and decision-making style. We are both small 
companies, and the decision-making is very fast. We do not 
have a centralised power as many Russian companies do. All 
people involved participate in the decision-making and 
organisational development. We are like a family.
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It was obvious that the General Manager was very angry with the European partner. 
She has been working in Venture B since 2000. She never saw the managers of the 
European partner because the majority of meetings were held in the head office of the 
European partner. The managers of the Russian parent met them every year in their 
head office. She has never been called for these meetings. She was usually informed 
about the results of the meetings and the new plans for development by the Russian 
partner.
She then explained that the managers o f the European and Russian partners have not 
seen each other for three years and the Russian partner “has to enjoy telephone 
conversations with them. ”
CEO: You see, there is nothing interesting. I  told you that our company
has nothing to do with organisational culture. Let ’s have a cup 
o f  tea and 1 shall show you our new Presentation Room.
The Presentation Room had recently been renovated. It was made in the Empire style. 
The decorations of the room demonstrated the core expertise of Venture B. All of the 
displays showed the wide range of products and decorative materials used in their 
construction works. The photographs on the walls showed examples of the most 
remarkable works done by the company in the past. The CEO was very enthusiastic 
while showing the room and the products on the displays. She told me that a few 
weeks ago she had ordered new catalogues and leaflets for the company.
While having tea the manager complained:
“Our partner firm s did not have any business plan. They simply 
signed the IJV agreement and started doing business. All the 
materials and techniques that we adopted from our European 
partner do not work in the local market. People here have 
completely different taste and preferences. No one thought about 
it when the Venture was opened. So we quickly got into financial 
troubles. We had to reorganise our work and business. The 
European partner was angry. He was, he is still sure that we 
simply do not want to work. Then they forgot about us. They 
contacted the Russian partner to get their share o f  the profits. ”
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Next, we moved to the final questions. A question about conflict resolution 
techniques confused her. After a short pause she said:
“No one tried to regulate it [i.e. a conflict]. This was not my 
fault. I  expected the managers o f  the European company to 
apologise at least. They did not. Moreover, they telephoned the 
Russian partner asking to fire me! I  had a shock when I  heard 
this from the Russian manager. But he [the CEO o f the Russian 
partner] assured me that I  will stay on in my position. After all, 
he said that he will negotiate with them by himself. So the 
European partner and our Venture have not been in contact with 
each other since that day. ”
Researcher: Would you call your IJV successful?
CEO (laughing): Financially it is just OK. As a partnership... probably not.
Analysis
The manager does not have a clear vision of the company’s objectives and aims. 
There is no mission statement. The organisation has been operating in the market for 
ten years and it still does not have a web-site. The leaflets and catalogues have just 
been ordered. The showroom has only been fixed. From the first days of the Venture’s 
operation there has been uncertainty and a lack of clarity about what and how the firm 
wants to reach.
There is lack of understanding of the meaning of organisational culture. The manager 
was certain that organisational culture can exist only in large companies. She was able 
to catch some points of definition and describe culture in the Venture B. However, she 
felt uncomfortable talking about this topic. The Venture is a small company and a 
family business. Perhaps, the manager was not ready to discuss some “family” issues 
of the company.
Venture B’s employees do not have any contact with their European partner, and the 
conflicts that rose between the managers have still not been resolved. No one has 
made an attempt to regulate it.
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7.3 Venture C
This case features a Russian-American IJV which provides a wide range of financial 
services. It was formed in 1993. By 1997 Venture C had became one of the biggest 
financial companies in the market.
American Partner
The American partner is a large and diversified financial company with a long 
history. It is very proud of its history and it has businesses in many countries. The 
paramount objective of this company is successful growth around the world. The 
organisation highlights that it aims for the market leadership and profitable growth. 
Its main values are stated on the web-site as being:
• Quality of services
• Value for customers
The first attempts to enter into the Russian and Eastern European markets were made 
in the end of the 1980s. The new governmental legislations in the Soviet Union at this 
time allowed the establishment of IJVs. However, a lot of control remained on the 
financial industry. Finally, in 1993 the American partner, following its main goal of 
diversification, established an IJV in Russia. One year later in 1994, the new 
governmental legislations allowed the American partner to extend its European 
division by opening its own branch in Russia.
Russian Partner
The Russian Partner is a large telecommunication company. A state-owned Russian 
company became a privately-held organisation after 1991. During many years a 
company had been a monopoly in the local market. It controlled the Internet services 
and the land-line telecommunications.
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In 1993 the Russian partner announced the formation of an IJV with the American 
company. The main target of the Russian partner was growth and extension in a new 
segment of the market. Also, a partnership with an American company was seen as 
prestigious, and it could attract new customers and create a new image for the 
company.
In 2001 the Russian partner was re-organised. Nowadays, the distribution of an 
ownership is in two main blocks -  51 % owned by the Russian telecommunication 
group and 40 % owned by different telecommunication and financial organisations. 
The rest of the ownership is distributed among the local citizens.
The new re-organised company adopted a Western style of management. Its mission 
statement declares that it has profitable growth and innovation. The core objectives 
are: quality, technological advance, and transparency. The company has experienced 
large growth. Nowadays, its shares are listed on foreign stock exchanges. At the same 
time, the staff of the Russian partner are recognised as the most technically and 
commercially competent.
Joint Venture
Both partners set up an IJV (Venture C) in 1993. As has mentioned above, the main 
goal of the American partner was making an entrance into the Russian market. The 
Russian partner followed its ambitions of exploring a new financial market and 
creating a new image for the company. Venture C is a large company where the 
American partner owns 30 % and the Russian partner holds 70 %.
Interviewee: Chief Strategic Development and Communication Officer
Place: Head Office
Date: 3d December 2009
The interview took place in the head office with the Chief Strategic Development and 
Communication Officer.
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The manager was holding the interview guide and the cover letter which were sent to 
her a few days before the interview. She introduced herself and said:
“You are doing PhD in Strategic Management. Great! So you 
can explain to me what it is! I  am the Chief Strategic 
Development and Communication Officer and... (Pause) This 
new fashionable phrase (Strategic Development) was added to 
my position o f  Chief Communication Officer two years ago. But 
the CEOs forgot to explain what it means, so I  had to learn by 
myself. ”
In spite of this ironical remark, the manager answered all of the questions clearly and 
confidently. None of the questions confused or surprised her. She was obviously 
ready to speak on the topic. Somewhere in the middle of the interview she mentioned 
that:
“Ispoke to our CEO on this topic [i.e. organisational culture] a 
few  days ago. Some o f  the questions in the interview guide really 
set us thinking. ”
The researcher asked permission to use a tape recorder during the interview. The 
manager was surprised with the question and rejected it straight away:
“A tape recorder? What for? I  would prefer to avoid it i f  you do 
not mind. ”
History
Venture C was one of the first large financial organisations in the local market. In 
1992 the Russian government started new reforms which resulted in huge inflation 
and decline in the GDP. Faced with a market economy, competition and inflation for 
the first time, Russian businesses chose the US economical model as an example and 
guideline. In 1993, when trust to in the new financial organisation was very low, an 
IJV with an American company became a symbol of success and prosperity. The 
English name of Venture C attracted a lot of customers. However, facing high risks 
and an unstable economical and political environment, the company experienced 
financial troubles. The American partner already opened its own branch in Moscow 
and Venture C was soon forgotten.
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By 1997 the economical situation in Russia had became much more stable. Venture C 
had achieved its best financial performance. The organisation became a “pride o f  the 
region”. In November 1997, when Venture C had been celebrating its astounding 
growth, the American partner attended the celebration:
“It [the American parent] suddenly remembered about us. We 
had not been hearing from them [the American CEOs] since 
1994. And it was the first and the last time I  saw them. Our 
Russian partner speaks to them from time to time but we [the 
Venture’s managers] do not know anything about it. ”
Less than one year later, in August 1998 Russia defaulted and faced one of the biggest 
financial crises that it has ever experienced. Most of the Russian financial institutions 
and many of the organisations were bankrupt. During the default crisis, Venture C 
experienced serious financial troubles. However, the organisation managed to survive 
thanks to the help of the Russian partner which had been sponsoring it during the 
crisis.
A few years later Venture C faced new troubles. The tense relationships between 
Russian and the US governments shattered the Venture’s image. Its English name and 
partnership with the American company were now used by its competitors in their 
marketing campaigns to shake customer’s faith in Venture C.
“It was even worse than the financial crisis. Trust in our Venture 
was undermined. We did everything to save our existing clients.
So, as you can see, the main goal o f  our organisation for most o f  
the time had been “to survive. ”
Role of Culture in Venture C
The manager described organisational culture in Venture C as competitive, friendly, 
and informal where people trust each other:
“Organisational culture is based on leadership style and 
motivation. We have a horizontal structure where a lot o f  people 
participate in the decision-making and organisational 
development. Most employees in the company are females with 
similar backgrounds and education. This is very important. In my
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opinion, this fact has shaped the supportive and caring culture in 
our organisation. ”
The CEO explained that many of the cultural artefacts were brought to the 
organisation by the Russian partner. The Russian partner developed an image for the 
Venture C, a logo, and shaped its values and practices.
“Our employees [from the Russian partner and Venture C] know 
each other. Since the first day o f  the Venture’s establishment we 
celebrated all the holidays and birthdays together. Every year we 
all go to cruise down the Volga River. We have winter and 
summer sports competition between our employees. Then, every 
year our organisations meet to reward the best employees and 
managers... You know, we even dress in the same way. ”
She continued to control the interview telling the researcher that many organisations 
write dawn all the values and procedures for their employees. Next, they try to change 
employees according to new values and procedures:
“In our company all the values and procedures were written 
when the culture was formed. And they were written to match 
existing culture. ”
The manager was absolutely certain that the organisational culture of Venture C is 
almost identical to the culture of their Russian parent. However, she highlighted the 
point that the culture of their Russian parent has been influenced by Western 
countries because the Russian partner has a lot of alliances and partnerships in the 
USA and Western Europe. Moreover, the CEOs of the Russian parent studied in the 
USA.
The Researcher: Some people suggest that differences in
organisational cultures lead to conflicts and 
dissolution o f  IJVs. Do you think differences in 
organisational cultures can cause IJV dissolution?
The CEO: I  think... yes, but only i f  cultures are very different. I
mean different in the decision making styles, a 
structure and governance, values etc. In case o f  small 
differences it [i.e. the partnership] should not be 
problematic. Small differences are easier to handle.
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The manager hesitated a moment when the researcher asked if Venture C is a 
successful company. She finally said:
“No. I think that our IJV is fa r from being a successful 
organisation. ”
Analysis
Venture C behaves in the same way as the Russian partner. It has adopted the same 
attitudes and values. Constant contacts and negotiations with the Russian partner 
helped to consolidate these values. However, employees in the organisation do not 
have the necessary training. The manager mentioned that she is not aware about 
strategic management, even though she is the Head of Strategic Management 
Department.
Additionally, there is lack of planning and clear strategy in the company. Facing its 
first troubles in the market (e.g. American name and image) the company did not do 
anything to resolve the situation. There was no awareness or concern about a new 
strategic direction.
This Venture has never had a person or a team responsible for the Venture 
development and negotiations with the partners. The manager was even unaware if 
the CEOs of the Russian partner maintain contact with the American parent.
The manager mentioned that the Venture has a supportive and carrying culture. The 
Questionnaire 2 was filled in by two managers from the Venture, including the 
interviewed manager. Their scores show a strong predominance of rule oriented 
culture.
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7.4 Venture D
The next case describes an IJV between three organisations from different countries: 
Russia, and two European countries. The Russian company owns 42 % of the venture, 
European partner 1 (former USSR) holds 33 %, and European partner 2 holds 25 % of 
the venture.
European Partner 1 (former USSR)
The European partner 1 is a large corporation that specialises in manufacturing, 
construction, and research. This company is one of the oldest in Europe in its field of 
work. It is very proud of its history and achievements in production and quality 
systems. It also has partnerships in many countries.
The main goals of the company are profit growth, quality, employee’s education and 
qualifications, and safety. The organisation does not have a mission statement. Its 
web-site is quite simple. It describes products and services, gives general information 
about the CEOs, and describes a long organisational history.
European Partner 2
European partner 2 is a part of a holding group. The company provides transportation 
for the holding’s products. The main goals and objectives of the company include 
quality and innovation.
Russian Partner
The company was set up in the Soviet Union as a manufacturing and research 
organisation. The organisation has developed a lot of new products and made a 
valuable contribution to engineering research. The company’s web-site highlights that 
the main goals of the company are innovation, quality, and employee education.
The majority of CEOs of the Russian partner have been managing the company since 
the Soviet era. The organisation’s web-site is very simple and tells a little about the
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company, but it mainly concentrates on the products and awards the company has 
received since its establishment.
Joint Venture
In 2000, the three organisations mentioned above founded an IJV company (Venture 
D). Venture D is a large manufacturing company (approximately 500 workers) which 
produces products for energy and utility industry. The main reason of the venture 
formation for both European partners was to enter in the Russian market. The Russian 
partner saw an opportunity for a technology transfer.
Interviewees: 1. Chief of Economic Analysis and Planning Officer
2. CFO
Place: Head Office
Date: 28th January 2010
The interview was arranged with the CFO in the Venture’s head office. When the 
researcher arrived, the CFO apologised and said that she has just been called to an 
urgent meeting in the Russian partner’s head office. So she introduced a young Chief 
of Economic Analysis and Planning Officer to act as a person who is competent in the 
research topic and promised to come back in an hour.
The Chief of Economic Analysis invited me into a meeting room and offered me tea. 
She was very confused and apologised that the CFO had left. She said that she saw 
the interview questions and felt very uneasy about most of them:
“I  have never thought about our organisation as an IJV. You 
know, we even do not have any contacts with our foreign 
partner. ”
The manager meant that Venture D does not have any contacts with the European 
partner 2.
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In the beginning of the interview the researcher asked a few general questions about 
Venture D. Surprisingly, the manager was misinformed about the country of the 
European partner 2. The researcher found it out later after speaking to the CFO.
Answering the question about the main goals of Venture D, the manager exclaimed:
‘'The same as the majority o f  manufactures have. The first goal 
is to increase production. The second goal is to increase profit. ”
Role of Culture in Venture D
An organisational culture in Venture D was described through its personnel. 
According to the manager, the Venture D has a “personnel-oriented culture” because:
“The company cares about its employees, their education, 
qualifications, and helps them with their personal 
problems. Moreover, the organisation provides them a lot 
o f  social benefits. ”
The manager could not answer the other questions as she has never participated in the 
negotiations with the Venture’s partners. Being the fourth person in the company, she 
has never been called for meetings with the partners. She was not even sure when and 
where these meetings take place.
We had been waiting for the CFO when she telephoned, apologised again, and 
assured us that she will arrive in half an hour. The young manager obviously felt 
uncomfortable about this. Firstly, she offered to go and see the production unit. Then 
she exclaimed that it is located 20 minutes away but her car was taken by the CFO. 
The temperature fell to -30°C. It was rather cold for a 20 minutes walk and we 
decided to stay in the head office. In twenty minutes all of the employees went for 
lunch. The manager invited me to join them.
The lunch bar was very large, new, and well decorated. It had two areas. The manager 
explained that the first, small area was for the senior managers. Basically, the two 
areas were almost identical and were not separated from each other. The CEO area 
had better tablecloths and each table was decorated with a vase and fresh flowers
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(quite expensive things in Russia in the winter time). The CFO telephoned again and 
promised to arrive in half an hour. She came in two hours and we met in her office.
Her view of organisational culture was quire different from the other manager. She 
noticed with irony:
“All the procedures and practices are written in our regulations.
We strictly follow them. Some o f  the practices are written in the 
company’s protocols. We have to follow them. Also, have you 
seen the structure o f  our organisation? It is vertical. I  think these 
facts say everything about our culture. ”
Many employees of Venture D came from the Russian partner. The Venture and the 
Russian parent have the same CEO. The Venture’s CTO (Chief Technical Officer) 
had been working in the Russian parent for almost 30 years. He is the second most 
senior person in the Venture.
“Our cultures are identical [i.e. the organisational cultures o f  
Venture D, Russian parent and the European partner 1]. Our 
organisations have been exchanging employees fo r  many years.
The Russian partner and the European partner 1 have been 
doing it fo r  almost 50 years! The same people mean the same 
style o f  work. The same CEOs mean the same style o f  leadership.
Some differences we have are related to the size o f  the 
organisations. ”
The CFO explained that the Russian parent is a bigger organisation. Consequently, 
decision-making and planning tend to be a bit slower.
According to the CFO, the Chief Technical Officer is the only person who is 
constantly in touch with the CEO. The Venture’s and the Russian parent’s CEO is the 
only person who participates in the negotiations with European partner 1. European 
partner 1 then gets in touch with European partner 2. European partner 2 and the 
Russian parent do not have direct meetings. The Venture’s managers and European 
partner 2 have never seen each other.
“European partner 2? I  do not know anything about it. I  know 
exactly that our CEO has never been in touch with them. ”
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Despite the fact that many employees and the CEOs of the Venture D have been 
working in both partner organisations and know each other, one of the main problems 
the Venture faced was trust.
“During many years our parent companies [i.e. Russian and 
European partner 1] were sure that we are cheating on them.
The situation was ridiculous. The European parent 1 believed 
that the Russian partner and our Venture act in collusion. The 
Russian partner decided that the European partner 1 and our 
CTO are in collusion. Many times they both sent independent 
experts to our company to check some financial and technical 
documentation. It took them both many years to resolve that 
conflict. ”
Answering the questions the CFO was quite sarcastic and even ironical. She 
explained that Venture D is out of risk and organisational culture differences cannot 
lead to the Venture’s dissolution.
“Differences? I  am afraid that organisational culture similarities 
can cause the dissolution. Nevertheless, it is not our case. We do 
not have many competitors and the government and many 
industries need our products. ”
Analysis
Venture D was set up by two similar companies. The Russian and the European 
parent 1 have similar organisational cultures. Their cultures can be described as 
autocratic, or rule oriented cultures. There is only one person in the company who has 
the power to make decisions. The rest of the employees do not participate in the 
decision-making. The CEO and the CTO of Venture D also work in the Russian 
parent. The culture of the Venture is reflected by the CEO’s own values and beliefs.
The Russian and the European partner 1 may be described as ‘Soviet organisations”. 
It seems that both companies are more production oriented. The companies do not 
have a clear mission. Venture D reflected a similar approach to business. The first 
interviewed manager exclaimed that the first goal is “to increase production”. In her 
opinion, this is a primary goal of all manufactures.
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Venture D does not have any team responsible for the venture development and 
communication processes are concentrated only on one man (the CEO). There is lack 
of training as well. The first manager could not answer most of the questions about 
organisational culture. She was not informed about the Venture’s parents at all.
7.5 Venture E
The next case features a 50/50 Russian -  Asian IJV (Venture E). The CEO of Venture 
E preferred to stay anonymous. He did not mention the names of the parent 
companies. So the current case study begins with a description of Venture E.
Joint Venture
Venture E was set up in the manufacturing industry by two large organisations. The 
Asian partner of the Venture is a large family business. Many of the executives and 
employees in the organisation are relatives. The CEO of the Asian company met the 
Russian CEO many years ago. The first idea about an IJV organisation was bom in 
the 1980s when the Soviet Government first allowed IJVs with foreign companies. 
However, the idea was brought to life many years later. To the Asian partner the 
partnership gave an opportunity for growth and diversification. It was also attracted 
by the possible access to the natural resources of Russia. The main goals of the 
Russian partner were profit growth, access to foreign capital and loans, and transfer 
of new technologies.
Venture E and the Russian parent have the same CEO. A vice-president and a Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) come from the Asian parent company. There are 
approximately 600 employees working in Venture E. Both organisations (i.e. Venture 
E and the Russian parent) are situated five minutes away from each other.
Interviewee: CEO
Place: Cafe - Restaurant
Date: 1st February 2010
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The interview was conducted with the CEO. He agreed to an interview with 
reluctance. He highlighted that he prefers to stay anonymous. The researcher called 
on the day of the interview to confirm a time. The CEO agreed to meet up during 
lunch. He told me that he usually has lunch in a nice cosy Cafe -  Restaurant which is 
close to the head office. He gave directions and explained how to find “his own 
table”. It was agreed that we would meet there.
The Cafe -  Restaurant is a luxurious cafe made famous by its delicacies and
Champaign and Whisky bars. The CEO was punctual:
“Good afternoon. (Laughing) I  hope you are not a British spy. ”
During the first twenty to thirty minutes, the manager was controlling the
conversation. He recommended and explained dishes from the menu. Then, he asked
a few general questions about the UK. Next, he started a discussion on Russian 
classical literature, history, and music. At the end of the discussion he exclaimed:
“Okay, now we can gradually turn to the issue o f  organisational 
culture! ”
Role of Culture in Venture E
The manager was quite unsure how to describe the organisational culture in Venture 
E. He was absolutely certain that the organisational culture in his Venture was 
influenced by the Russian parent:
“The organisational culture is very similar to the Russian 
parent. I  am the CEO o f  both organisations. Thus, it is not 
surprising that our Venture has the same culture as the Russian 
parent. ”
Then he added that Russian law requires the companies to have a charter with goals 
and purposes, described practices and procedures. The charter can “get on with the 
organisation” in different ways:
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“It depends on the CEOs and managers, how they work and how 
they motivate their employees... You see, the management style 
in our Venture is quite... (Smiling) call it autocratic i f  you want.
We have a horizontal structure but it does not work well. Two 
CEOs are from the Asian partner. Many o f  the decisions they 
make are wrong only because they do not work in this country.
They do not know Russian law and business environment as well 
as do I. That is why almost all the decisions are made by me.
They know that they can trust me. ”
At that moment the food was served and the CEO deviated from the subject. He 
started talking about Catherine the Great, Louis XIV, and Napoleon I. These three 
sovereigns are one of his subjects of interest. The manager is keen on history. He told 
the researcher that he spent quite a lot of time in different archives studying historical 
documents.
After the starters, he took the interview guide and said:
“Right, before the main course, we have to go through the 
questions about differences. Four... Five... Six... Seven!”
Then, he quickly started explaining. He made a pause from time to time waiting for 
the researcher to finish writing.
“Our Asian partner has a completely different culture! 
Obviously, our countries are different and national cultures are 
different. Our languages are very different. Our intonation and 
gestures are completely different. The Asian parent is a family 
company. They are paternalistic. They are very devoted to the 
company. They work fo r  the idea more than for money. 
Promotion and salary are less important fo r  their employees.
Finally, their CEOs keep a lot o f  workers only because these 
people devoted to the organisation.
In the Russian parent and Venture E, money and promotion are 
the first motivators for the employees. No one will work for an 
idea! Next, our ethics are different. I  mean bribes and 
corruption. The point is that large companies can easier avoid it 
because they are more powerful and they have good networks.
Small companies may get stuck in corruption. How to explain to 
your foreign partner that your company cannot promote its 
product without bribes? They do not understand it. They usually 
look at you and think you are immoral person... Anyway, we
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passed it long time ago. We are large organisation now and we 
have much less troubles with it. ”
During the meal the subject was changed again. The CEO told the researcher about 
the main sports events and competition. He noticed that his Asian partners are not 
keen on sports. He often goes to play tennis and golf with the other managers. These 
are his favourite sports. Moreover, the CEO and managers from the Venture E and the 
Russian parent organise golf and tennis competitions for their employees every year. 
Traditionally, these take place in a different country every year.
There are many points of interaction between the managers of both partners and 
Venture E. Firstly, all senior managers hold four large meetings every year. In 
addition to the formal meetings, Venture E organises a lot of informal meetings for 
the CEOs and employees. These meetings are used in order to educate employees 
about the parent companies, their products and services, and the Venture’s future 
plans and goals. Also, there are a lot of personal communication links between the 
partners and Venture E. For example, the CEOs send personalised memos and cards 
to each other to remind partners about up-coming events, or to celebrate birthdays or 
holidays. Newsletters, fax-line, and video-conferences are constantly used in order to 
update a partner and provide information.
The CEO of Venture E believes that constant communication is the most important 
factor in the IJV’s success:
“An IJV is a marriage! As in every marriage, it has its ups and 
dawns. You have just to be ready fo r  it. I f  you can get on with 
your partner cultural differences will not ruin the IJV. I f  not, 
then they [i.e. the cultural differences] may lead to dissolution.
In my opinion they play no bigger role than trust, commitment, 
similar aims, and so on. In order to smooth all the possible 
conflicts, partners have to be ready fo r constant meetings and 
negotiations. ”
Researcher: What advice would you give to a foreign company that would
like to set up an IJV in Russia?
CEO: First, find  a good partner. Second, go out with your partner
for some time, study it a bit more. Finally, i f  it is good then 
marry it!
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Analysis
Venture E has been managed autocratically by one man. So the culture of the 
company is replicated by the CEO’s values and beliefs. He was unsure how to 
describe organisational culture and finally referred to the firm’s charter. In his 
opinion, an organisational culture is a set of values and practices written in a business 
charter. All employees must read and study this charter.
The Russian partner and the Venture have the same CEO. Therefore, the 
organisational cultures of both partners may be very similar. The main advantage of 
the Venture is close relationships between the CEOs who have known each other for 
a long time. Also, there is a good communication process. The Venture’s employees 
are knowledgeable about both parent companies. They have an opportunity to meet 
each other, and they even spend their spare time together. Nevertheless, the Venture E 
seems to be endorsing the CEO’s hobbies and interests. For example, the CEO 
mentioned that the firm organises competitions in tennis and golf for its employees. 
Tennis and golf were chosen because they are the CEO’s favourite sports.
7.6 Venture F
This case illustrates an IJV between a Russian chemical organisation and a European 
construction company. The IJV was formed as a 51/49 project, where the Russian 
company owns 51 %.
European Partner
The European partner is a MSE which operates in construction industry. The firm’s 
main goal is financial and geographical growth. It tries to achieve this through 
partnerships with different companies.
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Russian Partner
The Russian partner is a large organisation that operates in the chemical industry. The 
company was formed in the Soviet era. It was privatised in 1992. It quickly reached a 
good financial performance. Nowadays, the Russian partner is one of the most 
successful companies in the country. Its shares are traded in many European stock 
exchange markets. The organisation was awarded a prize as one of the most dynamic 
and profitable companies in Russia.
The three main goals of the company are:
• Increasing economic efficiency;
• Maintaining environmental integrity; and,
• Ensuring social justice and stability.
The company has a lot of partnerships. Also, its clients are located in different 
countries. The organisation is proud of its geographic diversification.
Joint Venture
The European and Russian partners set up an IJV (Venture F) in 2005. The newly 
formed organisation aimed to provide engineering research and construction works. 
The main goal of the Russian parent was technology and knowledge transfer. The 
European partner wanted to enter and operate in the Russian market. Venture F is a 
small organisation. The CEO of Venture F is also one of the directors of the Russian 
parent.
Interviewee: Financial Director
Place: Head Office
Date: 19th January 2010
The interview was conducted with the Financial Director. She is the second person in
the organisation. The CEO mainly works in the head office of the Russian parent. He
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rarely comes into his office in Venture F as both organisations are located far from 
each other.
The Financial Director was contacted by phone. The cover letter and the interview 
guide were sent to her after the telephone conversation. In a few days the researcher 
called again. The Financial Director was quite confused. She explained that she 
cannot help a lot with the questions as the topic was quite new for her. Finally, she 
agreed to meet.
The interview took place in the head office. The head office has been recently altered. 
All of the furniture and equipment was new. Most employees were dressed informally 
(mainly jeans and a shirt) which is very unusual for a Russian company. The 
researcher was shown to the office of the Financial Director. After the initial greeting 
she exclaimed:
“I  hope this trip will not be absolutely useless for you. I  looked 
through the questions in the interview guide. I  have to admit, 
they are quite complicated fo r  me. ”
Role of Culture in Venture F
When asked to describe organisational culture the Financial Director responded:
“It is informal. All our employees are young. They have similar 
background. The decisions and instructions are not written 
down. We do not have a written policy. Negotiations and 
meetings in our firm  are informal, too. Most employees came 
from the Russian parent. ”
The manager acknowledged that Venture F does not have any contact with its 
European partner. All of the negotiations with European parent are made by the 
Russian partner:
“I  can not describe the differences in organisational cultures 
between our Venture and the European partner. Our employees 
have never participated in meetings with them. Our CEO, who is 
the manager o f  the Russian partner, contacts them. He usually 
informs us about the results and new plans.”
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The Financial Director felt strong about the autonomy of the Russian parent in 
Venture F. She highlighted that the major decisions are made by the Russian partner. 
All the instructions are made by their CEOs.
“Our company does not have clear goals and a mission. We even 
do not have a web-site. Our CEO thinks it is not necessary. ”
The manager acknowledged that many employees were happy to move to Venture F. 
They were motivated by hopes of a career and the opportunity to learn and explore 
new things. However, the Venture mainly does research and projects for their Russian 
partner.
The parent companies have a lot meetings and negotiations. They hold as least one 
official meeting every three months. Also, they have a lot of informal negotiations 
and meetings:
“We always attend corporate evenings and celebrations in the 
Russian partner's head office. I  saw the managers o f  the 
European parent there many times. They often come. O f course, 
our employees and I  were introduced to them. Unfortunately, we 
could not speak and get to know each other better. They do not 
speak Russian and our employees do not speak their language. It 
is pity. Some o f  the managers o f  the Russian partner are fluent in 
their language. Russian managers often go to the head office o f  
the European partner. They are constantly in touch by phone, e- 
mails, fixed-line, and video conferences. ”
The Financial Director felt that the culture of Venture F is quite similar to the Russian 
partner:
“As you understand, most employees brought Russian parent’s 
culture with themselves. We perform work in the same way as we 
did in the Russian partner’s organisation. Nevertheless, we are 
less formal. Also, we are very small company and the speed o f  
the planning and work is much higher. ”
The manager could not give a answer when the researcher asked her about the role of 
the organisational culture in the success of the IJV. She hesitated and responded that
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she is not sure how it may influence the Venture’s success or failure. She also showed 
much interest in the topic and when the interview was finished, she asked the 
researcher many questions about the research and methodology. The manager 
reminded a few times to send her a final report when the research is finished.
Analysis
Venture F does not have a clear vision, or goals. There is no clarity about where the 
organisation is going and what it would like to achieve. Also, the CEO has very little 
interest in the Venture. He rarely appears in the office. Most of contacts are made by 
telephone. The interviewed manager being the second person in the Venture does not 
have the power to make decisions or to change something. The CEO is the only 
person who can make decisions. The analysis of the future, and the future direction of 
the firm are conditioned by the CEO and the Russian parent.
The manager has a degree in business studies (accounting). Nevertheless, her view of 
organisational culture is weak. She found the questions about organisational culture 
quite complicated and recognised that she had never studied this topic.
7.7 Venture G
The IJV portrayed in this case was formed between Russian and European energy and 
utilities companies in 2003. The company was set up by the European partner as a 
branch. The newly formed European firm faced troubles in Russia due to poor 
knowledge of the Russian market and government laws. Because of this the company 
started seeking a Russian partner. In 2003 the firm became a Russian - European IJV.
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European Partner
The European partner is a subsidiary of a large corporation. It was set up for 
international projects. The firm offers innovative technologies combined with know­
how and operates in the energy and utilities industry.
Nowadays, the company has businesses in many countries. The success of the 
company is based on innovation, technical capacity, quality, and safety. The 
organisation pays a lot of attention to ecological issues. It is proud that its know-how 
has helped energy and utility companies to become more ecologically friendly 
organisations.
Russian Partner
The Russian partner operates in the construction industry. The company is a part of a 
holding group. The mission of the company emphasises four aims: geographical 
diversification, advanced technologies and innovation, and generating value to 
society through environmental issues and standards. The company has a horizontal 
structure and it is proud of its innovative management system. The company’s web­
site highlights its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), which includes health, 
safety, and environmental issues.
Joint Venture
The history of the organisation began in 2001 when the European parent opened its 
first company in Russia. Very quickly, the newly formed firm faced many troubles in 
the Russian market. Two years later, the European partner reorganised the firm into 
an IJV (Venture G).
Interviewee: CEO
Place: Head Office
Date: 3d February 2010
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The interview was conducted with a CEO in the Venture’s head office. The head 
office itself was a bit messy. The CEO apologised and explained that Venture G will 
probably be closed very soon.
He acknowledged that Venture G was set up in order to complete a few projects. 
Thus, the firm does not have a mission. It has a lot of goals which are related to the 
projects including quality, safety, staff qualifications, and environmental issues.
“ Venture G has already completed all its goals and the parent 
companies are going to close it soon. ”
Role of Culture in Venture G
The role of culture was seen as “big” and “very important” by the CEO. He captured 
the meanings of the definitions used by different scholars to describe the impact of 
culture. Organisational culture in Venture G was described as:
‘'Our culture was set up as a branch o f  the foreign partner.
Many employees in our organisation are from the European 
parent. So our culture was form ed and influenced by the foreign 
parent a lot.
We are a very mobile organisation. The speed o f  decision­
making and planning are very fast. Our employees are from  
different countries but they share similar experiences. The way 
they perform their work is the same. This is very important in our 
organisation where safety and quality play a very important role.
Our employees have a lot o f  training together. They have a 
similar background and education. ”
The manager clearly distinguished cultural values, practices, and artefacts. He 
continued his description by contrasting and comparing the Venture with its parent 
companies:
“Our Russian parent pays a lot o f  attention on cultural artefacts.
Its logo, equipment, furniture, personnel dress, parking etc. are 
all thought out in detail. They care about the f irm ’s image. The 
image was created, the values and practices were written and the 
employees were trained until their values and practices became 
the same.
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Our European partner is a smaller company. They pay less 
attention on artefacts and image creation. They have its mission 
and goals. They employ people who are compatible with them.
Profit growth bothers them more than the Russian partner. ”
The CEO acknowledged that different organisational cultures may lead to many 
conflicts between partners and an IJV. According to him, when the managers and 
employees believe in different things and do their work in different ways, it creates 
misinterpretations and misunderstandings between the partners. Later this can lead to 
conflicts. He commented:
“For instance, our Russian parent performs work faster. Its 
decision-making is quick. Its planning is quick. When it comes to 
an important decision, the managers who are responsible for it 
come fo r  a meeting. They negotiate and make a decision. In some 
cases, [depending on the situation] decisions are made only by 
the CEOs o f  our Venture. The Russian partner fully trusts us and 
will never check our decisions.
Our European parent is slower and its decision-making is much 
slower too. They negotiate and analyse a lot before they make a 
decision. They constantly check all o f  the decisions made by our 
CEOs. They prefer to have a 100 % guarantee in success. They 
calculate risks. The Russian parent prefers to take risk The 
European and Russian partners often disagree on the level o f  
risk. After all, the European parent believes that the Russian 
partner and the Venture’s managers are irresponsible. Then, 
they trust us less, and conflict begins to rise. ”
The Venture’s managers pay a lot of attention to meetings and communications with 
its partners. The European and the Russian parents do not contact each other. All the 
negotiations are made through Venture G.
Every year, all o f the CEOs have a large annual meeting where they discuss and set 
the goals for the following year. They also have at least four smaller meetings every 
year. All these meetings take place in Russia in the head office of Venture G.
“Obviously, we use e-mails, letters, and video-conferences to 
contact our partners. Our Russian parent is located one hour 
away from us, so we have more meetings with them than with the 
European parent. Our managers go to the head office o f  the
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European parent every year. All the meetings are formal. We 
rarely have informal meetings. ”
The Venture has a flat structure. Many managers participate in the decision-making 
and planning process. The CEO highlighted that he calls the managers for meetings 
regularly where they discuss the work of the Venture. Everyone is welcomed to 
propose and suggest new ideas. The managers are encouraged to make decisions. 
However, the main strategic decisions are usually made by the parent companies.
Researcher: Would you call your IJV a successful company?
CEO: It is difficult to say. We have completed all our goals. So...
probably yes, we have succeeded. Nevertheless, I  would 
prefer this organisation to last longer. Nowadays, we are 
becoming a competitor fo r  our European partner as we got a 
lot o f  orders from the countries where our European partner 
controls the market. Obviously, they do not want us to 
operate in those markets. Taking into account that we have 
completed our goals, they now hurry to close us. The Russian 
partner got what it wanted too. We 7/ see, our partners are 
negotiating now. They have a new idea. I  do not know 
anything about it, yet. ”
Analysis
The interviewed manager was one of the few executives whose scores in the 
questionnaires did not show a dominance of traditional values and rule oriented 
culture. Preference was given to the openness to change values, and a supportive and 
goal-oriented culture.
Venture G was formed by two companies who have similar goals and values. The 
European partner did a substantial analysis to find the “right” Russian partner. The 
Venture’s culture was mainly shaped by the European partner. During the first few 
years, the firm was a branch of the European parent. Also, many employees in the 
Venture came from the European partner organisation. All the employees and 
managers have had regular training in the head office of the European partner. It
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appears that in some cases the company continued to be treated as a branch of the 
European partner.
7.8 Venture H
The IJV described in this case was set up in the info-tech and telecommunications 
industry by the Russian and European companies. The IJV has been operating since 
1994.
European Partner
The European partner is a large organisation that operates in the info-tech and 
telecommunications industry. The company’s vision and mission aim for a stable 
growth and leading position in the globe through long-term relationships with its 
clients and through partnerships.
Being a relatively young company, the organisation managed to create a wide 
network of clients and suppliers. It has a lot of partnerships with universities and 
research centres which help to develop new products and services.
The company states its main values and principles of work as:
• Being committed to business ethics;
• Educated and cooperative staff; and,
• Excellence of work.
Russian Parent
The Russian parent is a large state-owned organisation. The company manufactures 
products for the energy, electronic, and transport industries. The organisation’s web­
site is very simple. It briefly describes its history, products, and provides contact 
details.
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Joint Venture
In 1994 both partners set up an IJV in order to develop and produce high quality 
products and services for the info-tech and telecommunications industry. The IJV is a 
MSE. One of the main aims of the European partner was geographical expansion and 
an entrance in the Russian market. The main goal of the Russian partner is technology 
and knowledge transfer. The European partner holds 60 % of the equity. The IJV in 
this study will be referred as Venture H.
Interviewee: CEO
Place: Head Office
Date: 28th January 2010
An interview was arranged very quickly. The researcher telephoned the organisation. 
On the same day the cover letter, the interview guide and questionnaires were sent to 
the company. In a few days the researcher received a response from a secretary who 
offered possible dates for an interview with a CEO.
The interview took place in the head office. The head office is a new modem style 
building. All decorations in rooms and halls create an atmosphere of home. There 
were a lot of flowers, mats, wooden furniture, and paintings on the walls.
The CEO greeted the researcher and began asking different questions about the UK 
and Cardiff. He pointed on the wall under his table and said: “I  studied in the UK, 
to o ” The researcher saw a framed Masters Diploma from a British business school.
In the beginning of the interview the researcher asked a few general questions about 
Venture H. The CEO acknowledged that he would not be able to provide with the 
information about the Russian partner. The Russian partner did not participate in the 
Venture’s development.
“It [the Russian parent] is a closed state-owned company. There 
is a lot o f  secrecy around them. We do not know much about it. ”
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Role of Culture in Venture H
The CEO described the organisational culture in Venture H as a “democratic”, 
“family style”, and people-oriented.
“The core o f  our culture is people. We pay a lot o f  attention to 
their education and training. We help them in personal 
development. Our managers are democratic. I  think that our 
organisation is like a family. All our employees know each other.
Also, the power distance is small in the company. ”
Many employees and managers in the Venture came from the European partner. The 
CEOs have always come from Russia. The European partner changes the CEO every 
four to five years. All the major decisions concerning the work of Venture H are 
made by the European partner.
The organisational culture in the Venture has been shaped by the European parent. 
During the first three years the Venture H had develop its mission, values and goals. 
They are similar to the European partner. Business ethics, transparency, team-work, 
excellence of service, and staff trainings have become the main values of Venture H. 
All of the documentation, accounting system and databases had been improved to 
match the standards of the European partner.
The manager acknowledged that the national cultures of Russia and the European 
parent’s country are very similar. Despite the fact that the organisational cultures in 
Venture H and the European parent are similar, there are some economical and 
political differences which influence the way people perform their work.
“Russian legal and political environments create an additional 
culture in the company. This culture is completely different. It is 
parallel to our existing organisational culture. I  mean 
bureaucracy and corruption. For example, the governmental 
bureaucracy here may freeze a business. In order to get 
necessary documents or certificates we may wait a few  weeks or 
even months. The officials can make you waiting purposely. The 
company cannot continue its work without these documents and 
certificates. What to do? I f  you do not pay a bribe you may wait 
a few  months longer. You may start a court process but it may 
take a year to resolve a conflict! ”
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The CEO highlighted that differences in organisational cultures are very important 
and they could lead to the Venture’s dissolution.
“They (differences) definitely can ruin an IJV. I  have explained 
to you the main differences in our organisational cultures. We 
cannot be perfect in our ethics because o f  the government. Now,
I  can tell you how it can cause troubles.
Our European partner even does not want to hear about bribes.
Great! I  agree with them. What to do then? Close a company?
They are sure that there are some ways to avoid corruption. They 
think that the CEO does not try to do it. In some situations, I  am 
afraid; there are no ways to escape from  it.
During the first six years the European partner had changed 
many CEOs in Venture H. Almost every year they chose a new 
CEO. There were a lot o f  conflicts between managers. ”
Later, the manager added that another big difference in organisational cultures 
between Venture H and its European parent is the speed of work. The Venture 
performs its work faster, including: decision-making, documentation, planning, and 
contacts with customers.
“We had a lot o f  complaints from  our employees about it. We 
tried to speak to our partner [i.e. the European parent] about it.
But it is useless. They ju st do it slower because they are bigger 
company. It is a difference you have to accept. ”
The next difference the manager observed was related to the working hours. In the 
partner’s head office employees usually start work at 7.30 am and then finish earlier. 
The European partner decided to organise work in the Venture in the same way. The 
new working hours helped in the communication and negotiation processes between 
the Venture and the European partner. If the two companies work the same hours, 
then the time difference between their cities will have been minimised.
“You can’t imagine how much suffering and indignation it 
evoked among the employees. The European parent had its own 
way. Finally, our employees fom ented a little insurrection here.
It came as a big surprise to the European partner. Their 
judgement was that our people are lazy. You know, they are 
simply a bit different. One has to remember about these 
differences. There are some changes one should not make.
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The Venture’s managers pay a lot of attention to meetings and communications with 
its European partner. There is a special programme of meetings and negotiations. All 
the managers strictly follow it.
Both the board of directors and shareholders have two large annual meetings. A 
winter meeting usually takes place in Russia in the Venture’s head office. A summer 
meeting takes place in Europe. The CEOs also have two annual meetings. The main 
strategies for the future development are dictated by the board of directors. The 
European parent has a bigger power in the decision-making as it owns 60 % of the 
Venture.
In addition, every month Venture H takes part in various exhibitions. At least one 
manager from the European parent attends the exhibitions. Also, the Venture has a 
few branches and many service centres in Russia. The managers of both companies 
have a tradition to visit all of them every year. Almost all CEOs and managers in the 
European partner speak Russian fluently and this makes negotiations and contacts 
easier.
“I f  a conflict occurs I  telephone the CEO o f  the European 
parent. We organise a meeting or a video-conference 
immediately. All the conflicts are usually resolved by the top 
managers. Shareholders participate only i f  we are not able to 
come to an agreement, but... it does not happen often. I  am very 
glad that all managers from  our parent speak Russian. It helps a 
lo t r
Analysis
Venture H does not have any control from the Russian parent. The Russian partner 
does not participate in the Venture’s daily work. The firm’s organisational culture 
was mainly influenced by the European partner. There are European managers and 
employees in the Venture. The European partner developed the Venture’s values, 
aims, and goals and they are almost identical to those of the parent company. Also, 
the daily work of employees is also influenced by the European parent. The Venture s 
accounting system, databases, information sharing, negotiation style, and decision­
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making are similar to its European parent. It seems that the Venture is treated as a 
branch of the European parent.
The CEO of Venture H received his education in the UK. He reflected on some of his 
values in the Venture. The CEO filled in the questionnaires after the interview in 
front of the researcher. Venture H is the only interviewed company that showed a 
high score in the innovation-oriented culture category. The rule oriented culture 
received very low marks from the CEO.
7.9 Venture J
The next case describes a 50/50 Russian-European IJV between two large 
corporations. The IJV is engaged in the energy and utility industry.
European Partner
The European partner is a global company. It is engaged in the design, manufacture, 
and servicing of different products. The company's products are used in a wide range 
of applications and industries, including: oil and gas, pharmaceutical, chemical, food 
and beverage, power generation, and others.
The main values o f the company are quality, health and safety, and environmental 
protection.
Russian Partner
The Russian parent is a large organisations which is engaged in research, design, and 
manufacturing.
The organisation was set up during the Soviet era. Currently, the Russian parent is a 
public limited company where 55 % of the shares belong to the Russian government. 
The company is famous for its research centres and institutes. It employs a lot of
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scientists. Many of its managers and employees have a PhD in engineering. The 
majority of the employees have been working in the company for more than 30 years.
Highly educated and experienced workers have become the main competitive 
advantage of the company. The Russian partner developed a lot of new and innovative 
products. Currently, the company holds more than 1,000 international patents. It is 
proud of its new technologies, equipment, and electronic systems.
Joint Venture
Both partners set up an IJV in 1994. It was a big event in the region and it attracted a 
lot of attention from the mass media and officials. The Russian partner was a closed 
state-owned company. Since its establishment it has opened itself for the first time. A 
partnership with a foreign company became almost a sensation.
Both partners have equal shares in the IJV. The global European partner did not have 
access to the Russian market. The newly formed venture gave a new market and 
customers. The Russian partner was seeking for new and innovative technologies to 
increase competitiveness of its products and services.
The IJV under this study will be referred to as Venture J.
Interviewees: 1. CEO
2. CMO (Chief Marketing Officer)
Place: Head Office
Date: 3d December 2009
Venture J responded very quickly to the letter and suggested possible dates for the 
interview. The interview took place in the head office, which is located a few minutes 
away from the Russian parent. A CMO met the researcher. He apologised for the 
disorder in the office and explained that Venture J has recently moved to the new 
office.
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The first 20 minutes the researcher spoke to the CMO who provided with the general 
information about the Venture J. He added:
“I  am afraid I  will have to leave you soon. I  have an urgent 
meeting. Our CEO will answer the rest o f  your questions. He will 
join us in 5 minutes. ”
Role of Culture in Venture J
The CMO described the organisational culture in the Venture as “a mixture o f the
Russian partner’s culture and a fresh air”:
“We have a lot o f  employees who came here from the Russian 
partner. They brought with them the organisational culture o f  the 
Russian partner. We also have young managers who have 
established a completely different style o f  communication and 
decision-making. ”
Researcher: You have mentioned that some employees brought an
organisational culture from  your partner. Could you 
describe the organisational culture o f  your Russian 
partner?
CMO: It is Soviet culture, autocratic. The decision-making is
centralised on top. People strictly follow the written rules 
and procedures.
At this moment the CEO entered the office. He introduced himself and added that he
is very interested in the topic o f the research and will be glad to help. The CMO
briefly told him about the current discussion, apologised again and left.
The researcher asked the CEO to describe the organisational culture in the Venture J.
The CEO’s opinion was very similar to that of his colleague.
CEO: I  would describe our organisational culture as democratic.
We have a lot o f  employees from the Russian parent.
However, all o f  our managers are young. Our culture is 
less formal. The Russian parent still carries the Soviet 
culture because all top executives received their education 
and experience in the USSR. They have been working in the
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organisation fo r  more than 30 years. They know only one 
culture and one style. It is already useless to change them.
The manager acknowledged that most executives in the Russian parent are engineers.
According to the CEO,
“ They [the senior managers o f  the Russian parent] like to create 
a product. They are very good in research as well. Many o f  them 
are scientists. However, they do not know anything about profit 
and sales! They even do not think that profit is the most 
important. In their view the product is the first and foremost. But 
what is the point o f  it i f  you cannot sell it? Also, you know, 
scientists usually have pretty bad communication skills. But these 
skills are very important in a commercial field. ”
Researcher: Do these differences create any clashes or conflicts with the
Russian parent?
CEO: No, not really. Venture J  has a very good performance. They
trust us.
The CEO acknowledged that the Venture J has many things in similar with its 
European partner. The Venture’s managers constantly have training. Many of them 
take place in the head office of the European partner. Venture J adopted its 
production chain and operational management from the Russian parent, whereas 
marketing, finance, communication style and decision-making are more similar to the 
European parent.
The manager observed two differences in organisational cultures between Venture J 
and the European partner:
“First, the speed o f  our work is different. I  mean planning, 
decision-making, analysis etc. In Russia, we are used to doing 
everything quickly. We are in a hurry and in constant stress. We 
always have deadlines and never break them. Our European 
partner is more relaxed. It takes them much more time to make 
decisions or prepare documents. They do not understand why 
and where we hurry.
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Second, the average age o f  our top managers is different. It 
seems that the European partner does not like it. It had been 
creating some trouble in communications and trust. ”
The top managers of Venture J are quite young (35-40 years old) in comparison with 
the CEOs of the European partner (50-55 years old). The interviewee suggested that 
the European partner sees young managers as inexperienced. He argued that young 
managers in Russia have better experience because they had not been studying in the 
USSR. Therefore, their values and knowledge are more business oriented.
The role of culture in the IJVs success was seen as “a  very important” by the CEO. 
He acknowledged that communications play the biggest role, and help to match and 
fit cultures.
Venture J has regular meetings with its partners. During the first years when the 
company was still unstable, all of the managers had one meeting every month. Later, 
when the company stabilised, the meetings became less frequent. The board of 
directors usually meets one to two times per year. However, the CEO does not know 
much about their meetings. He usually participated in the meetings with top managers 
where the main future directions of Venture are discussed. As both partners have 
equal shares in the Venture, it is difficult to avoid conflicts and clashes in the 
decision-making. The CEO said that this happens rarely now because the partners 
have developed understanding and trust. During the first years the managers called 
for independent experts to resolve the conflicts.
The European partner has a manager who is responsible for the negotiations with 
Venture J and the Russian parent. This manager is fluent in Russian. He is also 
knowledgeable in Russian culture as he has lived in Russia for many years.
“We [the Venture J  and its partners] have a lot o f  informal 
meetings as well. Our Russian parent is only five minutes away 
from us. We can meet any time. We have very good relationships 
with the European manager who is responsible for the 
negotiations. We are constantly in touch. So i f  a problem occurs, 
it can be resolved quickly. ”
Researcher: Would you call the Venture a successful organisation?
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CEO: Yes, definitely.
Analysis
The overall strategic future direction of the Venture is based on profit. The manager 
does not have a clear vision o f the organisational goals. There is no mission statement 
as well. The Venture’s organisational culture was described well. The Venture 
adopted its production scheme from the Russian parent, whereas its managerial skills 
are more similar to the European parent. The managers are constantly trained in the 
head office of the European parent. Thus, they replicate new ideas and practices in the 
Venture. Actually, the answers from Questionnaire 2 show that the Venture has a goal 
oriented culture. The rule oriented culture received a quite low score.
The main advantage of Venture J is that it has a well organised communicative 
process with both partners. The Russian parent is located a few minutes away, and 
this allows the top managers to have regular meetings. Also, the European parent has 
a team which is responsible for communications with the Venture. One of the 
managers from this team is fluent in Russian and they are familiar with the Russian 
environment and culture. Nevertheless, it appears that almost all negotiations between 
the Russian parent and the European parent, and the Venture and the European parent, 
go through one man only.
7.10 Venture K
The next case will illustrate a Russian — American IJV. This IJV is a large 
manufacturer which produces products for many industries.
American Partner
The American partner is one of the world’s leaders in design, manufacturing, and 
service. The organisation’s products are used in many industries. The company
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operates globally in more than 150 countries, and it employs approximately 35,000 
people.
The main values of the American partner are:
• Excellence (to be the best);
• Innovation (new creative solutions);
• Integrity (be ethical and respectful);
• Customer service (exceed expectations);
• Dependability (honour commitments); and,
• Adaptability (to be passionate about change).
Russian Parent
The Russian parent is a large manufacturer which was established in the Soviet 
Union. In the middle of the 1990s the company became a part of a holding group, the 
largest part of which belongs to the government. Nowadays, the Russian parent 
specialises in the research, design, and, manufacturing of products for a number of 
different industries.
The company pays a lot of attention to its personnel, especially to the training and 
qualifications of its young employees. The company states that its main goals are to 
increase the education and qualification of employees, and the produce high quality 
products.
Joint Venture
In 1997, the Russian and American companies founded an IJV (Venture K). The 
Russian parent owns 75 % of the Venture, the American company holds 25 %. The 
main reasons behind the formation of the Venture were profit growth and market 
access for the American partner, whereas the Russian parent wanted to improve their 
product quality through technology transfer.
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Interviewee: CFO
Place: Head Office
Date: 14th January 2010
The interview was arranged with a Chief Financial Officer in the Venture’s head 
office. The CFO is an American, and he has been working in the Venture K since its 
formation. The interview was conducted in English as the CFO does not speak 
Russian.
Role of Culture in Venture K
The questions about organisational culture o f the Venture K and its partners provoked 
a lot of criticism from this manager. He was upset with the structure of the Russian 
parent, its goals, and the role of the Russian CEO. Describing the organisational 
culture, he started comparing and contrasting the role of the CEO and decision­
making styles in the American partner and in the Russian company.
“ The Russians are very formal. The organisational culture in the 
Venture is formal, too. Here the General Director decides 
everything. The CEO in Russia has all the power. In the 
American partner power is shared and different managers make 
decisions. Thus, responsibility is also shared. ”
Many Russian managers still carry their experience from the past. In the Soviet Union 
General Directors were the only people who made decisions. The management system 
in the Russian partner remains similar to those it had in the Soviet era. The same 
management style was brought to Venture K.
“When a CEO here makes a decision everyone agrees with him.
It seems that everyone has exactly the same idea. In the 
American partner decisions are shared. Not only the CEO 
decides. We vote. Everyone is responsible fo r  it. I f  managers in 
the American parent make a mistake they lose bonuses. I f  a CEO 
makes a mistake... Bad fo r  him! In the Russian parent and 
Venture K  CEOs will not be punished. I f  they decide “y e s” even 
i f  everyone says “no ” then they have a power to do it!”
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The manager felt that the employees in this organisation are idle. Their opinion is 
never counted, they cannot make decisions, and their initiative is low.
“In the American partner commitment to a project and work are 
very important. In the Venture there is no commitment. People 
fa il deadlines. They do not finish a project on time, and even do 
not keep their bosses aware o f  it. ”
The Russian managers have also brought with them their experience of work in a state 
owned company. Many of them do not have a sufficient knowledge about a market 
economy. The Russian partner and the Venture work according to the Soviet model. 
They are production oriented instead of being profit oriented companies.
“They say: “We want to rebuild our product. We want to make it 
better. I f  we make a profit, it will be nice, too. ” No! I  say that 
you have to make a profit. Then, you can rebuild and invest to 
rebuild again! But they have a completely different approach! ”
Information sharing in the Venture is very slow, and it takes long time to receive the 
necessary information. Also, as all o f the power concentrates on the top, employees 
have to get permission from the CEOs before getting the necessary documents or 
information.
“In the American partner I  can go to different departments to get 
information. Here, you have to go up in order to reach down. It 
takes a long time. ”
In addition, work in different departments is not structured. There are different 
databases in different departments which lead to difficulties in planning and analysis.
Shareholders and managers of both partners meet every 2-3 months. However, the 
American partner, who owns only 25 % o f the Venture, cannot make a decision.
“The American partner can only suggest and give advice, but the 
Russian partner makes all the decisions. I f  they decide to do 
something then they do it even i f  the American partner says 
“N o ”.
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Consequently, the American partner just follows the rules of the Russian 
organisation.
“I f  they have all the competences and can do things by 
themselves they do not cooperate. They even do not listen to us. 
Only when they are in serious troubles they will listen how to 
resolve the problems. ”
Researcher: Do you think that differences in organisational cultures are 
important, and they may cause an IJV ’s dissolution?
CFO: Actually, you can fin d  differences everywhere, even inside
one country. It is difficult to avoid them. They may create a 
conflict. But conflicts are everywhere. People do not like to 
share power. It is important to understand these differences 
and to know that they exist.
Researcher: Would you call your IJV successful?
CFO: Success is a long-term thing. So, it is still early to say.
Researcher: What advice would you give to foreign managers who would
like to set up an IJV in Russia?
CFO: Take the majority o f  ownership or make it 50/50 because i f
you do not have power to make a change then this change 
will not happen!
Analysis
Venture K is managed autocratically by one man -  the CEO of the Russian partner. 
Thus, the organisational culture of the Venture was copied from the Russian partner. 
The CEO brought his experience from the Soviet era. He has a little interest in a 
profitable business. There is a strong production-led preference and a lack of any 
strategic direction. As in many autocratic cultures, the organisation reflected the 
values and beliefs o f the CEO. The style of work, motivation, and the decision­
making are conditioned by the values of the CEO.
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7.11 Venture L
The next case is about a Russian -  European IJV. This partnership is based on mutual 
trust and long stable relationships between managers.
European Partner
The European partner is a part of a holding group. This company is engaged in the 
design, manufacturing, and distribution o f IT products for the energy industry. At the 
end of the 1990s the firm reached its financial pick and the European partner started 
seeking for opportunities in new markets with new partners. The Russian market 
presented great opportunities for the European partner because the competition in this 
sector of business was not as tight as it is in Europe. Moreover, the CEO had a friend 
in Russia who owned a company operating in the IT industry. The long friendship of 
both managers led to the creation of an IJV company.
Russian Partner
The Russian partner is engaged in the design o f products for the IT industry. It is a 
small family owned company. The company was operating in the local market. The 
idea of an IJV presented a good growth opportunity to this company. The European 
partner could create a good image for the firm. Moreover, the Russian partner would 
be able to get access to new technologies, knowledge, and customers.
Joint Venture
Both CEOs have been friends since they went to university. They agreed to open a 
50/50 IJV company (Venture L) in Russia. Venture L was set up in 2001 and it is 
engaged in the construction, distribution, and service of IT products for the energy 
industry. The Russian partner and Venture L have the same CEO.
Interviewee: CMO
Place: Head Office
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Date: 3 February 2010
An interview took place in the head office with a Chief Marketing Officer. He greeted 
the researcher and said:
“Before we start I  have a favour to ask o f  you. I  looked through 
the interview questions. Please, remember that I  did not finish 
Harvard Business School. So could you avoid all these difficult 
terms? ”
The CMO has a degree in mechanical engineering. He was working in R&D in a 
construction company before he came in the Venture L. He found that many of the 
interview questions are quite technical and more applicable for large corporations, 
whereas in small companies all o f the processes are different.
Role of Culture in Venture L
The manager described the organisational culture in the Venture as “informal” and 
“a family culture ”. According to him, the Russian and European partners have very 
similar cultures. Both CEOs are friends and many managers in partner companies 
know each other. Their families have also been friends for a long time.
“Obviously our Russian parent and the Venture are very similar.
We have one CEO. All employees in Venture L are Russians. 
However, they all trained in the European partner’s head office.
Our European partner has a similar culture. It is an informal 
fam ily style culture. ”
Many employees in the European partner are family members. Before the company 
was bought by the holding group it had been a family business.
The CMO complained that despite all the similarities the European partner has a 
different style of work, which causes some clashes between managers.
“You know, they are too relaxed. Everything they do, they do 
slowly. They answer e-mails in 3 to 5 days! We do it in one day.
It takes them a long time to make a decision. When our managers 
meet here, they firstly discuss business. Next, they go to a
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restaurant or a theatre. When our managers go to the European 
partner we spend a few  days in the restaurants and theatres 
before we start to speak about business. This is the way they like 
to do it. ”
The researcher asked a few questions about the work practices in all three companies. 
The manager assured me that the Russian partner and the Venture have exactly the 
same procedures, accounting systems, and documentation. He explained that after the 
Venture formation, the Russian partner changed its business practices according to 
the European company. Thus, all three companies perform work in a similar manner.
Researcher: Some people suggest that differences in organisational 
cultures lead to conflicts and dissolution o f  IJVs. Do you 
think differences in organisational cultures can cause IJV ’s 
dissolution?
CMO: (Thinking)... I am not sure. Different cultures may cause
conflicts, I  think. Nevertheless, i f  people are flexible and 
diplomatic enough, these conflicts can be regulated.
The CMO highlighted several times during the interview that negotiations and 
communications between partners plays a very big role in the success of the Venture. 
Venture L and its partners have a lot o f meetings during the year, most are informal. 
Most of winter meetings take place in the European partner’s head office. Most of the 
summer meetings take place in Russia. In addition, all employees of the parent 
companies and Venture L exchange greeting cards and memos. Every year Venture L 
takes part in various exhibitions. It is a tradition for the managers from the European 
parent to come to these exhibitions in order to introduce and present the Venture.
The manager was uncertain when the researcher asked him to contrast the decision­
making styles of both parent companies and Venture L. He responded that in the 
Venture the CEO always brings the other managers to the meetings. The decision­
making is shared between two to three managers. All of the questions concerning the 
Venture’s development are decided only by the parent firms, the other managers of 
the Venture do not participate in these decisions.
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The structure of the European parent includes a Board of Directors and a management 
team. The Board o f Directors makes all the decision about the Venture’s 
development, the managers implement them. The CMO told that from time to time 
there is a collision o f interests between the Venture’s CEO and the Board of 
Directors. Both partners have equal shares and only negotiations help to avoid a 
conflict.
“In such situations, the European CEO helps a lot. He is a 
friend  o f  our CEO and they always fin d  a compromise and 
agreement. Then, the European CEO authorises this with 
the Board o f  Directors. Thus, we easily avoid conflicts. ”
Analysis
Venture L does not have clear goals and vision. As in the previous cases, the 
company does not have a mission statement. There is no strategic approach to 
business development.
The manager’s view o f organisational culture is weak. His knowledge of management 
is limited. They are mainly based on a few training sessions in the head office of the 
European partner.
7.12 Venture M
The current case illustrates an IJV between Russian and European companies. This 
IJV operates in the chemical industry. The Russian company holds 48 % of the 
Venture, and the European partner has 52 % o f the equity.
European Partner
The European parent is engaged in the research, design, and production of products in 
chemical industry. The company has been operating in the European market for more 
than 80 years. The European partner achieves a sustainable development through
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good quality and environment oriented products. It pays particular attention to the 
qualifications and training of every employee.
At the end of the 1990s the organisation began the development of new products and 
opened a few branches. The company decided to open a manufacturing plant in 
Russia in order to achieve a competitive advantage for its products. The IJV would 
give the company an opportunity to decrease the costs of production and enter into a 
new market. Consequently, the European company began looking for a Russian 
partner.
Russian Partner
The Russian partner was set up in 1991. It is a MSE. The company is engaged in the 
design and manufacturing of products for different industries such as the chemical, 
pharmaceutical, and catering industries.
The company is proud o f its laboratories and highly qualified staff. The Russian 
partner states that the main values o f the company are innovation, cost efficiency, and 
quality.
Joint Venture
Both partners set up an IJV (Venture M) in 2002. Venture M is a manufacturer which 
is engaged in the chemical industry. The CEO o f the Russian partner became the 
General Director of the newly formed organisation.
Interviewee: CEO
Place: Head Office
Date: 27th January 2010
The interview was arranged very quickly. Venture M responded to the letter asking 
the researcher about convenient dates for an interview.
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The interview took place in the Venture’s head office. Actually, the head office of the 
Venture and the Russian partner are combined together as the CEO and many 
managers work for both organisations.
Role of Culture in Venture M
The CEO briefly described both partners. When the researcher moved to the 
questions about organisational culture, the manager answered with a smile:
“7/ is very difficult question fo r  me. I  received my education in 
the USSR. I  did not study business and management theory. I  
learned management and leadership from  practice. I  think that I  
am carrying old ideas o f  management. ”
The CEO has a PhD in Chemistry. He felt that his knowledge of management is 
limited and old. However, when the Venture M was formed almost all of the 
managers went for training in the European partner’s firm. This training has become 
regular and happens a few times every year.
“We constantly go fo r  training. It helps us a lot. Firstly, it gives 
a lot o f  knowledge on the necessary subjects. Secondly, it helps 
us to know our partner better. ”
Comparing and contrasting the organisational cultures of both partners, the manager 
mainly concentrated on national cultures. He described the differences between the 
partners’ countries, people’s life style and habits, and their beliefs. On the question 
about decision-making and the style o f work in both companies (Question 7) the 
manager responded:
“The Russian partner and Venture M  have very similar cultures, 
almost identical. It is obvious because the managers are the 
same. ”
According to the CEO, the Russian parent and Venture M have similar 
characteristics. Both organisations follow the same procedures and regulations, which 
are described and determined by the charter. Thus, the organisational cultures cannot 
be different.
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Observing the differences between the Venture and the European partner, the CEO 
mainly paid attention to the speed of work.
“The European partner is more flexible and less formal. They 
are slower, too. We make decisions quickly. We answer e-mails 
and letters quickly. They always keep us waiting. Also, they plan 
the Venture's work many years in advance. We do not 
understand how they can do it in Russia. ”
He commented that the Russian environment is so unpredictable that any advance 
planning is almost useless. However, the Venture follows the rules of the European 
partner and makes forecasts and analysis for a period of five years.
The CEO saw the Venture’s culture as very similar to that of the Russian partner. He 
also referred to himself as an old school Soviet. On the other hand, the work in the 
Venture (including the analysis, planning, documentation and the decision-making) 
were organised according to Western standards.
“Actually, they treat us like a branch. We are not a branch.
However, all the procedures are organised similar to those o f  the 
European partner. "
Furthermore, decision-making and power are shared between a few managers. For 
example, answering the question about communications and conflicts between the 
partners, the manager exclaimed:
“I f  a conflict occurs, we can resolve it through negotiations. It is 
very important that both sides understand each other well. Long 
discussions help. Then, we vote, o f  course. Our managers vote 
and decide what decision to make. ”
Researcher: Some people suggest that differences in organisational 
cultures lead to conflicts and dissolution o f  IJVs. Do you 
think differences in organisational cultures can cause IJV's 
dissolution?
CEO: I  think that trust is the most important thing in Russia. I f
there is no trust then the relationships between partners' 
managers will be very tense. Differences in cultures may be 
smoothed by the partners. You may negotiate with your
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partners and explain these differences. I f  there is no trust, it 
is very difficult to build it. I f  trust is broken, it is almost 
impossible to rebuild it.
Analysis
The European partner owns a bigger part o f Venture M. So, it has an advantage in the 
decision-making process. Venture M almost operates as a branch of the European 
partner. The European parent even mentions Venture M on its web-site as “a Russian 
branch The Venture’s work and daily practices are organised similarly to those of 
the European partner.
The CEO’s knowledge on organisational culture is weak. He constantly referred to 
the national cultures of both countries. He views organisational culture as policies 
described in a charter. On the other hand, his leadership style is different from many 
Russian managers. The company has a small, flat structure and many managers 
participated in the decision-making.
7.13 Venture N
The following case represents a Russian -  American IJV operating in the energy and 
utility industry. The company was one o f the first IJVs in the region. It has recently 
celebrated its jubilee and is very proud of its successful growth.
American Partner
The American company is a medium-size, privately owned firm. It is engaged in 
energy production. The company has been operating in the local market for almost 
forty years. Organisational culture in the firm can confidently be called “a family 
culture”. A family, and family values play a very big role in the American partner’s 
country. Many employees and managers in the firm have known each other for a long
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time. They studied together in schools and universities. Also, their families spend a 
lot of time together.
The American partner was one o f the first organisations that entered into the Russian 
market in 1991. The company opened its own branch; however, in a few months the 
company was faced with many difficulties and it began to look for a Russian partner.
Russian Partner
The Russian parent is one o f the subsidiaries of a large, leading, and vertically 
integrated company. The firm is engaged in the energy production industry. It aims to 
support long-term economic growth, social stability, prosperity and progress in the 
regions where it operates, as well as caring for the environment and ensuring 
sustainable use of natural resources.
The Russian partner identifies its values through personnel management policy which 
“helps to create a strong stable corporate culture and a well-shaped system o f  
corporate values According to the Russian parent, the main goal of the Personnel 
Management Policy resides in the creation o f a human resources management system, 
which would enable the company to have a stable status as a “preferable employer in 
the labour market.”
Joint Venture
The Russian -  American IJV (Venture N) was set up in 1992. It is operating in the 
energy production industry. The Venture was built as a 50/50 project.
Interviewee: CFO
Place: Head Office
Date: 1st December 2009
The interview was conducted with an American Chief Financial Officer. He has been 
living in Russia for 30 years. He studied at Leningrad Polytechnic University (Saint-
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Petersburg State Polytechnic University) in Russia. He worked in a branch of the 
American partner in Moscow. Later, he moved to Venture N.
The interview took place in the Venture’s head office. The head office is in a 
renovated modem building. All of the offices are equipped with new furniture and it 
uses the most recent models of office techniques. The waiting, or reception room, has 
an accurately arranged display with the Venture’s diplomas, awards, and presents 
from partners and other organisations.
The CFO greeted the researcher and invited her for a coffee in the lunch room. The 
lunch room is also used as a meeting room for the CEOs. There is a large round table 
in the centre, large plasma screens on the walls, sofas, and sideboards. The table was 
covered with a white cloth and set for a lunch with an elegant porcelain coffee 
service. During the coffee, the manager preferred to speak about general topics. He 
asked a few questions about the UK and Cardiff University. Then, he moved to the 
topic of classical music and Russian composers. In 15-20 minutes he offered to begin 
the interview. The CFO felt uneasy when the researcher asked to use a tape recorder. 
He hesitated a moment and said:
“Everything I  am going to tell you is not fo r  a report. I  will speak 
slowly and we have plenty o f  time, so you can make notes. ”
Role of Culture in Venture N
The manager described an organisational culture in Venture N as “friendly”, 
“employee oriented”, and “a  fam ily culture”. According to him, the national cultures 
in Russia and his home country are similar because in both countries the family plays 
a very big role. He explained that in Venture N all employees know each other and 
spend a lot of time together. Venture N organises different trips, sports competitions, 
and corporate evenings for the employees.
“People in the organisation create culture. In our company all 
employees are like one family. We are not a very large company, 
so all our employees know each other. They have been working 
together fo r  a long time. Thus many o f  them are not only 
colleagues but friends. ”
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In the beginning of the Venture formation, the Russian parent was a young company. 
Its organisational culture was only beginning to be shaped. Venture N was the first 
partnership of the Russian partner. So, learning from an American partner, the 
Venture adopted many work practices. However, in a few years the Russian parent 
grew into a large corporation. Nowadays, it has a lot of alliances and IJVs in many 
different countries.
"Nowadays, organisational culture in the Russian parent is more 
Western in style. They have a mission, goals, CSR, its own 
traditions and stories. I  would say that they have fu lly  adopted 
the Western model. So, our Venture and the American partner 
also had to change. It was necessary to have a good cooperation.
So, we [i.e. the American parent and the Venture N] changed our 
accounting and audit systems. We changed our documentation.
We changed our databases and the way we do planning. I  would 
say that now our Venture has a mixed culture adopted from both 
parent companies. ”
The manager argued that the Russian and the American partners still have some 
differences in their work practices. Nevertheless, all o f these differences are related to 
the company’s size.
“We have a different speed o f  decision-making and planning. It 
is obvious. The size o f  the companies is different. ”
The CFO also distinguished organisational and national cultures. He commented that 
on the national level both companies are very similar because people in both 
countries have similar values.
“I  was quite surprised to fin d  out that in Russia family and 
fam ily values are very important. It is very similar to my home 
country. ”
Before the researcher moved to the questions about communications between 
partners, the CFO pointed to his watch and said that it was lunch time. He offered to 
have lunch together and continue the interview later.
A cafeteria and a dining hall o f the Venture are situated a few minutes away from the 
company. It is located in a restaurant. The Venture’s employees go there for lunch.
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The restaurant has a VIP area which is used as a lunch, or dinner, room for the 
Venture’s managers.
The VIP room is completely isolated from the rest of the restaurant area. It has a pool 
table, a small bar, and a large dinner table. The top managers are usually served by 
waiters. The researcher had lunch with the CFO and a chief accountant. During the 
meal the CFO continued the discussion about the Venture.
He noticed that the Venture’s partners do not communicate at all. The main reason for 
this is that all top managers have limited knowledge of foreign languages.
“As I  am the only person in the Venture who is fluent in both 
languages, all communications go through me. I  am like a bridge 
between both partners and the Venture. ”
All CEOs have regular meetings four times a year.
“It is [the number o f  meetings] written in our regulations. We 
strictly follow  it. The meetings usually take place in the head 
office o f  the Russian parent because it is easier and faster to 
reach it. ”
The CEOs of both partners make all the decisions about the Venture’s future 
directions. According to the CFO, the partners have never had any conflicts and 
always come to the same decisions.
“They both have the same aims. Thus, it is easy to find  a 
compromise. ”
After lunch myself, the manager, and the chief accountant walked to the display, 
which was described above. The manager told me about all the diplomas, and recalled 
when and how each present was received. He commented:
“We prefer to develop long-term relationships with our partners.
I  do not really like when people come to do business, then leave 
and never think about you again. That is why we pay a lot o f  
attention to the post cards and different presents. We always
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congratulate our partners on different holidays. We remember 
the birthdays o f  our employees. ”
He did not finish the sentence because his mobile rung. The manager apologised and 
left the hall. As soon as he walked away, the chief accountant noticed sarcastically:
“This is the way he sees it. And it is useless to dissuade him. ”
The CFO came back. He did not hear the comment of the other manager. The chief 
accountant returned to her office.
The CFO continued to tell the researcher about the Venture’s charity events. He 
highlighted that the company helps the local community (e.g. schools, hospitals, 
sports clubs, and churches).
“It is very important not only to maximise your own wealth but 
to give a bit back as well. This is a key to prosperity. ”
The researcher asked a few questions about the CEO. Nevertheless, the manager tried 
to avoid all these questions. He did not respond directly. The CEO of the Venture also 
works in the Russian partner. He is not very often in the Venture. The CFO as the 
second most senior person in the organisation manages the company. All the 
decisions are made by two people -  the CEO and the CFO.
Analysis
With the absence o f the CEO in Venture N, the CFO is the only person who manages 
the company. The interpretation of the organisational culture in the Venture was 
conditioned by the values and beliefs of one man. The CFO appears to be proud of 
the company. He views the organisation as one big happy family. In his opinion the 
national cultures in both countries are very similar. Meanwhile, he distances himself 
from the other employees (e.g. in the VIP area in the restaurant).
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Another negative influence is the absence of a strategic approach to business 
development. The overall future strategic direction of the company is based on 
production. There is no publicly stated mission or vision.
The CFO is the only person who connects both parent companies. All the 
negotiations, letters and telephone calls go through him. This means that both parent 
companies may see only one point of view and one vision in different situations.
7.14 Venture O
The IJV in this case was formed by Russian and European companies in 1995. Both 
partners are small private companies. They do not have websites and the information 
the researcher received about them is limited.
The directors of Russian and European companies met long time ago. They worked in 
one of the USSR’s first IJVs. Later, their relationships developed into a close 
friendship. By 1995 the IJV, where they both had been working for five years, closed. 
The Russian manager set up his own firm in Russia while the European manager 
came back home and opened a small firm in his own country. Both firms operate in 
the construction industry.
In 1995 the manager o f the European firm offered his friend in Russia an opportunity 
to open a 50/50 IJV (Venture O). The newly formed company had to bring a lot of 
benefits to both partners. The European side wanted to operate in the Russian market 
which promised a high profit. The main aims of the Russian side were access to 
technology and knowledge transfer.
Joint Venture
Venture O was established in 1995. By 2002 the size of the Venture had doubled. In 
2007 the Venture O opened its own production unit. The European manager moved to 
Russia and headed the company.
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Interviewee: CEO
Place: Head Office
Date: 5th December 2010
The interview was conducted with a CEO (he is also an owner and the former CEO of 
the European partner). He is fluent in Russian as he has been living in Russia for a 
long time. The manager preferred to meet on a Saturday in the Venture’s head office. 
He explained that on Saturdays he finishes work earlier and will be able to devote 
more time for the interview.
The head office of the company is located in a small old historical house which is 
situated in one of the oldest streets of the city. The house had not been renovated 
since the October Revolution in 1917. The Venture O bought it for the head office 
and had it fully restored. Actually, in 1997 it became the first house on the old street 
to be restored.
“Our head office was a white crow on the street. It was the best 
advert we could make to our Venture. The quality o f  work was 
obvious. In one month we got a lot o f  customers and orders. It 
was the beginning o f  success. ”
The offices in the Venture O were well equipped. Many workers were working in the 
office on a Saturday.
Role of Culture in Venture O
The manager was quite uncertain how to describe the organisational culture of the 
Venture O. He hesitated for a moment. The CEO described the main policies written 
in the company’s charter, he said:
“Nevertheless, our culture is informal. We do not follow all o f  
the practices described in the charter. Our company and 
employees believe in one thing. It is quality. To be honest, I  
believe in it. And it took me some time to fin d  employees and 
form  a team which believes in it too. ”
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The CEO was absolutely certain that the organisational cultures of both partners are 
very similar. He told me that both parent firms are small companies and operate in the 
same industry. Both CEOs have known each other for a long time and their friendship 
rose thanks to their similar interests and beliefs.
"I have been working with the Russian CEO fo r  23 years. We are 
friends. We think and act in the same way. Our companies have 
similar structure and the work is organised in the same way. 
Moreover, when the Venture was formed, we re-organised many 
processes in our companies to make them similar. For example, 
we have a similar accounting system, documentation, databases, 
and even equipment. The Venture operates in the same way. ”
The CEO laughed when the researcher asked about the role of culture in the 
Venture’s success. He exclaimed:
“In Russia trust is the most important thing. You have to find  a 
partner whom you may trust. Concerning organisational culture, 
in Russia we leave it fo r  the next 10-15 years. Organisational 
culture may start playing its role when the other o f  things are 
good. When there are problems with bureaucracy, corruption, 
and contract enforcement you do not have a time to think about 
organisational culture. ”
The managers of the Venture and both partners have regular meetings. Most meetings 
take place in the Venture’s head office. Once a year the managers meet in the 
European partner’s head office.
“ We do not have a strict schedule fo r  the meetings. We meet as 
often as we need. When a problem occurs, the managers are 
called fo r  an urgent meeting. Our European partner may arrive 
on the same day, or we can organise a video conference with 
them. ”
The manager is fluent in Russian. When he moved from the company’s European 
head office to Russia, a new director in the European partner was chosen who had a 
knowledge of the Russian language. Also, a few of the other managers in the 
European partner may also speak Russian. So, all o f the communications are able to 
be made directly in Russian, without the need for interpreters.
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Researcher: Would you call your IJV a successful company? 
CEO: Yes!
Analysis
As in many previous cases, Venture O does not have a clear future direction. The 
company’s goals and mission are not defined. There is also a lack of understanding of 
organisational culture. The manager referred to the organisation’s charter as a code 
which describes the corporate culture.
The CEO mentioned that he chooses employees who believe in the same things. 
Thus, the company behaves in the same way, it has adopted the same attitudes and 
values.
One of the biggest advantages o f the Venture is that both the Russian and European 
CEOs have worked closely together for a long time. There is a high level of trust 
between the two, and this makes communications and decision-making between them 
easier.
7.15 Venture P
This case is about a 50/50 Russian -  European IJV (Venture P) which is engaged in 
the construction industry.
European Partner
The European partner is a medium-sized, privately owned organisation. It has been 
operating in the European market for twenty years. The firm offers a wide range of 
construction work for the energy and utility industry. The company’s owner and a 
CEO visited the USSR at the end o f the 1980s. His company subsequently did a few 
construction jobs in partnership with Russian firms. In the middle of 1990s, the 
European partner decided to open a branch in Russia. The type of service and the
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technologies the European partner used were new  in the local market. However, very 
quickly the European firm was faced with many difficulties. The lack of knowledge 
of the legal system and the high level of bureaucracy caused many problems with 
registration. The branch could not get a licence for some types of work. Finally, the 
company withdrew its business from Russia and the CEO began to look instead for a 
Russian partner.
Russian Partner
The Russian partner is a small private owned company which is engaged in the 
construction industry. The company was set up after the fall o f the USSR in 1992. Its 
ownership was divided between three people. In 1995 one o f the owners bought all of 
the shares. He is currently the owner and director of the firm. The company employs 
30 people. Its main advantages in the local market are its highly qualified workers 
who were trained abroad and its access to the latest technologies and equipment. 
Thus, the high quality o f work that the organisation is able to offer in the local market 
gives it a competitive advantage.
Joint Venture
Both CEOs met many years ago in the 1980s. They both participated in the same 
works and projects in the USSR. Since that time they have been constantly in contact. 
The European partner offered the Russian director the opportunity to open an IJV. He 
told him about his unfortunate experience with the company’s Russian branch. Both 
companies set up Venture P in 1999. The director of the Russian partner became a 
CEO of the Venture P. The CEO of the European partner became a technical director 
(CTO) in the Venture.
Interviewee: CTO
Place: Cafe
Date: 5th February 2010
An interview was arranged with the CTO. He is fluent in Russian, and the interview 
was able to be conducted in Russian. The Venture’s head office is located in a region,
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very far from the city. The only way to get there is by a car. It takes approximately 
two hours of driving by motorway. The CTO offered to meet in the city explaining 
that in a few days he will be there to show his colleagues a picture gallery. The 
meeting with the CTO was arranged in a quite cafe in the city centre.
The cafe that the manager chose is located in the city centre not far from the picture 
gallery. The meeting was arranged for 3.30 pm. The cafe was really quite at that time 
and there were only a few visitors.
The manager came precisely at 3.30. He noted that he only had two hours available 
for the interview. Then, he took the interview guide and said:
“Right, I  have to admit that the questions are a kind o f  surprise 
fo r  me. I  mean, they are very interesting but we are a small 
company. What sort o f  organisational culture can we have? ”
Role of Culture in Venture P
According to the manager, an organisational culture is the way employees and 
managers perform their work, and the way they behave in attitude to each other. He 
also added that the firm’s traditions and the employees’ training are the main 
elements of organisational culture in the company.
The manager was able to establish part of a definition of organisational culture. 
However, he was certain that his Venture still does not have an organisational culture.
“I  think that organisational culture cannot appear by itself. The 
managers have to create and shape it. We still do not work on it.
You see, we do not have a nice logo, image, or a website. Except 
fo r  the engineering team, our employees do not have a dress 
code or uniform. We do not have any corporate events. We do 
not celebrate the holidays together. Finally, we do not go to play 
football or ski together. Our engineers are constantly trained.
Quality is very important in our field. So, our engineers are 
constantly trained in the European partner’s head office. ”
According to the manager, the Russian partner is quite similar to the European partner 
because both organisations are not large companies and they operate in the same
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industry. Nevertheless, he felt th a t th e  European partner “is a bit more form al”. Also, 
the manager highlighted that he h a s  known the Russian CEO for many years and their 
friendship is based on similar b e l i e f s  and attitude to work.
“We have a sim ilar b a ckg ro u n d . We are both engineers. We are 
both concerned about qr ztality. For us the employees, their safety, 
benefits and salary p lcrjv  a very big role. We are both precise in 
details. ”
The manager felt difficultly in e x p la in in g  all o f the similarities between the European 
partner and the Russian parent. H oA vever, he later told the researcher how he met the 
Russian partner and how he got t h e  idea to form his own company. The Russian 
manager worked with the E u r o p e a n  CEO for many years in the 1980s. Later they 
both received qualifications and w e n t  for training in Western Europe.
“ When we built our c o m p a n ie s  we applied the same model. That 
is why the Venture’s p a rre n ts  are similar. Thus, Venture P is the 
same. ”
The CEOs meet at least four t i r r t e s  per year. Also the Venture P has one annual 
meeting for all o f their m a n a g e rs . The main participants are two people from the 
Russian partner, two managers f r o m  the European partner, and two managers from 
Venture P. According to the C T O ,  they have all participated in the Venture’s 
development.
As has been mentioned above, b o t h  CEOs o f the Venture P also manage the parent 
organisations. This is very co m m o n , in the Russian IJVs. The CTO commented:
“Venture P is s itu a te d  a few  minutes away from  the Russian 
parent. Both com panies are small and the amount o f  work is not 
so big. Thus, one p e rso rr  can handle two companies. Moreover, it 
is not easy to fin d  a g o o d  CEO here in Russia. I  mean a person 
who would be exp er ie  need, knowledgeable, and responsible.
With me the situation is  sim ilar. The European partner is a small 
organisation. I  may do t> oth  jobs. There is a direct flight between 
two cities. So, it is not a  problem  to be both there and here in the 
same day. ”
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The manager was certain that organisational culture plays a big ro le  in the success of 
the IJV. He highlighted how important it is that both partners share sim ilar beliefs and 
trust each other.
"I have been living in Russia fo r  many years. I  know th e  culture 
and people well. I  already can see how different organisational 
cultures could ruin an IJV  between a Russian com pany and a 
firm  from  my home country. In Russia people did not u se d  to be 
responsible. Back home responsibility is one o f  th e  most 
important things in work. However, it is not so easy to  enforce 
responsibility here. The court system is extremely bureaucratic.
Being abroad you could be outraged and telephone y o u r  partner 
and demand he do this and that. You can have regular meetings 
explaining to your Russian partner the right way o f  d o in g  things.
But the foreign partner ultimately has to be here to see it all by 
him self and experience it. Thus, he will understand it be tter  and 
it will be easier to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings. ”
Researcher: Would you call your IJV a successful organisation?
CTO: Yes.
Analysis
Venture P has a strong production-led preference. There is a la c k  of any strategic 
direction. There is no mission statement and the goals are not defined . The manager’s 
view of organisational culture is weak. He sees organisational cu ltu re  as “something a 
company has” . In his view organisational culture is a set of a rte fac ts  that have to be 
introduced to the employees. The major positive influence is c lo se  relationships 
between CEOs which help to develop trust.
The final two case studies will describe IJVs which are no longer operating in the 
market.
7.16 Venture Q
This case features a Russian - European IJV (Venture Q) which w as set up in 1996 in 
the chemical industry. The biggest part o f the Venture belonged to the European
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parent — 51 %, while the Russian parent owned 49 %. In 1999 Venture Q became 
fully owned by the European company.
European Partner
The European partner is a leading chemical supplier to a number of the world's most 
essential industries (such as food and beverage, mining, manufacturing, oil and 
chemical processing industries).
The company’s vision seeks for a leading and global market position. Nowadays, the 
European partner has headquarters and branches around the world. It is very proud of 
its R&D and innovative technologies.
The European partner is committed to its CSR and to sustainable development. The 
firm has a long history as a ‘Responsible Care’ company. The company highlights on 
its website: "By fostering a culture that emphasises ethical business behaviour, strong 
corporate governance, community involvement and safety in all that we do, we strive 
each and every day to earn the trust o f  our customers, investors, employees, suppliers 
and neighbours. Our many stakeholders can fee l confident about their association 
with our name. ”
In March 2010, the European parent was recognised as one of the World’s Top 
Ethical Companies for 2010.
Russian Partner
The Russian parent is a state owned organisation which is engaged in the 
manufacturing industry. The company produces products which are used in many 
industries (such as defence, chemical, oil & gas, and food and beverage industries).
The Russian company does not state its goals and mission on its website. All the 
information there is related to its products.
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Joint Venture
An interview was arranged with a CFO of Venture Q. Currently, she is one of the top 
managers of the new European company.
Interviewee: CFO
Place: Head Office
Date: 25th November 2009
The interview took place in the head office o f the European company, which used 
was also the head office o f Venture Q.
The manager welcomed the researcher. She commented that after 1999 the head 
office was altered. The main changes which were made were related to logos and the 
company’s colours. Thus, the furniture and decorations were already different.
The researcher asked the CFO to answer the questions keeping only Venture Q in 
mind. Before the interview began the researcher had asked for permission to use a 
tape recorder. Similarly to the previously interviewed managers, the CFO looked very 
confused. She hesitated a moment. It was obvious that she felt very uneasy about it. 
She asked the researcher if it is really necessary to tape the interview and showed a 
preference to speak without the use o f a tape-recorder.
First, the manager classified the goals of both Venture’s partners:
“The European partner decided to set up Venture Q in order to 
get access to the Russian market. The firm  wanted to open a 
production unit in Russia which would have helped to minimise 
production costs.
I have no idea what the goals o f  the Russian parent were, we 
have never seen them. As the form er CFO I  can tell you exactly 
that they really cared about, which was to get their share o f  the 
profits on time. ”
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All of the employees in Venture Q were Russians, but the CEO was from the 
European parent. He had been working in the European parent for a long time before 
he headed Venture Q.
Describing the organisational culture in the Venture Q, the CFO was able to catch the 
meaning of culture:
“ When I  came there to work, I  was very much impressed from  
the very beginning. Everything that was there was not like it is in 
many Russian companies. For example, the people were less 
formal. They were more open and less tense. The power distance 
was small. The top managers never distanced themselves from  
their subordinates. The Venture had its own values which were 
related to the environment, quality and ethics. All the employees 
had regular training in the head office o f  the European partner. ”
According to the CFO, the Venture was almost like a branch o f the European parent. 
The Russian parent had never been interested in Venture Q. The managers of the 
Russian company did not participate in communications and negotiations with the 
European partner. All the decisions and future strategic directions were made by the 
European parent.
“We were like a branch. The European parent had a 51 % 
controlling stake. It had power in decision making. The 
managers from  the European parent communicated with us, we 
always been participated in the decision making process. The 
Russian partner only called and asked when it can grab its next 
part o f  the profits. ”
The Venture’s employees felt strong commitment to their organisation and the 
European partner. They had regular training in the head office of the European parent 
and an opportunity to increase their knowledge and qualifications. Venture Q helped 
its employees in their career and team-working was encouraged.
"The European parent was interested in a long-term 
development. All o f  the employees had regular training. We were 
taught to work as a team. We were a great team! The European 
partner helped every employee in his or her career development.
Finally, our managers had the power to make decisions. We 
were able to influence processes. ”
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In 1998 the Russian and European partners came into conflict, after which the 
European company bought out the Russian part and turned the Venture into its 
subsidiary.
“ The main reason o f  the conflict was the difference in goals. By 
the way, these goals were culturally different. The Russian 
partner was interested in profit. I  will say it differently. In 
Russia, there are many managers who are interested in getting 
their pockets full. They did not have any strategic approach or 
long-term goals. The European partner had long-term goals.
Thus, they invested all o f  their profit in new technologies and 
development. The Russian partner preferred not to invest but to 
grab all the profit. ”
Negotiations between parent companies began in October 1998. The Russian parent 
quickly agreed to sell its part. The necessary documents were signed in one and a half 
months. In 1999 Venture Q became a European owned company.
Analysis
The European parent had clear goals and strategic directions for its Venture. The 
main goal was to extend the Venture into a large production unit which would be able 
to supply the many clients o f the European partner.
During the first years, the European company had been investing in new technologies, 
equipment, and trainings. The Venture was treated almost as a branch. It had no 
influence or control from the Russian partner. Thus, the European company organised 
the Venture’s work similar to that in its headquarters. The CEO of the Venture was 
also from the European parent. The Venture’s employees were happy to learn new 
things and they had training abroad. They were faced with a new environment and 
style of work. It may be said that Venture Q shared a similar vision, goals, and style 
of work with its European parent.
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7.17 Venture R
The final case is of a Russian — European IJV. The venture was set up by two large 
organisations as a 51/49 project, where the Russian company owned 51 % and 49 % 
of the Venture belonged to the European organisation.
European Partner
The European partner is a global organisation. It is engaged in manufacturing 
products for different industries. The company has been operating in the European 
market for more than 100 years.
The European parent states its mission and goals through innovations, the pioneering 
spirit the company, and its leading position in the world. The main values o f the 
company are commitment to business ethics, achieving a high performance, and 
innovation.
Russian Parent
The Russian parent is a large manufacturer which produces electronic products for the 
telecommunication industry. The company’s mission and goals declare the firm’s 
growth and innovation through developing new technologies. The organisation 
achieves its goals and mission through partnerships with many companies.
Joint Venture
The two partners set up an IJV company (Venture R) in 1993. Venture R was in 
operation until 2008. The new firm produced electronic products for the 
telecommunication industry.
The researcher was able to contact and arrange an interview with the former CEO of 
Venture R. He invited the researcher into his new office. The interview was 
conducted during his lunch time. Thus, the manager had only one hour available.
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Interviewee: CEO
Place: Company X
Date: 25th November 2009
When asked, he immediately rejected the use a tape recorder. The manager smiled 
and asked:
CEO: Is this your first interview?
Researcher: Yes.
CEO: I  bet you will have to hear many such rejections. It is better
not use it, even do not ask the managers. You will be able to 
make better contact.
The CEO described the main goals o f the Venture as production and profit. Venture R 
did not have a mission statement. According to the CEO, Venture R was formed 
because the Russian parent wanted to get additional profit and transfer technologies 
while the European parent wanted to get access to the Russian market.
The new organisation had a small, flat structure. Many CEOs and employees came 
from the European parent. The Venture’s managers and employees had a lot o f 
training. All training was organised by the European parent. Two times per year 
managers went to the head office o f the European parent to attend lectures and 
seminars on leaderships and motivation. The engineers had training in the European 
partner’s production units. During the first two years the Venture’s work was 
organised in the same way as in the European partner. Venture R adopted the 
European partner’s: production system, safety system, engineering processes, 
operational management, accounting, software, databases, and analysis methods.
"Our employees were very happy to learn from  the European 
partner. We adopted everything from  them. We never heard 
anything from  the Russian partner. It seemed like the Russian 
partner even did not exist. We identified ourselves with the 
European parent. ”
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The CEO could easily compare Venture R with the European parent. He has a high 
level of education in engineering. The manager spoke a lot about technologies and 
operational management. He highlighted that, like its European parent, Venture R 
was very democratic in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, he could not 
describe the organisational culture o f the Russian parent. He commented:
“/  have no idea about it. They never contacted our Venture 
directly. All the contacts were made through the European 
parent. I  mean, we had been with the European parent all the 
time and the Russian parent contacted them from  time to time.
There were no direct contacts between our Venture and the 
Russian company. ”
The main decisions and directions o f Venture R were made by the European parent. 
The CEOs of the European parents had regular meetings and negotiations with the 
Venture’s managers. Then, it had a meeting with the Russian partner to confirm the 
future plans.
“The European managers firs t discussed the future plans and 
strategies with us. They always wanted to hear our opinion. After 
all the corrections were made, the European partner presented a 
plan to the Russian partner. The Russian partner always 
agreed. ”
Venture R experiences a number o f problems after the Russian financial crisis o f 
1998, but it had fully recovered in 2000. By 2002 the company had doubled its 
revenue and extended its production unit. In the same year it launched a few new 
products, which caused many conflicts between the partner organisations and which 
led ultimately to the Venture’s dissolution.
“We launched exactly the same products as the Russian partner 
produced. Obviously, our products with the European partner’s 
know-how were much better. We became a competitor o f  the 
Russian parent. When our market share began to rise, the 
Russian parent became angry. ”
The Venture could produce its products with lower costs by using the technologies o f 
the European parent. Many existing clients o f the Russian parent started using the
rVenture’s products. Venture R soon became a major competitor of the Russian 
parent.
“/  know that the firs t reaction o f  the Russian managers was to 
ban all the decisions and plans o f  the European parent. They 
could do this because they had a controlling 51 % stake. The 
European partner was persistent and still tried to go on with its 
plans. The Venture's managers did not participate at all in those 
negotiations. Later, speaking to one o f  the European CEOs, I  
found out that the conflict was serious. ”
The European parent was not able to resolve the conflict with the Russian parent. It 
did not involve managers from the Venture in the negotiations with the Russian 
parent. Also, the executives o f the European parent did not speak Russian and all the 
communications were made through interpreters. The Russian partner continued to 
disagree with the most of decisions and plans o f the European managers. Many of 
them were seen as a threat for the Russian company. By 2005 the Venture was 
entering a crisis. In 2008 the company was closed. The CEO looked sad while telling 
this story. At the end he said:
“ Unfortunately, I  still do not know all the details, even though I  
was the CEO o f  Venture R. The European parent wanted to buy 
the Venture but the Russian firm  did not sell its part. Then, the 
Russian parent wanted to buy the Venture but the European 
parent would not sell its share. The European CEOs were 
furious. Finally, they both withdrew their assets and the Venture 
was closed. ”
Researcher: What advice would you give to foreign managers who would
like to set up an IJV in Russia?
CEO: Do not set it up! The Russian market is very complicated. I f
a foreign company has an opportunity to open a branch 
instead then this would be the best option.
Analysis
The Venture R was almost operating as a branch o f the European company. Even 
though the Russian partner had a controlling stake in the Venture s ownership, it did
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not participate in the Venture’s development. The future direction of the company 
was drawn by the European parent.
The Venture’s communication process was poorly organised. All the communications 
were made through the European parent. The Venture’s management did not 
participate in the negotiation and communications with the Russian parent. There was 
confusion about what needed to be done when the conflict between partners became 
tense. The Venture and its employees stayed isolated from the negotiations.
7.18 Summary
The aim of this chapter was to provide observations and analysis of organisational 
culture in IJVs in Russia. Although all companies belong to different industries and of 
different organisational size, they share certain common characteristics. The next 
chapter provides an analysis and a concise comparison o f the findings from the cases 
and questionnaires to understand the role o f organisational culture differences in IJV 
success.
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This chapter uses quantitative and qualitative analysis to clarify the findings and 
research questions which were introduced in the Chapter 5. All IJVs were divided into 
three groups. The chapter describes organisational culture of each group using 
quantitative and qualitative studies. Then, it identifies the main differences between 
IJVs and their partners’ cultures. Finally, managerial perception about IJV 
performance is outlined.
8.1 Three Groups of IJVs
The analysis of interviews identified a linkage between parental control and 
organisational culture in IJVs in Russia. Consequently, all IJVs in this work are 
divided into three main groups (see Table 8.1 below):
1. IJVs where a foreign partner holds more than 50 % of the venture;
2. IJVs where a Russian partner holds more than 50 % of the venture;
3. 50/50 IJVs.
Table 8.1: The Three Groups o f IJVs in Russia
Foreign Control Russian C ontrol 50/50
Venture B Venture C Venture A
Venture G Venture D Venture E
Venture H Venture F Venture J
Venture M Venture K Venture L
Venture Q Venture R Venture N
Venture O
Venture P
The current research aims to explore how organisational culture differences can 
influence IJV performance. In order to explore this issue the current study developed 
five research questions (Chapter 5). These research questions are:
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1. What is the type o f organisational culture o f IJVs in Russia?
a. What are the managerial values in Russia?
b. What are the managerial practices?
2. Do successful and unsuccessful IJVs in Russia have different organisational 
cultures?
3. What are the main organisational culture differences between IJVs in Russia 
and their partners?
4. Do organisational culture differences influence IJV success?
5. What is better cultural fit for IJVs in Russia?
In order to provide a basis for the research questions’ answers, in the next sections we 
will discuss organisational culture o f each group, differences in organisational 
cultures between IJVs and their partners, and managerial perception about IJV 
success.
8.1.1 Group 1 -  Foreign Control
Organisational Culture o f  IJVs
Organisational culture can be defined as the set o f values and practices within an 
organisation. Values are central to culture and have core status. The questionnaires 
revealed that the values embedded by the most of IJVs in Group 1 are openness to 
change and self-enhancement values (Ventures G, H, M, and Q). These values 
represent how the managers in the company think. Thus, most o f the senior managers 
from the first group can be characterised as people who are passionate about success, 
power, recognition, and competent performance; they are innovative, independent, 
and logical (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987).
Van Muijen et al. (1999) develop four dimensions that can be used to measure 
organisational practices: support orientation, innovation orientation, rules orientation, 
and goal orientation. In order to get a closer look at the IJVs’ cultures, we asked the 
top managers to fill in a questionnaire related to organisational work practices. Their
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responses showed that most Russian IJVs have a rule oriented culture (Ventures B, M, 
and Q). In addition, a goal oriented culture received high rates from the managers. 
However, most managers describe the organisational culture in their venture 
differently during interviews.
From the interviews, it is clear that the ventures from Group 1 have a flat structure. 
Their decision-making process is shared and informal. People who work at these 
companies do not have to follow dress code.
These managers also showed interest in the personal development of their employees. 
The level of internal and external cooperation in most of these ventures was found to 
be good. However, the managers reported that they have to follow certain procedures 
which come under the Russian law such as requirement for ISO 9001:2008 - Quality 
Management Systems. Two questions from the section of rule oriented culture come 
under the rules and standards o f ISO and this may explain why many companies 
showed high scores in rule oriented culture.
Partners ’ Cultures
There are usually two or more collaborative partners involved in an IJV. They both 
bring their cultures together and form a new culture for an IJV. The new culture may 
be inspired by the partners’ cultures and, therefore, it may be very similar to one of 
the partner’s organisational cultures.
Most of the interviewed managers from Group 1 said that the organisational culture in 
their ventures is similar to that of the foreign parent:
“ Culture is more similar to a foreign parent. ”
“National cultures o f  Russia and the foreign parent are very 
similar. Organisational work in our venture has been fully  
synchronised with the foreign parent. ”
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w“Everything that was there [in the venture] was not like in many 
Russian companies. ”
Ventures G, H, M, and Q adopted values and objectives o f the foreign partner. The 
daily work in the ventures is organised similarly to that of the foreign parents; for 
example, databases, accounting system, analysis and documentations are the same. 
The foreign companies have placed their own employees and managers in the IJV. 
Foreign companies constantly organise training for the venture’s management and 
employees. In fact, all four ventures are treated as a branch of the foreign parent. 
There is a minimum of, or almost no control and contribution from, a Russian parent.
Venture B is an exception in this group. Its foreign parent has not participated in the 
venture’s progress. All the main decisions concerning the company’s development are 
made by the Russian parent. Consequently, its organisational culture has mainly been 
influenced by the Russian parent.
According to the conceptual framework provided in Chapter 3, different 
organisational cultures o f the IJV and its partners influence communication behaviour 
and conflict resolution techniques which lead to IJV success or failure. Table 8.2 
below summarises the main differences o f the partners and the ventures from Group 
1. The information about the differences was obtained through the interviews.
I
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Table 8.2: Differences in Organisational Cultures for the Group 1
Differences Russian Parent Foreign Parent IJV
Ve n t u r e  B
Size and structure Small company, flat structure MSE, hierarchical Small company, flat structure
Communication
styles
Flexible Directive, commanding Flexible
Approaches to 
meetings
Prefers face-to-face meetings and 
communications. E-mails, telephone, and fax are 
used to discuss small issues
Prefers to discuss the majority of issues by 
telephone
Prefers face-to-face meetings and 
communications. E-mails, telephone, and fax 
are used to discuss small issues
Response to each 
other requests
Fast From slow to very slow Fast
Ve n t u r e  G
She of a company A large company (part of a holding group) A MSE (subsidiary of a large company) MSE
Company’s image Extensive use of values and cultural artefacts for 
cultural image
The company pays less attention to cultural 
artefacts
The company pays less attention to cultural 
artefacts
Decision-making
process
Managers come with a few possible options, 
discuss them and choose one option
Managers come with possible options, choose a 
few of them, make analysis for them and choose the 
best
Managers come with possible options, 
choose a few of them, make analysis for 
them and choose the best
Speed of decision 
making
Fast Slow Varies
Approaches to 
planning
Risk taking Avoiding risks Avoiding risks
Delegation of power
The managers tend to consider the opinion of 
venture’s CEO. In many situations, they empower 
the venture’s CEO to make decisions by 
themselves
The managers make all the final decisions about the 
venture’s work by themselves. They take into 
account the opinion of the venture’s managers but 
do not empower them to make a final decision
Managers can make only small decisions. 
Most decisions are made by the foreign 
parent
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Ve n t u r e  H
Size and structure Large company, hierarchical structure Large company, flat structure MSE, flat structure
Goals and values Relative absence of values, production oriented Values and goals are well defined, market oriented Values and goals are adopted from the 
foreign parent, market oriented
Information sharing
Low information sharing. Information is tightly 
controlled. The company’s web-site states a 
minimum number of facts. There is not much 
information about the company in mass media 
and the Internet
High information sharing High information sharing
Delegation of power Managers do not participate in either the decision­
making or venture’s development
CEOs make the major strategic decisions 
concerning the venture’s development
CEOs are empowered to make decisions. 
Their opinion is counted by the European 
parent However, the most important 
strategic decisions are made by the European 
parent and its shareholders
Ve n t u r e  M
Roles in the 
organisational 
structure
The CEO and some managers work for the 
Russian parent and the IJV
Overlapping of work responsibilities was less likely The CEO and some managers work for the 
Russian parent and the IJV
Approaches to 
planning
Short-term Long-term Long-term
Delegation of power
Managers make small decisions but the main 
strategic decisions are made by the foreign parent
Managers make the major strategic decisions for 
the LTV
Managers make small decisions but the main 
strategic decisions are made by the foreign 
parent
Speed of planning, 
decision-making
Fast Slow Fast
Differences in 
contract definitions
All contracts are very detailed and long. If a firm 
signs a contract with ambiguous definitions, then 
it is that firm’s responsibility
All contracts are less long and use different 
definitions. The firm expects the parent to use 
similar definitions and general terms
The firm tries to be flexible and follow the 
rules of the foreign parent where possible
Management style Formal Informal
Following the style of the foreign parent the 
venture’s managers adopted a less formal 
style
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Response to each 
others requests
All requests are long and detailed. The parent 
expects to get a similar answer
All requests are very short and brief The venture tries to satisfy the foreign 
partner and makes its requests shorter
Language barriers Managers have limited knowledge of their 
partner’s language
Managers do not speak Russian. All negotiations 
are performed in Russian with interpreters
Managers have limited knowledge of their 
partner’s language
Ve n t u r e  Q
Goals and values Goals and values are not defined. There is no 
mission statement
Vales, goals, objectives, and mission are well 
defined
Values, goals and objectives were adopted 
from the foreign parent
Approaches to 
planning
Short-term Long-term Long-term
Participation
The firm did not participate in the venture’s 
development
Managers constantly participated in 
communications with the venture. They made the 
main strategic decisions
Managers could make small decisions. The 
main strategic decisions were made by the 
foreign parent
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Group 1 -  Perceptions o f  IJV Success
The achievement o f the partners’ strategic objectives and goals is the most appropriate 
measure of IJV performance (this has been described in the literature review). The 
interviews help to capture the top manager’s perspective on IJV success. The 
managers were asked about their perception of IJV success, the achievement of 
partner strategic objectives, and level o f conflict.
Most managers from Group 1 claimed that their ventures are successful companies. 
Inter-partner differences in organisational cultures did not lead to conflicts that could 
cause IJV dissolution. Most managers agreed that their partners and a venture did not 
have serious conflicts. Some o f the managers mentioned contradictions that were 
easily resolved after a few meetings and discussions:
“We have never had open conflicts. There were some 
contradictions, o f  course. However, we [i.e. the managers] could 
easily regulate it.
Obviously, our foreign parent reached its goals. The Russian 
paren t’s goals were unclear from  the beginning. It was happy to 
sell its equity, I  think. When the foreign partner made its offer, 
the Russian parent agreed without delay. ” (Venture Q)
“We completed all our goals... Our partners reached all their 
goals... There were no conflicts that our managers could not 
control. ” (Venture G)
“It [i.e. the venture] is successful. Our partners are happy about 
it... We have long discussions every time a contradiction 
occurs... There were some conflicting views, o f  course but 
nothing serious or something that would have caused a serious 
conflict. ” (Venture M)
“We had some problems in the beginning. Now, everything is 
going smoothly. We have unanimity o f  judgement with our 
partner. ” (Venture H)
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Summary for Group 1
This section began by defining the values o f the managers from Group 1, which 
represents the IJV where the foreign partner holds more than 50 % of the equity.
The analysis of questionnaires shows that top managers from Group 1 have values 
different from the majority o f the Russian senior managers. They score high in 
openness to change and egoistic values which are very similar to managers from the 
Western countries.
Moreover, the ventures from this group have adopted an organisational culture which 
is similar to that o f the foreign parent. Their values, beliefs, goals and objectives were 
taken from the foreign parent. Organisational structure, overall daily work and 
business operations in the ventures were organised similarly to their foreign partners. 
Foreign companies have placed their employees and managers in the venture. Thus, 
the foreign partners contribute more in management expertise and marketing skills. 
This finding suggests that the Western partner’s control and participation in daily 
work and operations has a direct impact on organisational culture in the IJV. The 
managerial values are another possible explanation: the chance for successful 
replication of the foreign parent’s organisational culture is high because top managers 
from the IJVs have values similar to those o f their Western colleagues.
One of the main differences which were found between parent companies and the 
IJVs is delegation o f power. Most senior managers in the ventures do not have the 
power to make the main strategic decisions. They have to follow the rules of the 
foreign companies. Basically, these ventures are operating like a branch o f  the foreign 
parent. In some firms the Russian partner did not even participate in the venture’s 
development. This is due to the level o f parental control and its influence in the 
decision-making process.
The foreign parents hold the biggest part o f the venture. Moreover, they have placed 
their employees and managers in the company and thus have greater control of the 
decision-making process. In comparison, the Russian parent does not have control in
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the venture and so does not want to cooperate and eventually walks aw ay from 
negotiation and participation.
The managers o f the IJVs did not mention many differences between partners. The 
majority of the reported differences were related to both parent companies and did not 
cause conflicts between partners. Most senior managers agreed that the differences in 
organisational cultures are important. Cultural differences between partners can 
sometimes lead to a conflict or contradictions between partners according to the 
managers. This observation supports the conceptual model of the current research 
suggesting that similarity in cultural values between IJV managers and their foreign 
partners helped them to develop shared understanding and to achieve smooth 
coordination. It is notable and significant perhaps that the possibility o f conflict in 
some ventures was reduced because the Russian partner did not participate in 
communication.
S. 1.2 Group 2 -  Russian Control
Organisational Culture o f  IJVs
Most senior managers from Group 2 showed high scores in tradition values 
(honouring parents, family security and curiosity). These people respect traditions and 
prefer to avoid uncertainty, risks and actions that disturb traditional order (Schwartz, 
1994). They also tended to make decisions that conform to the expectations o f  their 
close social environment, and in their information inflow they may rely on  personal 
networks (Wang et al., 2008). The literature review identifies that tradition managers 
are often associated with rule oriented culture. In this study the analysis o f the 
Questionnaire 2 shows that all ventures in Group 2 scored high in a rule oriented 
culture. This finding is fully consistent with the interview data which shows that many 
ventures in Group 2 have a vertical hierarchical structure where the CEO has an 
absolute power in the decision-making process. The mission statement, goals and 
values are not defined. The communication process and information sharing are slow. 
Most foreign parents do not participate in the venture’s development and daily work.
217
Partners' Cultures
Managers interviewed in ventures in Group 2 were certain that organisational culture 
in their firm is identical to that o f the Russian parent.
“Our organisational culture is very similar, almost the same as 
the culture o f  the Russian parent. ”
“Our cultures are identical. ”
“It is similar to the Russian parent but less formal. ”
All the decisions about the venture’s future development and daily operations are 
made by the Russian parent. Most managers could not describe the organisational 
culture of their foreign parent. In three out o f five ventures, the top managers have 
never met with the foreign partner. The Russian companies usually communicate with 
the foreign firm and the managers from the ventures do not participate in this process. 
Table 8.3 below describes the main differences o f the partners and the ventures from 
Group 2.
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Table 8 3 : Differences in Organisational Cultures for the Group 2
Differences Russian Parent Foreign Parent IJV
Ve n t u r e  C
Size of company Large organisation Large organisation MSE
Goals and values Clearly defined. Extensive use of 
values to describe organisational CSR 
and objectives
The mission statement and values are clearly 
presented on the web-site
Values are not defined
Long-term vs. 
short-term 
orientation
Long-term Long-term
Short-term, survival mentality and orientation for resolving 
existing problems rather than planning for the future
Participation in 
the venture's work
Participated in the venture’s 
development and daily work Not participated
The company copies its Russian parent. The managers can make 
decisions but all the major decisions need an agreement from the 
Russian parent
Ve n t u r e  F
Size of a company Large organisation MSE Small organisation
Goals and values Extensive use of values and cultural 
artefacts for cultural image
The company’s goals and values are well 
defined and presented on its web-site
Values are not defined
Organisational
structure
Horizontal structure but in fact, the 
power is centralised on the top
Horizontal structure
The venture has two CEOs. All the decisions are made by one 
manager. The other CEO does not have power in the decision­
making
Roles in the 
organisational 
structure
One of the CEOs also manages the 
UV
Overlapping of work responsibilities is less 
likely
Varies
Participation The company makes all the major 
strategic decisions and decisions about 
the venture’s daily work and 
operations
The managers do not participate in the 
venture’s daily work and operations
The CEO rarely comes to his venture’s office. He informs 
employees and die other managers about his decisions by phone 
or e-mail
Communication
style Formal N/A Informal I
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Ve n t u r e  K
Organisational
structure
Vertical structure Horizontal structure Vertical structure
Goals and values Relative absence of values Values and goals are well defined Relative absence of values
Market vs. 
production 
orientation
Production oriented Market oriented Production oriented
Long-term vs. 
short-term
Short-term Long-term Short-term
Roles in the 
organisational 
structure
The CEO and a few main engineers 
also work in the venture
Overlapping of work responsibilities is less 
likely
The CEO of the Russian parent also manages the venture
Decision-making
style
The CEO makes the major strategic 
decisions concerning the development 
of the Russian parent. Power is 
concentrated on the top
Many managers participate in the decision­
making process. Power is shared. The 
managers vote to make a decision
The CEO makes all the decisions. The managers from the 
foreign parent do not have power to make decisions. Their 
opinion is not counted
Delegation of 
power
The CEO has an absolute power and 
control in the company. There is 
almost no control from the board of 
directors and shareholders
Focus on a broad set of stakeholders The CEO holds all control in the venture
Information
sharing
Low information sharing. It is difficult 
to get information from another 
department. When an employee 
requires information they are asked 
why and what they need it for
Transparent system. Information sharing is 
high between departments
The same as in the Russian parent
Communication
style
Formal Informal Formal
Meaning of 
meetings
Meetings are placed in order to resolve 
a problem
Meetings are seen as an opportunity for 
discussion of future plans
The Russian parent organises meetings with the foreign partner 
when it needs an advice or solution in difficult situations. The 
foreign managers see meetings as constant cooperation between 
partners
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L angu age b a rrier The managers do not speak the 
language of their partner
The managers do not speak the language of 
their partner
The foreign manager who works in the venture uses interpreters 
in all the daily communications with employees. Both partners 
communicate and negotiate through interpreters
D a ta b a ses a n d  
a pproach es to  
a n a lysis
The company has different databases 
in their different departments. 
Analysis and planning are also 
performed differently
The databases and analysis are standardised 
throughout the company
The IJV uses databases similar to those of the Russian partner. 
Most methods of planning and analysis were adopted from the 
Russian parent
S p eed  o f  an a lysis 
cm d p lan n in g
Slow Fast Slow
Ve n t u r e r
O rgan isa tion a l
stru ctu re
Large, hierarchical structure Flat, small structure Flat, small structure
D elega tion  o f  
p o w e r an d  
p a rtic ip a tio n
The managers were not participated in 
the UV’s work and daily operations. 
They had regular meetings only with 
the foreign parent
The CEOs made all the major strategic 
decisions about the venture’s development
The CEOs were participated in the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, they were able to make only small decisions. The 
main strategic decisions were made by the foreign parent
Ve n t u r e d
D ifferen ces Russian Parent Foreign Parent 1 Foreign Parent 2 IJV
O rgan isa tion al
stru ctu re
Large, hierarchical structure Large, hierarchical structure Small, flat structure Large, hierarchical structure
M ission, g o a ls a n d  
values
There is no mission and values 
are not defined. Most goals are 
production oriented
There is no mission and values are 
not defined. Most goals are 
production oriented
Extensive use of values
Goals and values are seen as 
something that is dictated by the 
company’s charter. Many goals 
are production oriented
R oles in the 
organ isa tion a l 
stru ctu re
The CEO and the CTO also 
manage the venture
Overlapping of work 
responsibilities is less likely
N/A The CEO and the CTO also work 
in the Russian parent
Delegation o f power
The CEO has absolute power in 
the company. There is a 
minimum or almost no control 
from the board of directors and 
shareholders
The CEO has absolute power in 
the company. There is a minimum 
or almost no control from the 
board of directors and 
shareholders
Focus on a broad set of stakeholders
The CEO makes all the major 
decisions in the venture. The rest 
managers are almost not 
participated in the decision­
making
Participation
The company has a lot of its 
employees in the venture. The 
company is participated in the 
venture’s daily work and 
operations
The company has its employees 
in the venture. The managers 
often have meetings with the 
CEO and the CTO
The company does not participate in the 
venture’s daily work and operations. Its 
managers have meetings with the 
Foreign parent 2. There were no 
meetings with the Russian parent or the 
venture
Only CEO and the CTO are 
participated in the meetings with 
the foreign parent
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Group 2 -  Perceptions o f  IJV  Success
All managers in Group 2 had a negative perception about their venture’s success in 
comparison with the previous group. For example, when asked about success, the 
senior managers o f  Ventures C and D responded that their Russian partners still have 
not met their goals. Furthermore, the cooperation process between the partners is quite 
difficult and the managers often have conflicts.
The CFO o f Venture K was also critical while speaking about cooperation between 
partners. The autonomy o f the Russian partner caused many conflicts between the 
managers. The partners still have not met their goals.
Finally, the example o f  Venture R showed that conflicts between the parent 
companies led to its dissolution.
Summary for Group 2
Group 2 represents the ventures where the Russian parent holds the biggest part of the 
equity. In most o f these ventures the Russian parent has not only capital but also 
managerial control in the IJVs. In three out o f five ventures the CEO of the Russian 
parent also manages the venture company. Managerial values and beliefs in these 
ventures are identical to those o f the Russian parent suggesting once again that 
partner’s control has a direct impact on organisational culture in the IJV.
As in the previous group, the findings show that the partners may gain power in the 
IJV not only through capital resources but also through managerial skills, 
technologies, and participation in daily work. For example, Venture R has been 
constantly cooperating with its foreign partner and it has adopted its vales, 
technologies, know-how, operational processes, financial and marketing analysis and 
planning methods. The foreign partner has also placed its employees in the venture 
and hence the venture’s organisational culture became more similar to that of the 
foreign parent. Interestingly, the CEO from Venture R showed high sores in the 
openness to change values. This finding may confirm the previous suggestion that the
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Iventure could more easily adopt the Western culture as the CEOs values were sim ilar 
to those of the Western managers.
The main distinctive features o f this group are that the parent companies and the IJVs 
have many differences related to the values, organisational structure, different roles in 
the organisational structure, and delegation o f power in the partnership.
All of the Russian partners in this group used to be state-owned companies in the 
USSR, and the government still owns the biggest stake in three o f them. Moreover, in 
most of these companies the CEOs have been managing the organisation for many 
decades, and they still carry their managerial experience from the Soviet Union. These 
companies still do not have a mission statement and their values are not defined. Their 
organisational structure is large and hierarchical with a great power distance. Also, a 
production oriented approach dominates their market orientation. The CEOs in these 
companies have absolute power and they make all o f the major decisions without 
consulting their subordinates.
The delegation of power was one o f the main differences highlighted in the previous 
study of Group 1. In Group 1 the CEOs o f the foreign parent have the main power in 
the decision-making. Nevertheless, the foreign parents have a horizontal 
organisational structure where many managers make decisions. They focus on a broad 
set of stakeholders, such as: shareholders, customers, and employees.
In Group 2 the problem of power delegation is related to the centralised power o f  the 
Russian senior managers. They have almost full control in the company and tend to 
have good relationships with the government.
The IJVs in Group 2 mainly cooperate with their Russian parent. The Russian parent, 
as has been mentioned above, has financial and managerial control in the venture. So, 
the organisational culture in these IJVs was shaped by the Russian parent.
Despite many similarities between these IJVs and their Russian parent, the managers 
during the interview reported a negative response about the venture s success and 
reported conflicts between the parent companies. Most of the similarities are related to
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the organisational structure and management style. This finding suggests that if  the 
Russian parent exercises more control and influence daily operations in IJV, then the 
levels of conflict may be high and IJV will have a negative performance. One of the 
reasonable explanations o f this is low trust between managers. Almost all interviewed 
managers from this group reported that trust is a very important aspect in IJV success.
8.1.3 Group 3 -  50/50 IJVs
Organisational Culture o f  IJVs
In equity-based IJVs the parent companies hold equal shares and the outcome of 
integration is less predictable.
As the previous group, most managers from the Group 3 scored high in the rule 
oriented culture and traditional values.
According to the interview data, all shared equity IJVs may be divided into three 
cultural groups:
1. IJVs with organisational culture similar to the foreign parent (Venture A)
2. IJVs with organisational culture similar to the Russian parent (Ventures E and
L)
3. IJVs with a hybrid culture (Ventures J, N, O, and P).
Next, we briefly describe organisational culture of each group.
Venture A has, for the most part, been cooperating with its foreign partner. The 
organisation’s CEO worked in the foreign parent for many years and he has organised 
the venture’s work along similar lines to that o f the foreign parent. The Russian parent 
has not participated in the venture’s operations. The venture’s employees do not have 
to strictly follow a dress code. The atmosphere in the Head Office is more relaxed. 
The CEO involves the managers in the decision-making process. Venture A organises
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regular trainings for its employees. Also, the main values that Venture A states are 
almost identical to those o f its foreign parent.
Ventures E and L both claimed that their organisational culture is very similar to that 
of the Russian parent. Both ventures scored highly in rule and goal oriented culture. 
From the interviews, the ventures and the Russian parent were found to have the same 
CEO. Their organisational culture can be described as autocratic, where the CEO 
makes all the main decisions. The Russian parent in these ventures holds all the 
managerial control. These ventures are operating similarly to the Russian partners. 
Although Venture E also has a few managers from the foreign parent, they do not 
have any power in the decision-making process. Both ventures place a lot o f emphasis 
on employees, their career, and salaries. These ventures have also adopted a market 
oriented approach to meet customer needs. However, at the same time they follow 
strict rules and guidelines to meet these requirements.
Most managers from Group 3 described the organisational culture in their ventures as 
a mixture, or hybrid, o f  the Russian and foreign parents’ cultures. These ventures have 
many similar characteristics. For example, both parent companies have their senior 
managers in the venture. The managers have almost equal power in the decision­
making process. They make all major decisions at a high level while the rest o f the 
employees are involved in making small decisions. Most ventures adopted their 
structure and the decision-making from the foreign parent, whereas operational and 
technical control came from the Russian company.
Partners * Cultures
Table 8.4 below summarises the data gathered from the interviews which is related to 
the differences between partners and the IJVs. The ventures from Group 3 can be seen 
to have better developed communication processes. Their parent companies 
constantly cooperate and involve the IJV’s managers in the cooperation process. So, 
most managers from this group were able to provide better information about parent 
companies.
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Table 8.4: Differences in Organisational Cultures for the Group 3
Differences Russian Parent Foreign Parent IJV
Ve n t u r e  A
Size of company Large organisation Large organisation Small firm
Organisational
structure
Large, hierarchical structure Small, flat structure Flat structure
Financial and 
accounting 
documentation
N/A
The managers expect the UV to prepare all 
accounting and financial documents according to 
their standards
The managers follow the standards that are described in 
the Russian legislation
Participation in the 
venture's work
Not participated Participated in the venture’s development and 
daily work
The CEO had been working in the foreign parent for 
many years. The foreign partner makes all the main 
decisions about the venture’s strategic development. The 
employees have regular trainings with the foreign partner
Communication
style
Formal Informal Informal
Information sharing
Difficult to get information. The UV’s 
CEO has to get permission from the 
top managers in order to receive 
necessary information
Easy to receive information from any department High information sharing
Ve n t u r e  E
Roles in the 
organisational 
structure
The CEO of the Russian partner also 
manages the IJV
Overlapping of work responsibilities is less likely The CEO and a few managers also work in the Russian 
parent
Management style
Autocratic. The CEO makes all the 
major decisions
Consensual. Managers are relatives and they try 
to find an agreement
Autocratic. The CEO makes all the major decisions
Type of 
relationships
Professional relationships between 
managers and employees
Personal relationships. Managers tend to develop 
long-term personal contacts with people
Professional relationships between managers and 
employees
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Meaning o f work 
and motivation
“W orking to live”. The main 
motivators for employees are salary, 
bonuses and career development
“Living to work”. Devotion to work and the 
company plays a big role
“Working to live”. The main motivators for employees 
are salary, bonuses and career development
HR system
Formal. All employees have a contract 
with the company. The contract states 
the cases when the company may fire 
an employee
Informal. The managers will not fire employees 
who have been working in the company for 
many years, even if an employee makes a large 
mistake
Formal. All employees have a contract with the company. 
The contract states when the company may fire an 
employee
Expectations about 
payments
All payments to contractors are made 
according to the rules of a contract
The managers pay more to their contractors if 
they think that the contractors did their work veiy 
accurately and honestly
All payments to contractors are made according to the 
rules of a contract
Meetings style
Meetings are usually placed to find a 
solution for existing problems or 
define the future plans. All meetings 
are formal
Meetings are less formal and they are placed for 
reaching consensus. Managers try to avoid 
confrontation
Mixed approach which combines the style of both 
partners
Language barrier Managers speak Russian and some 
managers are fluent in English
Managers do not speak Russian and knowledge 
of English is limited
All communications and meetings usually take place in 
the Russian language. The foreign managers use 
interpreters. Two CEOs who work in the UV use 
interpreters in their daily communications
V en tu re  J
Organisational
structure
Large, hierarchical structure Small, flat structure Small, flat structure
Decision-making
style
Autocratic. The CEO makes all the 
major decisions
Shared decision-making, voting Shared decision-making, voting
Product vs. market 
orientation Product oriented Market oriented Market oriented
Information sharing Low information sharing. When 
managers want to get information 
from another department they always 
asked why they need it and what for
It is easy to get information from any department High information sharing
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Speed o f planning Slow Slow Fast
Communication
style
Formal Informal Informal
Managerial 
experience and 
educational 
background of 
managers
Most managers have administrative 
experience and an education in 
engineering
The managers have good managerial experience 
and qualifications
The managers are younger than their colleagues from the 
parent companies. They have good educational 
background and qualifications. Their managerial 
experience is smaller than that of their foreign colleagues
Venture N
Size of the company Large company MSE MSE
Organisational
structure Large, hierarchical structure Small, flat structure Large, hierarchical structure
Roles in the 
organisational 
structure
The CEO also manages the IJV Overlapping of work responsibilities is less likely The CEO works in the Russian parent
Decision-making
style
Autocratic. The CEO makes all the 
major decisions
Shared decision-making Autocratic
Speed of decision­
making and 
planning
Slow Fast Fast
Company ’s image The company pays a lot of attention to 
its image
The company has not been working on its image
The LTV began creating an image. The CFO is fully 
responsible for it. Many things have been copying from 
the Russian parent
Language barrier
Some managers are fluent in English 
and German but they do not speak the 
language of their foreign parent
The managers do not speak Russian/German. 
Their knowledge of English is limited. They 
usually contact the venture’s CFO who translates 
all of their messages to the Russian parent
Most meetings take place in Russia in the Russian 
language. The foreign managers use interpreters
229
w * * -
V e n t u r e  L
Size o f  the com pan y Small Large Small
Roles in the 
organisational 
structure
The CEO also manages the venture Overlapping of roles is less likely The UV and the Russian parent have the same CEO
Type of 
relationships
Personal relationships. Many 
employees are family members and 
close friends
Personal relationships. Many employees are 
family members
Professional relationships
HR system Partially informal. The company 
employs only very close friends and 
members of the family
Informal. Almost all employees in the company 
are family members and relatives. The company 
recruits new workers from among their friends 
and relatives
HR system is formalised
Ve n t u r e P
Size of the company Small Small MSE
Style of work Individual orientation. People cannot 
work in a team
The team-work is developed better Everyone tries to get a better result for him/herself. The 
employees cannot work well in a team
Feedback system
There is no feedback system
Well developed feedback system between 
managers and engineers
The venture uses a feedback system similar to its foreign 
parent
Ve n t u r e  0
She of the company Small MSE Small
Quality issues Quality issues play a very big role The firm uses additional inspections to guarantee 
the best quality
The engineers in the venture think that their foreign 
colleagues are too pedantic and behave like prison 
wardens
Approaches to the 
deadlines
The employees often break the 
deadlines
If the employees break the deadline, they loose 
bonuses. The engineers usually submit projects
on time
Although the bonus system is similar to the foreign 
parents, the engineers sometimes break the deadlines
Communication
style
Informal Formal Informal
230
As can be seen from Table 8.4, all o f these IJVs mainly have many differences with 
only one o f the partners.
Group 3  -  Perceptions o f  I.JV  S u c c e s s
In equity-based IJVs both parent companies have similar levels of control; however, 
in order to achieve their strategic objectives they may compete with each other 
(Kogut, 1989). Consequently, cooperation between partners tends to become more 
difficult in these equity ventures.
All managers from Group 3 claimed that their ventures are successful companies. As 
can be seen from Table 8.4, the parent companies have many differences in 
organisational cultures; however, these differences did not lead to conflicts. None o f 
the managers reported conflicts between parent companies and the venture. Many 
managers mentioned that both partners have developed mutual trust and their 
relationships are smooth.
Summary for Group 3
The IJVs in G roup 3 fell into three categories.
The first category includes Venture A. The manager of the Venture A reported that 
the company has an organisational culture sim ilar to that of the foreign parent. The 
foreign parent introduced its marketing and operations management to the venture. It 
also organises training for the employees. So the foreign partner holds the main 
control in the Venture A. This finding suggests that in equity IJVs the partner who 
contributes m ore to the venture’s work will be able to gain more control. This also 
confirms the previous findings that recommended that organisational culture in the 
venture will be more similar to that o f the partner with the highest level of control. 
Interestingly, the CEO of Venture A received the highest scores in change values. 
This finding is similar to the ventures from Group 1. In the IJVs in Russia it seems 
that successful adoption o f a foreign culture m ay be possible if the CEO of the venture 
shares similar values with its foreign parent.
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The second category includes Ventures E and L, which have both adopted the values 
and vision o f the Russian parent. In both ventures the C E O  is the same as that o f the 
Russian parent company. The CEOs of Ventures E and L  have the main pow er in the 
decision-making and, consequently, both companies have an autocratic managem ent 
style. Although two o f the managers in Venture E came from the foreign parent, they 
are not able to exercise their power. This finding suggests that it is difficult for a 
foreign parent to implement its own managerial control in a company with such a 
different structure.
The rest of the ventures (i.e. Ventures J, N, O, and P) fall into the third category. 
These ventures have a hybrid culture and have adopted the managerial style and 
operational processes from both partners; for example: they employ senior managers 
from both parent companies, they have similar powers in  decision-making, and the 
operational routines and technologies expertise have equal contributions from the 
partners. All of the managers from these ventures claimed that both parent companies 
contribute equally in the venture’s daily work and development.
Table 8.4 above shows that while the ventures and parent companies from Group 3 
have many differences in their organisational cultures, a ll o f the managers claimed 
that their partners have developed mutual trust. This has helped them to achieve 
shared understanding and smooth cooperation between parents and the ventures. Also, 
when the researcher asked the managers if  organisational culture plays an important 
role in the venture success, almost all of the managers answered that the role o f trust 
is bigger. This finding suggests that in Russia trust between partners smoothes 
differences in organisational cultures and contributes tow ards better cooperation. O f 
course it always possible that the managers may have under-reported the conflicts 
between the parent companies during the interviews. T hey  could view conflict as a 
negative trait and, consequently, did not want to look or sound bad during the 
interview.
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8.2 Summary
In this chapter results o f quantitative and qualitative analysis were presented. Based 
on the interview data, all IJVs were divided into three groups depending on the 
partner’s control. It was found that IJVs in Russia have adopted an organisational 
culture which is similar to that o f the partner who has the highest level of control. So 
if the foreign organisation holds more than 50 % of the IJV, then it is likely that 
organisational culture in the venture will be more similar to that o f the foreign partner. 
A partner in an IJV can also exercise control through operational management, human 
resources, and knowledge.
It was found in this research project that IJV success in Russia is positively associated 
with foreign influence and control. All IJVs with Russian control reported many 
conflicts between managers and experienced a negative performance. One o f the main 
reasons for this has been found to be trust. The researcher recognises that trust is a 
very important characteristic and one of the major aspects that may influence IJV 
success.
The next chapter concludes this thesis, it will include a description o f the 
contributions of this research.
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Conclusion
The main aim o f this research project is to increase the understanding of how 
organisational culture influences IJV success in an emerging economy context, with a 
particular focus on IJVs in Russia. This final chapter considers the aims and 
objectives of this thesis, answers research questions, and offers some conclusions and 
contributions to current understanding (including theoretical and managerial 
implications). Recommendations are also made for future research.
9.1 Context and Rationale
The main purpose o f this thesis is to understand the contribution and limitations of 
recent theories of organisational culture, and how they explain the role of culture in 
IJVs. This thesis considers emerging economies, and Russia in particular, in order to 
develop the understanding o f institutional voids and their influence on organisational 
culture.
Chapter 1 of this thesis is introductory. It explains the impetus of the research, states 
the research aims and objectives, and presents a structure and organisation for the 
thesis.
Chapter 2 looks at strategic alliances and IJVs, types of strategic alliances, motives of 
alliance formation, and different factors which influence alliance success. Strategic 
alliances have become popular in the modern business; however, despite their 
popularity and the growing number o f strategic alliances, more than a half of these 
alliances fail. The literature review presents Mohr and Spekman’s (1994) model, 
summarises the main attributes o f partnership success, and describes the main 
measures of alliance success. This thesis uses a satisfaction measure of performance, 
where performance was operationalised as the extent to which senior managers of the 
IJVs agreed that their ventures are successful companies and both partners have 
achieved their strategic objectives. This measure helps to discover any of the 
relationships issues o f IJVs.
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Chapter 3 looks at organisational culture and its role in IJV success. The literature 
review shows that many researchers argue about the importance of culture and 
cultural “fit” in IJVs, but they do not explain “how” important it is and to what extent 
both partners need to have similar cultures.
The literature review demonstrates a lack o f consensus on the meaning of culture. The 
perspective taken by the researcher is that organisational culture is something the 
organisation “is” . Values and practices are generally perceived as the most important 
elements of organisational culture. Values are the core o f  national culture. It is 
important to take account o f values in respect o f IJVs where at least two partners 
come from different countries. Practices are the main element of organisational 
culture because at an organisational level cultural differences reside mostly in 
practices (Hofstede, 1991).
Chapter 3 discusses the concepts o f values and practices, different value and practice 
frameworks, and their main advantages and limitations. This research adopts a 
modified Schwartz value scheme to measure managerial values and the organisational 
practices model of Van Muijen et al. (1999). Finally, Chapter 3 ends with a 
presentation of the conceptual framework.
Chapter 4 defines emerging and transition economies, and it reviews the previous 
literature on Russian culture and economy. The main purpose o f this chapter is to 
introduce the problem o f institutional voids and explain how institutional voids in ECs 
may influence organisational culture. The literature review notes that although 
emphasis is placed on the match between IJV partners and their organisational 
cultures, this relationship has not been well explained (especially within the context of 
emerging economies and Russia). Chapter 4 discusses the national culture of Russia, 
its cultural values, as well as the institutional voids and managerial practices, and 
focuses the research aims on Russian IJVs.
Chapter 5 considers the research questions, objectives, and methodology. The 
literature review leads to a suggestion that organisational culture difference is the 
main factor that influences IJV success or dissolution. Therefore, the research project 
was designed to explore the following questions:
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1. What is the type o f organisational culture o f IJVs in Russia?
a. What are the managerial values in Russia?
b. What are the managerial practices?
2. Do successful and unsuccessful IJVs in Russia have different organisational 
cultures?
3. What are the main organisational culture differences between IJVs in Russia 
and their partners?
4. Do organisational culture differences influence IJV success?
5. What is a better cultural fit for IJVs in Russia?
In order to investigate all o f these issues two research approaches were selected — 
quantitative and qualitative. Both approaches are used in cultural research and in this 
study the quantitative data has led to a greater focus for the qualitative interviews that 
were conducted. The research sample included 17 IJVs in Russia. Interviews were 
conducted with 19 senior managers from the 17 IJVs. Two questionnaires were 
completed by 27 senior managers. The chapter also discussed reliability, validity, 
triangulation and ethical issues.
Chapter 6 presents the data and analysis o f questionnaires. Senior managers of 17 
IJVs completed two questionnaires which aimed to collect information about 
managerial values and practices. The first questionnaire uses a modified Schwartz’s 
value scheme and the second questionnaire uses the practices model of Van Muijen et 
al. (1999). Hierarchical cluster analysis with simple average calculations was applied 
to data from both questionnaires. The results show that tradition values and rule 
oriented culture receive the highest scores from most respondents.
Chapter 7 presents the cases which resulted from interviews with the 17 IJVs that took 
place in Russia. The cases are based on interview data with 19 senior managers. Each 
case is supplemented with a brief analysis.
Chapter 8 provides analysis and contrast o f findings from the case studies and 
questionnaires to understand the role o f organisational culture differences in IJV 
success.
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9.2 Research Findings and Discussion
This study helps to develop a better understanding o f the influence of organisational 
culture on partnership success or dissolution. The case studies provide deep insights 
into organisational culture and daily work o f IJVs in Russia. The questionnaires help 
to gather additional information about managerial values and practices, which are the 
central aspects of organisational culture. Although the findings are specific to 17 
organisations, there were commonalities between IJVs and a number o f  important 
points are observed. This section is going to discuss the main findings and answers to 
the research questions.
9.2./ Profile o f  the Sample
The sample consists o f  17 IJVs. Overall, 19 senior managers were interviewed from 
these ventures and questionnaires were collected from 27 senior managers. The 
sample included top managers who participated in the venture strategic development. 
One significant observation o f the sample is the high percentage o f females amongst 
the senior managers in Russia: 37 % of interviewed managers and 48 %  o f  the senior 
managers who completed questionnaires were females. The current study did not find 
interdependence between the large number o f females and managerial vales and 
practices. Although, the researcher analyses female and male responses individually, 
there are no substantial differences. Although the literature review does not highlight 
a large number o f senior women executives in Russia, this fact may have a great 
impact on organisational culture in Russian companies.
At 42 %, Russia has the world’s second highest proportion o f women in senior 
management roles (Grant Thornton IBR, 2009). Extensive previous research on 
women executives (e.g. Rosener, 1990; Karau and Eagly, 1999; Lyness and 
Thompson, 2000; Van Vianen and Fischer, 2002) shows that women and m en have 
different approaches to management. For instance, women encourage greater 
collaboration (Rosener, 1990; Van Vianen and Fischer, 2002) and have more
* Global average is 24 % o f  females in senior management (e.g. Poland -  32 %, Germany -  17 %, 
Denmark -  13 %, and Japan -  7 %).
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consultative-decision making processes (Rosener, 1990). Women are believed to  
discourage competitive behaviour in an organisation as they are not interested in  
claiming individual achievement (Van Vianen and Fischer, 2002). Their interest is  
found to lie in producing the best outcome. They are more interested in encouraging 
and motivating staff than exercising their own power (Rosener, 1990).
The interaction effect o f gender, and managerial values and practices was not found in  
this study. Nevertheless, this is an issue that needs to be addressed further in fu ture 
research which needs to look closer at the values o f women executives in Russia an d  
their influence on organisational culture.
9.2.2 Research Questions
I. What is the type o f  organisational culture o f  IJVs in Russia?
a. What are the managerial values in Russia?
b. What are the managerial practices?
Values o f  the Senior Managers in IJVs in Russia
A modified version o f  the Schwartz values survey, which consisted o f 12 values, w as  
given to the research sample (ranking them in order o f importance). Chapter 6 
discusses the results o f the quantitative analysis which was conducted in this study. 
The cluster analysis that was conducted as part o f this research project found that th e  
three values which received the highest ranks from the managers were fam ily security , 
honouring parents, and curiosity. These values can be good indicators o f  econom ic, 
political, and cultural conditions in a society (Rokeach, 1973; Hofstede, 1991).
The value o f family security is ranked highest by the total sample. This result m ay b e  
interpreted as the result o f some difficulties with a lower standard o f living in R ussia. 
Russia experiences high inflation rates as a result o f increases in prices and the overall 
cost of living, w hile incomes have remained relatively low. These findings a re  
supported by statistics; for example, the inflation rate in Russia was last reported a t 
8.8 % in December o f 2010. From 1991 until 2010, the average inflation rate in
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Russia was 175.36 % reaching a historical high o f 2333.30 % in December of 1992 
and a record low of 5.50 % in July o f 2010. The inflation rate refers to a general rise 
in prices as measured against a standard level of purchasing power (Trading 
Economics, 2011).
Another factor that could explain the dom inance o f security values is the lack of free 
speech and mass media in Russia. An ineffective judiciary, a high level of corruption, 
and bureaucratic courts make it difficult to bring legal action against anybody (Savov, 
2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2007). Many newspapers and TV channels are controlled 
by the government, and it is hard to speak or publish any information that is disliked 
by the government. In another example, the government puts many limitations on 
organised strikes. These factors go some way to explaining why the security value is 
placed in the first rank by Russian managers.
The other value that is identified as im portant to senior managers in the sample is 
curiosity. There are as least two factors that m ay explain this result. The first factor is 
both political and historical: from 1869 higher education has been accessible for all 
people in Russia, including females. In 1925 the Soviet government proclaimed free 
compulsory primary education. Students and pupils with high marks had better work 
opportunities. They were also paid higher levels of grant. The second factor is 
economic. In an unstable Russian economy people with a good education tend to 
more easily find work and they have better opportunities for a successful career.
Finally, honouring parents and elders value is given a high ranking by senior 
managers. This value can be an indicator o f  the Russian culture because the main 
factors that influence the choice o f this value include religion and education.
Practices o f  the Senior Managers in IJVs in Russia
This research uses a modified model o f  Van Muijen et al. (1999) to measure 
managerial practices. This model includes 21 questions which are related to different 
types o f organisational culture: support orientation, innovation orientation, rules 
orientation, and goal orientation. From the literature review it was found that cultural 
values impact human behaviour and determ ine what leadership dimensions the
240
managers are likely to choose. Traditional values are adjacent to power and are 
consistent with rule oriented culture (Smith et al., 2009; Kozan, 2002). In the current 
research, all o f the questions from the rule orientation category received the highest 
scores from the senior managers. Rule oriented culture demonstrates respect for 
authority, rationality o f procedures, and division of work. The structure of 
organisations with rule oriented culture is hierarchical, and communication is written 
and top-down. The top managers are usually directive and tell their subordinates what 
to do (Bitici et al., 2004). This finding is fully consistent with the literature review 
(e.g. Kets de Vries, 2000; McCarthy et al., 2005) which found that Russian managers 
are administrators and have an autocratic style of leadership. Furthermore, the 
findings show that managerial practices as well as values may be indicators of 
economic, cultural, and political situations in the country.
The first aspect that supports this view is the role of authority and power of leaders in 
Russian history. Part o f the Russian culture is that people accept authority. Russia has 
been an autocratic country for more than 300 years. The findings show that many 
organisations in Russia still have large hierarchical structures where power is 
centralised at the top in the figure o f a CEO who makes all of the major decisions. 
The CEO’s delegate decisions to low-level managers and subordinates for 
implementation. Employees in the companies are generally unwilling to question 
decisions that are made by the CEO. This may repress the development of the IJVs 
because employees cannot freely express their ideas.
The second aspect shows political and economic influence over organisational 
practices. Russia is planning to enter into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In 
order to meet the standards of WTO it has introduced the ISO’s Quality Management 
Systems into Russian business organisations. Russian companies now have to follow 
specific rules and procedures to receive ISO certificates. For example, managers have 
to write down all instructions. This can explain why some responses of the second 
questionnaire contradict some of the interview answers.
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Organisational Culture in IJVs in Russia
Overall, it may be concluded from the questionnaires that most IJVs in Russia have a 
rule oriented culture. However, the interview data suggests that organisational culture 
in many IJVs does not conform to the main characteristics of rule oriented culture.
The findings show that there are obvious differences in organisational cultures 
between three types o f IJVs:
1. IJVs where a foreign company holds more than 50 % o f stake;
2. IJVs where a Russian company holds more than 50 % of stake;
3. Equity-based IJVs.
The first group has an organisational culture similar to that of their foreign partner. 
The majority o f senior managers from this group gave highest priority to change and 
egoistic values. These ventures have a less formal culture than other organisations 
with an open information system and low power distance. The structure of the 
companies is small and flat with shared decision-making.
Most companies from the second group have a rule-oriented organisational culture. 
The managers from these ventures rank tradition values high. Almost all IJVs have a 
large hierarchical structure where the CEO makes all o f the major decisions.
The third group includes IJVs with different organisational cultures. One of the 
ventures has adopted its culture from the foreign partner, the organisational culture of 
one venture is similar to that o f the Russian partner, and several ventures have a 
mixed or hybrid culture where some work practices were adopted from the foreign 
parent and some processes are identical to the Russian partner.
2. Do successful and unsuccessful IJVs in Russia have different organisational 
cultures?
In order to investigate the role of organisational culture differences in IJV 
performance two types of IJVs were selected — successful and unsuccessful. Chapter
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3 describes that this study uses the subjective opinion o f the senior managers to 
measure IJV performance. Managerial values and practices in both groups were 
investigated in order to determine whether successful and unsuccessful IJVs in Russia 
have similar or different values and practices and identify values and practices 
associated with successful IJVs.
As previously mentioned, the senior managers o f  all equity-based IJVs held positive 
impressions about the performance o f their companies. Almost all o f the IJVs with 
foreign control described themselves as successful organisations. The group of 
successful IJVs includes 11 companies (Ventures A, E, G, H, J, L, M, N, O, P, and 
Q). Most IJVs that held negative impression about their performance (i.e. Ventures B, 
C, D, F, K, and R) are ventures with Russian control.
Most managers from the unsuccessful IJVs gave the highest priority to values of 
tradition and rule oriented culture. They have similar organisational cultures to those 
of the Russian partner. The Russian partner holds the majority control in most of these 
companies. Half the unsuccessful IJVs were described as autocratic organisations. 
CEOs of these organisations hold the highest managerial role in the Russian 
partnership and IJV. They make all o f the decisions and deliver them to subordinates 
who implement them.
Many senior managers from successful IJVs showed highest scores in change and 
egoistic values. Only one company from this group was described as an autocratic 
organisation with the power concentrated at the top. Most successful IJVs have either 
an organisational culture similar to that o f their W estern partners or a hybrid culture 
adopted from both partners.
i .  What are the main organisational culture differences between IJVs in Russia 
and their partners?
Chapter 8 presents the tables that state the main differences between IJVs and their 
partners. All o f the information about differences was derived from the interviews 
with senior managers. Many IJVs described various differences related to the size of
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the companies and the speed o f work. For instance, large companies are slower at 
planning and decision-making than small firms. Also, differences in communication 
style and language barrier were mentioned. This section describes the main and most 
important differences: organisational structure, decision-making style, and short-term 
vs. long-term planning. These differences are highlighted as the most important for 
two reasons. Firstly, the literature review indicates that these differences play a very 
important role (e.g. Fey and Bjorkman, 2001; Ennew et al., 2000; Kets de Vries, 
2000; McCarthy et al., 2005). Secondly, from the interviews with managers, these 
differences between IJVs and the partners are found to be the most widespread in 
Russia and can be crucial in a company’s performance.
Organisational Structure
The interviews revealed that organisational structure is one o f the most common 
differences between the Russian and foreign partners, and an IJV. Interviews with the 
senior managers confirmed the results of the literature review which states that many 
Russian companies have a high level o f centralisation, a large hierarchical structure 
with high power distance between the top managers and subordinates, a high level of 
formalisation, and low information sharing between departments (e.g. Fey and 
Bjorkman, 2001; Ennew et al., 2000; Kets de Vries, 2000; McCarthy et al., 2005). The 
majority of foreign partners have a small flat structure with a low level of 
centralisation and transparent system with high information sharing.
Decision-making Style
The different structures cause large differences in decision-making styles. Many 
Russian CEOs make all of the decisions without consulting subordinates (Kets de 
Vries, 2000). The interviewees suggest that employees in Russian companies do not 
question the decisions o f the CEO. The CEOs in many Russian partners make all the 
major decisions. Most foreign partners have a shared decision-making process of 
some kind following mainstream management training and education literature.
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Short-term vs. Long-term Planning
The interviews revealed that short-term planning is one o f the main features of IJVs in 
Russia. The preference for security values m ay explain managerial short-term 
orientation. Most companies put emphasis on the present and the managers are not 
oriented towards long-term strategic development. This can explain why so many 
Russian IJVs do not seem to have clear objectives and goals. This organisational 
practice is an indicator o f the quickly changing social and economic environment in 
Russia which stimulates a short-term view.
4. Do organisational culture differences influence IJV  success?
The findings show that similarity in the parent firm s’ organisational culture is not 
essential for IJV success in Russia, and many successful IJVs in Russia have parent 
companies with different organisational cultures. These differences are not seen to 
create conflicts between partners and their senior managers reported that their IJVs 
have good performance. On the other hand, differences and similarities between the 
organisational cultures o f IJV and its parents do appear to influence the venture’s 
performance.
Similarity in the organisational culture o f the foreign partner and IJV is found to be 
important when the foreign company holds the m ajority  o f  control in IJV. Most of the 
Russian IJVs where the foreign partner has control have excellent performance.
Similarity in the organisational cultures o f the R ussian  parent and the IJV is not found 
to be an indicator o f IJV positive performance. O ne explanation for this is related to 
the organisational culture o f the Russian partners, many o f  whom are controlled by 
the state. These are large companies, with a vertical structure and centralised decision­
making. Information sharing in these companies is weak. The Russian partners are 
production-oriented rather than market-oriented. Strategic planning is not developed 
in the organisations. The interviews in this study have revealed that these companies 
do not have explicit, or even implicit, mission statem ents. Many of their reported 
goals and objectives speak about an increase in production. The other determinant is
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related to trust. Low levels o f information sharing, transparency, and trust can create 
additional conflicts between managers and subordinates that negatively influence 
performance. In IJVs with Russian control, the foreign partner is not empowered to 
make decisions and bring change to the IJVs. Most o f these ventures operate in a 
similar way to their Russian parent. When an IJV in Russia adopts an organisational 
culture similar to that o f its Russian partner, it transfers similar work practices (e.g. 
short-term orientation and low level o f trust) which can result in a less positive 
performance.
Strategic goals and organisational objectives are better determined in IJVs which 
adopt the organisational culture o f their foreign parent, or which use an organisational 
culture which is similar to a foreign partner (i.e. a hybrid culture in the equity IJVs). 
These ventures are more likely to have clear strategic directions and market- 
orientation. The foreign partners often introduce marketing, strategic management, 
and financial analysis to the ventures. The Russian partners mainly contribute with 
employees, operational management, and knowledge o f the Russian business 
environment. Most o f these IJVs have small flat structures and shared decision­
making. The work processes and communication between venture managers and 
partners are organised more effectively in these IJVs. The result is that these ventures 
have a better performance.
5. What is better cultural f i t  fo r  IJV s in Russia?
The current research project included IJVs with organisations from different countries 
(i.e. America, Europe, and Asia). The results show that IJVs that have an 
organisational culture more similar to that of their foreign partner have a better 
performance. Consequently, it is important for foreign organisations to create an 
organisational culture in a Russian venture which is similar to their own. It is more 
likely that IJVs will adopt foreign culture if a foreign organisation has a major control 
in the venture. There can be many ways to exercise control in the IJV; for instance, 
through management, technologies, and know-how. This study shows that there is a 
large group o f managers who share non-tradition values (i.e. change values and 
egoistic values) which are more similar to those of Western societies. A foreign
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partner may try to recruit managers whose values are more similar to that of Western 
societies, thereby minimising the level o f conflict between managers and helping to 
develop an organisational culture in the IJV which is similar to that of the Western 
partner.
9.3 Key Findings and Contributions to Theory
The major contribution o f this thesis is related to managerial values and practices, and 
the role of organisational culture in IJV success or dissolution.
Some o f the key findings o f this research are:
• Managerial values and practices are good indicators o f current political, 
economic, and social conditions in Russia;
• Senior managers in IJVs in Russia show differences not only in practices but 
in values too; and,
• Tradition and openness to change values are congruous.
Cultural values represent the most fundamental elements o f an individual’s culture 
and personality (Hofstede, 1991). They help people to compose perceptions and 
attitudes (Rokeach, 1973). Information about the cultural values o f managers can help 
in understanding and explaining managerial behaviour or practices (Fritzsche and Oz, 
2007). One o f the main objectives o f this research was to explore the values and 
practices o f senior managers in the IJVs in Russia. This study uses a Russian context 
and contributes to understanding managerial values and practices, it also contributes 
to our understanding o f the source o f these values and practices.
The findings show that political, economic, and social trends in Russia have a 
significant impact on managerial values and, therefore, political and economic 
changes can reshape managerial values. Schwartz et al. (2001) sought to find 
universal values that have the same meaning for all societies. The values proposed by 
Schwarz do not offer universal application in all environments and depend to a large
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extent on traditional views o f culture and business behaviour which are adopted by 
more developed business cultures and, perhaps, within the confines of scholarly 
research in that environment. In a transitional Russian environment these values have 
a different meaning because o f a quickly changing economic, political, and social 
situation.
Managerial practices similar to values are also seen to be influenced by political and 
economic trends. Therefore, the question is whether these values can be a good 
measure o f organisational culture. For instance, the interviews illustrated that many of 
the organisations that gave highest priority to rule oriented practices are not consistent 
with the definition o f rule oriented culture given by Van Muijen et al. (1999). One of 
the CEOs explained that he gave high scores to rule oriented culture only because 
some work practices are currently required by the ISO standards. Consequently, the 
political and legal aspects dictate the values to be adopted, and these may differ as a 
result o f history, tradition, and political systems.
Hofstede (1991) was one o f the first researchers to notice that cultural differences at 
an organisational level reside mostly in practices and less in values. Therefore, many 
researchers have studied organisational culture within a given society through the 
measurement o f organisational practices and not values (e.g. Van de Berg and 
Wilderom, 2004). This research suggests that organisational values are in fact mainly 
determined by the dominant values within a country -  in this study, Russia.
The results o f this research project has highlighted that people’s values may be very 
different within one country. Most o f the managers in this study gave a high priority 
to tradition values. Nevertheless, there is a group o f managers who show high scores 
in change and egoistic values. This suggests a learning, or imitational, aspect to values 
in the Russian business environment.
This research helps to explain collectivistic cultures. Schwartz et al. (2001) contends 
that his tradition dimension corresponds to the collectivism dimension of Hofstede 
(1991), and some literature suggests that Russia is a collectivistic society (e.g. 
Elenkov, 1997; 1998). Collectivistic societies are characterised by team-working, 
long-term social relationships, avoiding conflicts, and high organisational
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commitment (Hofstede, 1991; Kozan, 2002). For example, people in collectivistic 
societies identify themselves with the group and, therefore, workers from 
collectivistic cultures are more involved and identified with their workplace 
(Hofstede, 1991). People are more likely to work together to increase efficiency in 
collectivistic countries. Collectivism shows people’s ability to work in a team at an 
organisational level, it also shows that they prefer to avoid conflicts in decision­
making (Kozan, 2002). Collectivistic societies perceive the workplace as more than a 
source of income, they see it rather a place where social ties are widened. The 
collective creates a paternalistic organisation and support culture (Hofstede, 1991).
Nevertheless, the findings o f this research show that Russian IJVs gave the lowest 
scores to support culture. Many respondents in the interviews made comments which, 
to varying degrees, showed an individualistic approach. Some m anagers mentioned 
that team-working is bad and not effective in their companies. The senior managers 
explained that team-working is weak due to the individual approach o f each team 
member. Competition between employees, rewards for the best performing employees 
and managers, career and salary orientation, and low organisational commitment were 
all described by the senior managers. It can be argued that a conflict avoiding style is 
absent in Russia. For example, Russian history with many wars, conflicts, and internal 
confrontations shows that the conflict decision-making style has frequently been used 
over the years. Furthermore, although collectivistic cultures typically value a long 
term orientation (Hofstede, 1991), the interview responses showed that a short-term 
orientation is dominant in many organisations in Russia. The interview s indicate that 
the collectivistic characteristic of Russian society can be called in question and may 
offer some explanation for Russian managerial values.
Collectivism in Russia is perhaps different from the collectivism in Asian societies. 
Collectivism in Russia may have links to the political and econom ic environment as 
human values are related to the socio-economic trends. A possible explanation is 
related to the political ideology o f collectivism. Russia had experienced substantial 
Western influence before the time of the USSR. Both the autocratic power of tsars and 
the recent communist regime created a collectivistic political and economic ideology. 
Ralston et al. (2008) identify Russia as a country where economic ideology is more 
collectivistically-oriented while the national culture is more individualistically-
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oriented (Ralston et al, 2008). Russia contrasts with China from a socio-cultural 
perspective, and with the USA from an economic and ideological point o f  view (see 
Figure 9.1).
Figure 9.1: Countries Classification According to National Culture, Economic and 
Political Ideology
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Source: Ralston et al. 2008: 12
This research contributes to the understanding o f  the value m odel which was 
developed by Schwartz et al. (2001) (see Chapter 3). Schwartz et al. (2001) show a 
circular structure o f relations among values (see Figure 9.2).
According to Schwartz et al. (2001: 521), openness to change values “w likely to 
undermine preservation o f  tradition values”. The circular structure portrays the 
relations among values, their conflict, and their congruity. The m ore distant the values 
are then the more antagonistic they will be.
Figure 9.2: Theoretical Model o f Structure o f Relations Among V alues
S e lf­
transcendence
O penness to 
Change
ConservationSclf-
cnhancctncnt
Source: Schwartz et al., 2001: 522
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The quantitative part o f this study (see Chapter 6) found that both conservation 
(tradition) and openness to change values received the highest scores from the senior 
managers. This shows that these values may also be congruent. Congruency of 
openness to change and traditional values may be a specific characteristic o f  Russian 
culture. It also suggests that the relationships between the four value domains may be 
different to that described by Schwartz et al. (2001). The relationships between value 
domains may not be circular where two domains are conflicting or congruent, but 
consistent (see Figure 9.3). Figure 9.3 shows four dom ains o f  cultural values where all 
domains are consistent. Consequently, the pursuit o f  any value does not conflict with 
the pursuit o f the other value.
Figure 9.3: Value Construct: Four Domains
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Some further findings o f this research are:
• IJVs with foreign control adopt an organisational culture which is similar to 
their foreign partner;
• Foreign organisational culture in the IJVs in Russia is associated with IJV 
positive performance;
• IJVs with Russian control adopt organisational culture similar to their Russian 
partner;
• Russian organisational culture in IJVs in Russia is associated with IJV 
negative performance;
• Equity IJVs have a hybrid organisational culture which includes practices of 
both partners; and,
• Hybrid organisational culture is associated with IJV positive performance.
In non-equity IJVs in Russia a parent that has less control participates a little, or not at 
all, in the venture's development. A partner w ho does not have power in the decision­
making process does not participate in negotiations and meetings. Only one partner is 
usually committed to a venture in non-equity IJVs, and these IJVs operate as though 
they are a branch o f its partner. A partner w ith major control brings to a venture a 
similar organisational structure, decision-m aking style, marketing skills, customer 
service, and planning. Partners with m ajor control exercise managerial control 
through its own managers in an IJV, or organise regular training for managers. 
Consequently, the organisational culture o f a non-equity IJV is more likely to become 
similar to that o f  a partner who holds major control.
The major contribution to theory o f this research project relates to the commitment of 
both partners in IJVs. A high level o f com m itm ent can help partners to achieve their 
objectives and avoid conflicts (Mohr and Spekm an, 1994; Zaman and Mavondo,
2007), but this study shows that in non-equity IJVs a low level o f commitment from 
one of the partners does not lead to conflict o r low  performance.
This study shows that IJVs with a “foreign” organisational culture have a positive 
performance, whereas IJVs that have an organisational culture similar to the Russian 
partner have a negative attitude about their success. This finding disagrees with the 
studies o f Beamish (1984) on IJVs in ECs which finds that dominant control by 
foreign organisations in IJVs was negatively related to performance in ECs; and when 
local partners dominate ventures, no such relationship is found. The current study
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examines IJVs in Russia and indicates opposite findings: foreign organisations with 
more control in IJVs transfer organisational culture in a company similar to their own. 
Similarity o f organisational cultures between IJV and a foreign parent is positively 
associated with IJV success.
Most non-equity IJVs with Russian control adopted an organisational culture similar 
to that of their Russian partner. These IJVs w ere described as unsuccessful by their 
senior managers. Although organisational cultures o f  IJVs and the Russian partners 
are similar, the managers reported conflicts and negative performance. The main 
reasons for this are the lack o f effective strategic planning in organisations, a 
production-oriented instead o f a market-oriented approach in these companies, and the 
Russian partner has transferred its centralised decision-m aking in most of these IJVs. 
A plausible explanation for this may be that some managerial practices are crucial for 
successful collaboration.
The equity IJVs in Russia usually have a hybrid organisational culture which is 
adopted from that o f both the partners. In the interview s, all o f the executives of these 
IJVs expressed certainty o f a positive perform ance o f  their companies. One of the 
main contributions made by the foreign parent in the equity IJVs in Russia is a 
strategic long-term approach to the organisational development. This factor may help 
the company to achieve better performance. One o f  the major implications for 
practitioners is, therefore, that a foreign partner should introduce its strategic 
management perspective to an IJV.
A further important finding o f this research is that trust is one o f the most important 
aspects o f IJV success in Russia. In the interviews, m ost o f  the top managers referred 
to trust as one o f the most important factors which influences IJV success or 
dissolution. Managers felt that when both partners and a venture have a high level of 
trust then such factors as commitment, com m unication behaviour, and conflict 
resolution techniques become less important. W hen partners trust each other, they are 
less likely to question plans and actions. A low  level o f  trust exists in Russian 
organisations, which is highlighted by the fact that all o f  the senior managers when 
asked if they minded the use o f a tape recorder during interviews rejected it outright.
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9.4 Limitations
This study has several limitations.
The first limitation is related to the sample. The interviews with the senior managers 
o f the IJV were essential as they make the major decisions about a venture’s work and 
development. The senior managers have busy schedules and arranging a 1, or a 2 hour 
interview takes a long time. Large distances between cities in Russia, and the travel 
requirements, made the time limit even more problematic. A larger sample of IJVs in 
Russia would have been preferable, but the time limit o f  a thesis and the difficulty of 
obtaining the agreement o f Russian based senior managers for interview necessarily 
restricted the research to a small sample.
The comparison o f organisational cultures o f IJV in Russia would have been aided by 
interviews with the top managers o f both parent companies. Again, time and 
availability were a significant hurdle, as was the widely spread geographical locations 
o f parent companies.
This research was limited to one country -  Russia. Consequently, the findings have 
limited external validity because o f the culturally specific character of the study.. 
Whilst generalisation o f a case is important because this is how the case is able to 
contribute to theory, care should be exercised in attempting to draw generalisations 
from this research in respect o f other geographical areas The rigour with which a 
particular theory has been established depends on the number o f cases that show 
replication (Rowley, 2002) although in some exceptional circumstances a single case 
can be used a powerful example (Siggelkow, 2007). Single cases can enable the 
creation o f more complicated theories because the researcher can fit theory to the 
many details o f a particular case. In contrast, by doing research in many countries a 
researcher can only apply those relationships replicated across all cases. The potential 
for more richly observed detail is available to a single case because there are fewer 
relationships and the resultant theory is often more generalisable (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). Nevertheless, it would be valuable to explore the research questions
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from this particular study in other emerging and transition economies. This would be 
a valuable topic for future research.
Finally, as Russia is still going through an extensive socioeconomic transition, further 
studies should be repeated at a later date in order to gauge the changing 
environmental, social, and political influences on business and society. A longitudinal 
study would offer a multidimensional view o f evolving business practice, and the 
influence o f more traditional capitalist business practices, in the context of IJV’s and 
transition economies.
9.5 Implications and Recommendations
The findings o f the present study have raised a number of theoretical and practical 
implications. It has also produced a number of recommendations regarding 
organisational culture and its role in IJV performance.
This research recognises that organisational culture is an important factor which can 
influence IJV performance. It shows that similarity o f organisational cultures between 
partner companies is not essential. This research highlights different situations in 
equity and non-equity IJVs in Russia, and the way they operate. Further research 
should distinguish between equity and non-equity IJVs.
Schwartz et al. (2001) have been thought to find universal value dimensions to 
measure culture; however, they have been successful only at certain level of the 
concept. This research highlights that in ECs with a turbulent environment, human 
values may be influenced by the current political, economical, and social 
environment. Many researchers have described Russia as collectivistic country with 
high uncertainty avoidance and high power distance (e.g. Elenkov, 1997, 1998; 
McCarthy et al., 2000). In this case, many Russian senior managers have 
characteristics o f traditional orientation which is similar to the collectivistic 
dimension (Schwartz et al., 2001). Many IJVs in Russia also show high uncertainty 
avoidance by preferring short-term planning. However, in this study there is a group
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of managers with different values and different leadership style. This case shows that 
cultural values and managerial practices must be studied not only at a national level 
but also at a local level.
In addition, this research used a mixed methodology to examine organisational culture 
in IJVs. The use o f quantitative and qualitative methods helped to receive information 
about organisational culture that would have not been evident with the use of each 
methodology independently. A combination o f qualitative and quantitative techniques 
uncovered different aspects o f the organisational culture. Although the quantitative 
analysis identified managerial values and practices, the qualitative analysis helped to 
get at the underlying reasons for these. Thus, the use o f mixed methods created a 
deeper understanding o f the organisational culture.
This research has meaningful implications for both the managers of IJVs and the 
managers o f partner companies. Interviews with the senior managers show that many 
managers think that organisational culture is something an organisation has. They see 
organisational culture through the set o f written rules and regulations described in an 
organisational charter. Organisational culture is an important factor in IJV 
performance and a foreign partner may contribute a lot by providing the necessary 
training for managers and employees o f IJVs, the training should include 
organisational culture as well as the different managerial styles and practices.
Foreign managers should take into account the different managerial practices of the 
managers in Russia as well as the influence o f political, economical, and social 
environment on managerial style and behaviour. Many Russian managers have an 
autocratic style and they prefer to make all the major decisions without consulting 
their subordinates. However, this research shows that there are different cultural 
groups in Russia and many managers have cultural values similar to those in the West. 
In determining appropriate managerial practices and values, the IJV partners would 
benefit from pre-opening trainings by examining the culture of the region and the 
managers who are going to lead an IJV.
This research highlights the fact that foreign influence has a positive impact on IJVs 
in Russia. Foreign partners should try to create an organisational culture in an IJV
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which is more similar to their own by providing the necessary training for managers 
and employees in the IJV, developing better communication processes inside a 
company, and introducing market-oriented strategies, production management, 
international finance, human resource management, and organisational development.
"Leaders are the guardians o f  the culture o f  the organisation, the silent values, 
beliefs, and norms o f  behaviour that make the organisation unique. One o f  the central 
tasks is to create and maintain a corporate culture whose values support the 
organisation's central goals ” (Kets de Vries, 2000: 78). Many IJVs in Russia do not 
have clearly stated goals and values. Russian managers need to develop a vision -  the 
primary reason for the venture’s existence. They then need to educate their staff about 
what that vision is and why it is important. By sharing, communicating and 
reinforcing this vision to employees the managers will create a better group identity 
where everyone will feel involved in the process o f IJV development.
Finally, many senior managers referred to trust as one of the most important factors in 
IJV success. In Russia, due to historical reasons, there is lack o f trust within 
organisations. Low levels of trust between IJVs and partners can be a source of 
conflict and even IJV dissolution (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Also, lack of trust 
stifles communication processes and information sharing (Lane et al., 2001), as well 
as planning and coordination (Simpson and Mayo, 1997). Building trust with the 
managers o f an IJV is essential.
9.6 Further Research
There are several topics for further research emerging from this thesis.
It is recommended that future research should include longitudinal studies that 
investigate organisational culture in IJVs over a period of time. This is because 
relationships may change between partners over time, and a learning process may 
occur.
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A further study may consider using quantitative and qualitative methods, and include 
more IJVs in Russia and their parent companies. The scale o f the study could be 
extended and include other transition economies in order to gain a more holistic 
picture o f ECs. Repetition o f the current study in other ECs may classify more 
common trends in IJVs in these economies.
This research domain could expand and use different value and practices models. The 
role of women executives and their influence on organisational culture in Russia 
could profitably be explored. Finally, trust is seen as a very important factor by the 
majority of senior managers in Russia, and future research should examine the role of 
trust in IJV performance in Russia or other transition economies.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Letter to IJVs in Russia
Cardiff Business School 
Aberconway Building 
Colum Drive 
Cardiff, CF10 3EU 
United Kingdom
/DATE/
Dear [Mr./Mrs./Miss/Ms ]
I am a PhD student at Cardiff University -  one o f the UK’s premier research institutions. I am 
conducting research about International Joint Ventures (IJVs) in Russia. The main issue of 
this research is to investigate how differences in organisational cultures of IJV partners 
influence IJV success or failure. There is a little information and research on organisational 
culture in IJVs in Russia. Your views and experience as the managers of IJVs are very 
important and will greatly contribute to this study.
I would be grateful if you or any o f your colleagues could help me with my research. It would 
be a great help if you could fill in 2 questionnaires and send them back to 
kobem vuke@ cf.ac.uk  or by fax +7 3422 111111. It will take approximately 5-7 minutes of 
your time. The aim o f these questionnaires is to examine values and practices of IJV 
managers. You can find questionnaires in the Word files which are attached below.
I would also greatly appreciate if you agree to give an interview and answer some questions 
about organisational culture o f your IJV. If so, please indicate convenient dates and times.
The information you provide is strictly confidential. While your responses will be analysed 
for this study, your identity and the identity o f the firm you represent will not be disclosed.
I would be pleased to offer you a summary o f the results once it is completed, to thank you for 
helping with the research.
Thank you in advance for your help at this busy time.
Yours sincerely, Supervisor:
Elena Kobernyuk Dr Tony Ellson
E-mail: kobernvuke@ cf.ac.uk Email: ellsonti@ cf.ac.uk
Mob: +44 7717 01 4500 (UK) Tel: +44 (0)29 2087 5195 (UK)
Tel/Fax: +7 3422 111111 (Russia) Fax: +44 (0)29 2087 4419 (UK)
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire 1
Ca r d iff
UNIVERSITY
P R lE vS C G l
Q* Rpvg>
This questionnaire represents 12 cultural values. Please rate how important each o f 
these is as a guiding principle in YOUR life. Mark the appropriate box (use “x” or 
highlight a figure) according to the scale below.
1 -  unimportant 2 -  a little important 3 -  o f  moderate importance 4 -  quite 
important 5 -  extremely important
1 A w orld at peace (free o f  war and conflict) 1 2 3 4 5
2 Social justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak) 1 2 3 4 5
3 Equality (equal opportunity for all) 1 2 3 4 5
4 A v aried life (filled with challenge, novelty, and change) 1 2 3 4 5
5 An exciting life (stimulating experiences) 1 2 3 4 5
6 Curiosity (interested in everything, exploring) 1 2 3 4 5
7 Authority (the right to lead or command) 1 2 3 4 5
8 Influence (having an impact on people and events) 1 2 3 4 5
9 Wealth (material possession, money) 1 2 3 4 5
10 Honouring parents and elders (showing respect) 1 2 3 4 5
11 Family security (safety for loved ones) 1 2 3 4 5
12 Self-discipline (self-restraint, resistance to temptation) 1 2 3 4 5
Thank you very much for your cooperation!
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Rules orientation
1 -  never, 2 -  seldom, 3 -  sometimes, 4 -  usually, 5 -  always
How often...
13. Are instructions written down?
1 2 3 4 5
14. Are jobs performed according to defined procedures?
1 2 3 4 5
15. Does management follow the rules themselves?
1 2 3 4 5
Goal orientation
1 -  never, 2 -  seldom, 3 -  sometimes, 4 -  usually, 5 -  always
How often...
16. Is competitiveness in relation to other organisations measured?
1 2 3 4 5
17. Is individual appraisal directly related to the attainment of goals?
1 2 3 4 5
18. Does management specify the targets to be attained?
1 2 3 4 5
19. Is it clear how performance will be evaluated?
1 2 3 4 5
20. Are the hard criteria against which job performance is measured?
1 2 3 4 5
21. Is reward dependent on performance?
1 2 3 4 5
How old are you? What is your gender?
1. 25 years old or less 1. Male
2. 26-35 years old 2. Female
3. 36-45 years old
4. 46-55 years old
5. 56 years or over
What is your educational level?
1. BSc (including undergraduate or specialist diploma in Russia)
2. Masters degree (postgraduate or magistrate programme)
3. PhD
What is the subject of your education?
1. Business (e.g. management, economics, or accounting)
2. Other. Please, specify_______ _________________
Thank you very much for vour cooperation!
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide*
Explain the purpose o f  this study. Explain the confidentiality is ensured unless the IJV  
senior manager explicitly gives permission fo r  his/her name and the name o f  IJV to be 
used.
Ask respondents and complete the following sections:
Name and job title
The name o f the IJV
Year the IJV was formed
Name, country and percentage of Parent 1
ownership of the IJV’s parent firms, at
the time the IJV was formed Parent 2
Date
1. What are the main reasons that your IJV was formed?
• What were the reasons of the Russian parent?
• What were the reasons of the foreign parent?
2. Could you describe the main goals o f your IJV.
3. How would you describe your IJV’s organisational culture?
4. Is your IJV’s organisational culture similar to your Russian parent organisational 
culture?
• In what ways is it similar/different?
5. Is your IJV’s organisational culture similar to your foreign parent organisational 
culture?
• In what ways is it similar/different?
This is an interview guide. These questions m ay be m odified or changed depending on 
situation and respondents’ answers.
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6 . Some people suggest that differences in organisational cultures lead to conflicts 
and dissolution of IJVs. Do you think differences in organisational cultures can cause 
IJV’s dissolution?
• Do you think that these differences are substantial? (If no, why?)
7. How dissimilar are your IJV and your partner organisations in the ways you make 
decisions and perform work?
Ask the following i f  it has not mentioned in the answer fo r  the question 7.
Do the following differences make collaboration difficult?
• Different speeds or styles of decision making?
• Different pace and rhythm of planning?
• Different ways of handling data?
8 . Are your managers comfortable with the level of interaction with their partners (or 
is it too little or too much)?
9. How is communication between the partners managed?
• What channels and vehicles are used to communicate with your IJV’s 
partners?
10. Do all partners make similar contribution to the IJV in terms of planning and goal 
settings?
11. If a conflict/problem occurs between IJV and partners, how would you describe 
management attitude towards a conflict between your IJV and partners?
12. Does your IJV have an external communication strategy or programme?
13. Would you call your IJV successful? (If no, why? If yes, ask about partners’ 
objectives and goals).
14. What recommendations would you give to foreign managers who are going to 
set up an IJV in Russia?
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A ppend ix  5: C lu s te r  A nalysis (Q u estio n n a ire
Color Key
1 ■ ^
1 2 3 4 5
Value
Colour Key: black = male, red = female
Value Key: FamSecurity -  family security
HonParents -  honouring parents and elders
Curiosity -  curiosity
Discipline -  self-discipline
Justice -  social justice
Peace -  a world at peace
Authority -  authority
Influence -  influence
Equality -  equality
Wealth -  wealth
ExcitL -  an exciting life
VarL -  a varied life
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A ppend ix  6: C lu s te r  A nalysis (Q u estio n n a ire  2)
Color Key
Value
f t
Colour Key: black = business education, red = other subjects
Practices Key:
innovation3 -  how often do unpredictable elements in the market environment present good opportunities? 
support2 -  how many people who wish to advance are supported by their supervisors? 
support3 -  how often is constructive criticism accepted?
support4 -  how often do managers express concern about employees’ personal problems? 
support 1 -  how many people with personal problems are helped? 
innovation2 -  how often is there a lot of investment in new products? 
innovation6 -  how often does the organisation search for new products/services?
innovation5 -  how often does the company makes the best use of the employee skills to develop better products/services?
innovation4 -  how often does the organisation search for new opportunities in the external environment?
innovation 1 -  how often does your organisation search for new markets for existing products/services?
rules3 -  how often does management follow the rules themselves?
rules 1 -  how often are instructions written down?
rules2 -  how often are jobs performed according to defined procedures?
support6 -  how often do management practices allow freedom in work?
support5 -  how often are new ideas about work organisation encouraged?
goall -  how often is competitiveness in relation to other organizations measured?
goal5 -  how often are the hard criteria against which job performance is measured?
goal6 -  how often is reward dependent on performance?
goal4 -  how often is it clear how performance will be evaluated?
goal2 -  how often is individual appraisal directly related to the attainment of goals?
goal3 -  how often does management specify the targets to be attained?
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